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Definitions Meaning
avWTP Average of individual willingness to pay calculated between maximal and
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BDM Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism.
Cummatti Cummulated attitude of individual i in the ﬁve experimental rounds.
Cummattj Cummulated attitude of individual j in the ﬁve experimental rounds.
DM Decision Maker.
H&L Holt and Laury test.
maxWTP Maximal amount of money that individuals want to expend in the choco-
late bar.
minWTP Minimal amount of money that individuals want to expend in the choco-
late bar.
Stdv Standard deviation of the WTP-Range.
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WTP -Range Interval expressing the diﬀerence between maximal WTP and minimal
WTP.
Symbol Meaning
β Individual’s ability to adapt consumption in time.
κ Factor of external noise.
λ Factor of strength of preferences.
σsi Internal learning states s of individual i.
σij Sensory experience of the individual i stored in the position j of individ-
ual’s memory.
ζ Adjust speed of habits to consumption of new goods.
ai Attitude of individual i
aj Attitude of individual j.
A˜i Tendency to attitude change of individual i.
Ai Attitude Change of Individual i.
Aj Social interdependence factor accounted by attitude of neighbors.
Bi Budget of Individual i
cs Consume Stock.
Fτ,s is the impulse that triggers the corresponding internal state s at a given
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hs Habit Stock.
ht Habit Stock at time t.
IA,i Shannon information entropy of the internal attitude A of individual i.
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Li Learning function of individual i.
Lo Lottery
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R1 First Experimental Round.
R2 Second Experimental Round.
R3 Third Experimental Round.
R4 Fourth Experimental Round.
R5 Fifth Experimental Round.
StdvTn Dummy variable of the n-th treatment in the regressions of the standard
deviation of WTP-Range.
T1 Control Treatment.
T2 Second Experimental Treatment
T3 Third Experimental Treatment
T4 Fourth Experimental Treatment
Ui Utility of Individual i
z Market Price
1. Introduction
Human cognition is related to several processes in the brain that deal with functions
like attention, memory, and other complex tasks, and is continuously adapting to
face challenging physical and social environments. The way in which information is
processed inﬂuences the formation and evolution of individual preferences. The de-
cisions that we make are the result of combining and analyzing acquired information
within a determined period of time.
But human beings do not only accumulate factual information in their memories.
As Kandel et al. (2000, p.1007) express it: ‘Pleasure is unquestionably a key factor
in controlling the motivated behaviors of humans’. For economists, the interesting
question is then about the properties of the evolutionary optimal reward system, and
how these properties adapt to the environment in which individuals make choices.
Indeed, human beings make decisions not only under the rationality of facts, but
also againts the backdrop of pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences accumulated along
our lives.
1.1. The Problem
A purchase decision confronts subjects with a variety of potential challenges that
concerns mental processes before and within the decision process self. An individual
is busy becoming aware of the need of a new product and the availability of it,
collecting information about attributes and alternatives, trying to remember past
experiences and considering all the possible outcomes depending on the decision (
1
Peter and Olson, 1993; Slovic et al., 1988). After structuring the decision problem,
the consumer processes the acquired information, chooses a preferred course of action
and implements the decisions at the appropriate opportunity.1 Finally, consumers
can use feedback resulting from this purchase to re-evaluate their decisions, perhaps
reversing it by returning the purchased product to the store. All this accumulated
information remains available for future purchase decisions. The central problem
is therefore: how are cognitive processes and environment aﬀecting the ability of
individuals to make purchase decisions?
The central goal of this work is to show that the ability of an individual to make
the best decision vastly depends on the information available about the object of
choice, the sensory experience within the human memories, and on the diversity
of opinions that the individual draws upon. If individuals are able to easily access
the aforementioned factors, the preference uncertainty at the moment of choosing
is likely to decrease. This, in turn, improves the level of ex-post satisfaction with
the individual choice. By means of laboratory experiments, we want to study how
incoming information from sensory experiences is applied eﬀectively to solve prefer-
ence uncertainties with regard to a speciﬁc consumer good and to make an optimal
choice in terms of their endogenously formed preferences.
Economics and psychology have a diﬀering point of view when it comes to the
individual valuation of goods and things. Neoclassical tradition deﬁnes a rational in-
dividual as an individual which is able to choose according with her well-established
preferences obeying logical rules which have been formalized in consumer theory and
in models of decision making under risk and uncertainty (see Section 2.1). In order
to attain the higher utility level by choices, individuals require to accurately valuate
the object of choice.This is approached as soon as the complete information about
this object is available.
But Psychology is not congenial with the idea of rational decision making; more
speciﬁcally with the idea that a logic of rational choice can serve double duty as a
1For reasons of clarity, the feminine form has been used throughout, the masculine is always also implied.
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model of actual decision behavior. Many research works have been devoted to illus-
trate how individuals violate the logic of the economic model, i.e., that individuals
fulﬁlled all the requirements stipulated by neoclassical economics. The implication is
that people do not have preferences in the sense used by economic theory (Fishhoﬀ,
1991; Slovic, 1995; Payne et al., 1992). Therefore, if preferences cannot be exactly
deﬁned as required in the economic model, an alternative should be introduced.
Indeed, the capacity of the human mind to solve decision-making problems in
general, and to deal with large amounts of information is strikingly limited (Simon,
1955; 1986). In a wide range of judgment problems, such as medical diagnosis,
people are typically not better than, or outperformed by simple linear regressions
or even simple methods called ’rules of thumb’ or ’heuristics’ (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999). Moreover, people exhibit large and systematic biases in dealing with complex
decisions. For instance, according to Stewart et al. (2003), even trading-oﬀ two or
more factors in a decision about risk and return seems to overload the cognitive
system.
In this work, we address the problem of introducing additional information within
a decision-making process about a consumption good. Additionally, we analyze how
attitudes toward the object of choice could change in time by giving additional in-
formation within the decision-making process generating preference uncertainties.
Furthermore, we added a second informational source by allowing that individuals
discuss their preferences via a chat interface. The major components of this the-
sis focus on the acquisition of information from the environment, i.e., by sensory
experiences.
The common approaches to practical preference elicitation (e.g., conjoint analy-
sis, analytic hierarchy process (Saaty, 1980), pricing out (Clemen, 1996), and other
elicitation techniques (Fishburn, 1967) assume that preferences are separable, or ad-
ditive, meaning that the value of one attribute does not aﬀect preferences over the
other. This is particularly the case in practical systems that require preference elic-
itation. In contrast, real preferences, as those obtained from experimental settings,
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are rarely unconditional. Often, the value of one attribute or objective depends on
the availability or the value of another objective.2 That is the reason to introduce
a mechanism to incentivize individual preferences in a more reliable fashion (see
Section 5.4).
The model and experiment presented in this thesis relate to and extend previous
research on information aggregation. More precisely, this work is concerned with
the ability of individuals to extract information from sensory experience, to process
it, and to choose accordingly, while most of the existing literature is concerned
with the institutions that serve to accumulate individual knowledge. For example,
many theoretical and experimental papers have considered the capability of auctions
and other market institutions to aggregate private information through the price
mechanism (Hellwig, 1980; Plott and Sunder, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990;
Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 1997, 2000).
Other papers have looked at the process by which individuals use information
to make decisions. However, most of the literature has been concerned with issues
relating to sequential decision making or herding, and has used simple stimuli such
as the urn-ball design3 (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Goeree et al., 2007; Kraemer et
al., 2006). A further set of papers has examined how individual voters search and
aggregate relevant information to make decisions (Lohmann, 1994; Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997; Piketty, 1999).
2This claim is supported by evidence from behavioral economics in reference to decision under uncertainty (Von
Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986).
3In the original experiment by Anderson and Holt (1997) this setup was implemented by putting balls labeled
‘a’ or ‘b’ in two separated urns labeled A and B, with three labeled balls in each. Urn A contained two balls ‘a’ and
one ball ‘b’, whereas urn B contained two balls ‘b’ and one ball ‘a’. The urns were equally likely to be chosen by
the throw of a fair six-sided die. A throw of 1, 2, or 3 determined that urn A would be used for the draws, and a
throw of 4, 5, or 6 determined that urn B would be used. Hence, each of the 6 balls was ex ante equally likely to be
drawn. Since 2 of the 3 balls labeled ‘a’ were in urn A, the posterior probability of event A given signal ‘a’ is 2/3.
Similarly, the posterior probability of event A given signal ‘b’ is 1/3. The balls were actually identified by a ‘light’
or ‘dark’ color, instead of being labeled by letters.
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1.2. Research Questions
This project gradually introduces new sensory experiences with regard to a speciﬁc
consumption good: a 100 gr chocolate bar with 70% cocoa.4
Figure 1.1.: Chocolate (70% cocoa) used in the experiments that has been provided by Lindt
This carefully designed laboratory experiment helps to observe how the process
of decision making under uncertainty is inﬂuenced by systematically added new
information. Basically, two aspects of the process of decision making are investi-
gated: individual heterogeneity in processing newly acquired information, and the
information role in overcoming uncertainty at the moment of making choices. The
design of the experiment makes it possible to test a series of hypotheses relating to
how eﬀectively subjects use information in solving decision problems (see Section
6.2). In order to explain the inﬂuence of habit formation and social learning within
4The chocolate used in this experiment was donated by the company Lindt, located in Aachen, Germany.
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the preference formation process, this project mainly seeks to solve the following
questions:
1. How is the sequential process of information collection linked to the process
of preference formation?
2. Once preferences have been formed, how do individual preferences change when
new information is aggregated?
3. How do attitudes operates in order to modulate decision-making processes?
Since human beings do not live and make decisions in isolation, they also depend
on the inﬂuence exerting by social interaction on the decision-making process. Social
learning is done in situations where contact with neighbors is unavoidable. The
interdependence of preferences introduces a kind of bias in the decision-makers’
behavior, forcing them to instinctively act in a diﬀerent manner than they otherwise
would if there was not any social interaction. In the second part of this research the
following questions will be solved:
1. Does social inﬂuence (in terms of direct sharing of information and attitudes
toward objects among individuals) decrease the heterogeneity of individual
preferences?
2. Does that mean that individuals are achieving higher satisfaction levels by
making choices based solely on their own preferences or by combining intrin-
sic and collective preferences? (According to Herbert Simon (1955, 1986),
‘satisfying behavior ’ is the core of a decision-making model).
We expected that interpersonal exchange and social learning processes could al-
leviate individual heterogeneity, allowing the formation of consumption trends.
There are also a couple of more general but complementary questions that need
to be solved with this project: Does learning (in the form of acquisition of new
6
information) limit our choice capacities? Or does learning have a positive eﬀect on
reaching the desired (targeted) satisfaction level?
Since the main component of individual communication is the attitude of indi-
viduals toward the incoming information, we develop a model of individual decision
making by introducing attitudes in the individual utility function (see Section 6.1.1).
Our intention is to introduce psychological aspects of individual behavior into eco-
nomic theory by assuming that the decision that individuals made are strongly
motivated by their individual attitude. Additionally, we explore how an individual’s
own attitudes redounds upon neighboring individuals and therefore could introduce
changes in their utility functions. We made this by observing the inﬂuence of neigh-
bors’ attitudes in the stated individual WTP.
With these purposes, we designed an economic experiment divided into four ex-
perimental treatments, where diﬀerences in the amount and sources of additional
information were introduced. In T1, our benchmark treatment, individuals, after
each experimental round have been asked to state their WTP by themselves. For
the other three treatments (T2, T3, and T4) our subjects were able to exchange
their attitudes after each round via a chat interface. In T2 our subjects exchanged
attitudes toward the chocolate with a ﬁxed partner. In T3 individuals were assigned
to a new partner for each experimental round and in T4 each individual was assigned
to four partners which remained ﬁxed for the ﬁve rounds.
The individuals were randomly assigned to groups and the exchange was con-
ducted anonymously. After we had disentangled the messages exchanged by chat,
individual attitudes were measured by a Likert’s like scale (for a better explanation
of this methodology see Chapter 3) indicating signs and intensities. Our scale ran
from -2 to 2, where -2 meaning very negative and 2 very positive attitudes toward
the chocolate after sensory experience. In order to achieve our goal to incentivize
individuals to elucidate their real preferences, we made use of a re-designed Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (1964). Risk attitude was tested following the methodology
proposed by Holt and Laury (2002).
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In research studies involving food products, the willingness to pay is evaluated
using basic purchase intent questions through simple consumer surveys (for instance
Bower et al., 2003; Magnusson et al., 2003) as well as experimental Vickrey auc-
tions with consumers bidding real money to elicit their actual WTP (Lange et al.,
2002; Stefani et al., 2006, among others). As will be explained below, the current
study combines a reformulated BDM mechanism (see Section 5.4) with individual
risk attitudes to elicit individual preferences tuned by direct external inﬂuences as
sensory experiences and information exchange with a partner (or with the members
of a group).
The limited utilization of combined economic and sensory approaches in studies
regarding the individual willingness to pay (hereafter WTP) for food to this date is
perhaps surprising, given the obvious importance of sensory experience in repeated
consumer choices. Moreover, consumer studies frequently use demographic variables
to proxy for underlying diﬀerences in preferences 5.
Experiments of this kind with food such as yogurt and coﬀee have been carried out
before (Kahneman and Snell, 1992; Menges, 1996). The present research attempts
to expand on the ﬁndings of these studies by introducing information exchange.
In other words, it gives individuals an opportunity to exchange their impressions
and attitudes with regards to the object of choice, before making a ﬁnal decision.
Although the decisions are still made individually, the subjects also have access to
personal opinions from other participants before having to make a decision. This
additional information may either increase or decrease the individual uncertainty
when making a decision, and may also raise or reduce individual satisfaction level
after the decision is made. Until the present time, the extent of the inﬂuence of this
information exchange was not explicitly investigated experimentally.
Our experiment was designed in four parts: In the ﬁrst part we asked the partici-
5In the case of the evaluation of sensory attributes, there are well established methodological tool boxes for
assessing preferences at an individual level as well as quantifying sensory characteristics. But the use of sensory
experiences to elicit individual preferences will help to reduce the hypothetical bias that often accompanies such
studies. The use of these methods to measure the individual WTP and its changes over time would therefore have
both theoretical and practical appeals
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pants for their habits, general knowledge and attitudes towards chocolate. This was
done to observe the inﬂuence of new information upon the preexisting situation. In
the second part, individuals received information in ﬁve steps, each step involving
one of the ﬁve human senses, allowing a real interaction with other participants to
interact closely with the product. After each step, new information was processed
and individuals were asked to determine an interval reﬂecting their WTP (maximal
and minimal) for the chocolate bar (100 gr). This interval allowed us to identify the
preference uncertainty of our participants. No price was given to the participants;
it was determined along with the information aggregation process.
To incentivize our participants to reveal their prefererences in a truthful manner,
we applied a variant of the Becker-DeGroot- Marschak mechanism (BDM) that
will be explained in section 5.4. The third part tested for individual risk attitudes
by means of lotteries and the outcomes were chosen following the methodology
introduced by Laury and Holt (2002). In the last part of the experiment, subjects
ﬁlled out a questionnaire designed to elicit their risk preferences (see Section 6.3.3
for a more detailed description of the experiment). By reformulating the BDM
mechanism we ensured enough incentives to reveal preferences and by testing the
risk attitudes we are able to approach the individual behavior in our uncertain
scenario, since information permanently change the environment where individual
decisions are made.
In this project, WTP is implemented to reveal individual preferences, i.e., to
better approach the preferences’ dynamic in a scenario where new information is
aggregated. In order to account for individual uncertainty, the experimental design
allowed the participants to choose a WTP-interval with the boundaries being ex-
pressed as minimal and maximal WTP. This fact is explained in detail in Section 5.4.
The results showed a high level of heterogeneity in the way our subjects were pro-
cessing information. Regarding uncertainty, we found that subjects increased their
uncertainty level, showing a drift in the probability distribution of their answers.
This last result reveals a biased individual calculation capacity raising uncertainty
9
levels from one round to the next.
1.3. Outline
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present a literature overview
of the psychological and economical approaches to this problem and introduce the
theoretical frame to handle our research problem. Chapter 2 explores individual
decision-making and problems of information processing. The chapter begins by in-
troducing the neoclassical approach to solve individual decision-making problems. In
this approach is required to simplify human subjects to be mathematically modeled
as optimal consumers. This oversimpliﬁcation is exacerbated by the poor capacity
of individuals to assimilate new environmental inputs (Simon, 1955), challenging the
neoclassical concept. By this reason the neoclasical school cannot solve the dilemma
faced by buyers at the moment of choosing (the most popular examples of violations
to neoclassical theory are Bernoulli (1798) and Allais (1953)).
Chapter 3 presents a review of the role played by attitudes for preference forma-
tion, mainly from a psychological point of view, placing emphasis on the economic
consequences of attitude formation and attitude change along the process of prefer-
ence formation. This chapter clariﬁes the relevance of the study of attitudes as an
element that modulates individual behavior within the decision process. Chapter 4
is devoted to introducing human information processing, cognition and perception
being core elements of this process. Naturally, these two strongly linked abilities
map the environment in which the individual behaves within an objective context.
Memories from prior experiences are perceived and recognized in order to select the
pertinent information at the moment of choice and help individuals to improve their
personal satisfaction.
The following four chapters describe the applied methodology to solve the research
questions, the obtained data and its analysis, and the experimental ﬁndings aimed
to prove the validity of our hypotheses. This part begins with Chapter 5 with a
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detailed description of the methodological issues to be applied in the experimental
design. In Chapter 6, the experimental design is presented. The chapter begins
with a description of the hypotheses that support the mathematical models and
the models themselves are presented. Then, it describes the experimental design
used to solve the research questions. Chapter 7 presents the experimental results
testing the proposed hypotheses and Chapter 8 concludes the study by discussing
the experimental ﬁndings.
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2. Consumer Behavior: Normative
Decision Theory and Decisions
Individual decision making is in the center of microeconomic theory. The under-
standing of the process, which leads to a decision or a best alternative from a ﬁnite
set of possible alternatives, forms the basis of decision theory. In order to better un-
derstand individual behavior, economists have proposed several reﬁned models able
to describe this process. This chapter is aimed to summarize the main approaches
to decision making applied in economic theory.
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, we make a short introduction
to neoclassical decision theory and its basic axioms. The concern here is not only to
summarize decision theory as a set of axioms prior to the process of decision making,
but particularly the phenomenon of decision making itself. In the second section, we
make a brief summary of Stochastic Choice and Random Utility theory, developed
as alternative theoretical approaches aimed to overcome the problems faced by in-
troduce uncertainty in the neoclasical economic models. As introduced in Chapter
1, individual choice is made in uncertain environments that cannot be completely
described by means of Expected Utility theory, and Models of Stochastic Choice and
Random Utility have been formulated as an attempt to better approximate individ-
ual behavior in risky environments. The ideas consigned in such models will be used
as a basis to formulate a mathematical model to describe individual behavior in our
experimental setting. The third section discusses the pertinence and applicability
of theory and models summarized in Section 2.1 and 2.2.
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2.1. Neoclassical Decision Theory
Individual consumption behavior analyzes what consumers buy and for what reasons
they do buy certain goods or services. Its study is of particular importance because
the demand and price of a product depend on the individual’s preferences (needs,
beliefs and expectations). Theories on individual consumption behavior concentrate
on how individuals determine to maximize the enjoyment (utility) from their pur-
chased good/service. For example, if the price of good x1 increases, consumers will
buy less of x1 because it is more expensive for them, with the result that the same
consumption level of x1 yields less utility. On the other hand, if the price of good x1
decreases, then consumers will buy more, raising their utility level. Individual con-
sumption behavior is the interaction between price change and consumer demand
and what inﬂuenced the consumers to purchase the product, taking other factors,
such as budget constraints, into consideration.
The ﬁrst mathematical approach to understand individual consumption behavior,
the so-called Neoclassical Economics, has been formally introduced in the 19th Cen-
tury by Marshall and his scholars. The ambition of the ﬁrst neoclassicists was to
mathematically formalize the subject’s behavior to facilitate calculations of earnings
and losses after decision processes. Due to individual behavior attempts to maxi-
mize outcomes, the calculus was introduced in the marginalist revolution as a tool
to predict individual choices and outcomes. The two main components of consumer
theory are individual preferences and utility, and the budget constraint. These fac-
tors are needed to derive a demand curve, more speciﬁcally the marshallian demand
curve, aimed to depict individual preferences at a given time.
The ﬁeld of economics studies human behavior as a relationship between ends
and scarce means that have alternative uses. Neoclassical economics pursues this
study by means of supply and demand models that determine prices based on the
subjective preferences of producers and consumers. Neoclassical economics relies on
subjective preferences for determining prices in order to escape from the objective
value theory of classical economics, according to which the value of goods could be
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established by reference to some basic commodities or the labor input required to
produce a good. Neoclassicists hoped that by introducing formal mathematical tools
to obtain objective values, Economics could be placed on a more scientiﬁc basis as
an essentially descriptive and predictive theory of human behavior. In neoclassical
economics, decision theory is developed with a purely axiomatic method (see Section
2.1.2). The theory proceeds by ﬁrst deﬁning a set of possible choices that the decision
maker faces. Then, the decision maker selects one of these options. The observed
data are pairs of choices oﬀered and decisions that are made regarding the set of
these possible choices.
2.1.1. Expected Utility Theory
The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) states that the decision maker (DM) chooses
between risky or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values,
i.e., the weighted sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied
by their respective probabilities. The expected utility model (EU) is the oldest
decision model, and its central ideas date back to the 17th century. The history
of EUT is constructed in terms of the principle of maximizing expected monetary
values. It was ﬁrst conceived by mathematicians (Pascal, 1670; Bernoulli, 1798) to
help wealthy people to choose among diﬀerent gambling options. It is interesting to
note just how many thinkers have contributed to it, and at the same time to realize
that the earliest statements of the theory were the most powerful ones and were
followed by weaker conceptions. It just took the ﬁeld of economics a surprisingly
long time to grasp its full potential.
EUT consists of two components. The ﬁrst is that people use or should use
the expected value of the utility of diﬀerent possible outcomes of their choices as a
guide to make decisions. This component goes back to Pascal (1670). The second
component is the idea or insight that more of the same creates additional utility
only with a decreasing rate. This assumption of decreasing marginal utility plays a
central role in economics in general.
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This simple decision rule is the most important question in decision theory. But
ﬁrst, what is the meaning of the utility numbers referred to in the formula, do
they belong to the same value scale as do the numbers that represent the DM’s
choices under uncertainty? Second, is the weighting sum procedure of combining
probabilities and values the only one to be considered at the moment of choice?
Should it be taken for granted that the DM relies on probability values without
taking other things of theoretical constructions into account (the probabilities are
exogenously given and are not explicitly part of the DM problem)?
From these questions, we can distinguish two theoretical versions aimed to solve
the problem: the Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) regarding uncertainty
and the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory (VNMT) in the case of risk. The basis
and axiomatic structure of EUT can be used both as a positive and normative (or
prescriptive) theory.
However, there are a couple of problems when trying to generalize the EUT to
non-additive or non-probabilistic decision theories. The most notable examples are
Bernoulli’s (1798) resolution of the St. Petersburg paradox, and Allais’s (1953)
invention of a rather provoking problem referred to as Allais’s paradox. Both express
strong violations of rational thinking by decision making.
In the St. Petersburg proposition, people were asked how much they would pay
for a prospect as follows: by tossing a fair coin, if tails comes out of the ﬁrst toss, the
game will stop and in this case, you receive nothing. In the complementary case, you
receive two guilders and stay in the game. Also, if tails comes out of the second toss
of the coin, then you receive nothing and stop the game, and in its complementary
case you receive four guilders and stay in the game; and so on ad infinitum. The
expected utility value of this prospect is
∑
n 2
n · 1
2n
=∞. Since people always stop
after only few steps, they are setting a set of deﬁnite, possibly quite smaller upper
values, on the St. Petersburg prospect, and as a consequence they are not pricing it
in terms of its expected monetary value. Bernoulli’s hypothesis counts as the ﬁrst
experiment in EUT theory.
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Two centuries later, Maurice Allais (1953) questioned the naturalness of EU-based
choices by proposing the following questionnaire:
Question 1. Which prospect would you choose of :
• x1= to receive 100 million FF with probability 1, and
• y1= to receive 500 million FF with probability 0.10, 100 million FF with
probability 0.89, and nothing with probability 0.01.
Question 2. Which prospect would you choose of :
• x2 = to receive 100 million FF with probability 0.11, and nothing with prob-
ability 0.89, and
• y2 = to receive 500 million FF with probabilty 0.10, and nothing with proba-
bility 0.90.
Allais found that the answers that were given the most were x1 to question 1 and
y2 to question 2. He argues that, although these prospects could be chosen by good
reasons, they violate EUT since there is no function U that would satisfy both:
U(100) >
10
100
· U(500) +
89
100
· U(100) +
1
100
· U(0), (2.1)
and
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100
· U(100) +
89
100
· U(0) >
10
100
· U(500) +
90
100
· U(0). (2.2)
The Allais Paradox, as Allais called it (though it is not really a paradox) was one of
the ﬁrst conﬂicts between decision theory and human reasoning to be experimentally
exposed.
The theoretical inﬂuence of the EU theory seems to have had a long-lasting in-
ﬂuence until 1944, when von Neumann-Morgenstern chose to determine the utility
value of a randomized strategy in this mathematically convenient way. Not only is
current game theory still heavily dependent on EU calculations, but its inﬂuence
is also conﬁrmed by the microeconomics of imperfect information. A fundamental
result in decision theory, according to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947,) is
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that subjects having preferences, that satisfy the axioms in Section 2.1.2, behave as
if they had a simple numerical representation of their preferences. More speciﬁcally,
it is a well deﬁned function that associates a single number with a lottery (called
the utility) that can be written as U(x). This function represents the preferences
whenever x1 is preferred to x2, the utility of x1 is larger than the utility of x2, that
is U(x1) > U(x2).
The von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem also states that preference orders satisfy
the axioms presented in Section 2.1.2 only if the numerical representation has a very
simple form, equal to the expectations of the utility of each outcome, according to
some function u(x) of outcomes.
Marschak (1950) and Herstein and Milnor (1953), probe that the EU formula was
derived as the numerical counterpart of a qualitatively deﬁned preference structure
subjected to various axiomatic constrains (see Section 2.1.2). All available axioma-
tizations assume that there is a binary relation ≤ on the Set X of all risky prospects
(also called lotteries), subject to the pre-ordering properties (axioms).
2.1.2. Axioms of Preferences
To fully describe the behavior of a subject, one should in principle list the inﬁnite
set of decisions between an inﬁnite set of possible lotteries. To make this situation
manageable, a set of axioms has been put forward.
Axiom 1 requires that preferences are complete: for every choice between two
bundles of goods, x1 and x2, either x1 is preferred to x2, or x2 is preferred to x1.
The occurrence of both possibilities is not excluded: in this case, the subject is
indiﬀerent between the two bundles. When the subject prefers x1 to x2, but does
not prefer x2 to x1, we say that she strictly prefers x1 to x2.
The preference order  is then written as x1  x2. Formally:
1. Axiom Completeness. For all bundles x1 and x2 we have: Either x1  x2,
x2  x1, or x1 ∼ x2. Without this property, preferences are undeﬁned.
Axiom 2 requires that preferences be transitive: if the decision maker prefers x1
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to x2 and x2 to x3, then she prefers x1 to x3.
2. Axiom Transitivity. For all bundles x1, x2, and x3 we have: If x1  x2 and
x2  x3 then x1  x3.
3. Axiom Continuity. If x1  x2 and x3 lies in a radius r of x2 then, x1  x3.
1
These axioms are central to all the theories because the validity of the theories
using indiﬀerence curves will be aﬀected if these axioms change.
2.1.3. Representation of Preferences
A consumer’s preference ordering can be represented by a (real valued) utility func-
tion u(.) if, for any two bundles x and y, x  y if and only if u(x) > u(y).
A consumer’s preference ordering can be represented by a (continuous) utility
function if and only if the preference ordering is complete, reﬂexive, transitive and
continuous (Debreu, 1954). Furthermore, the preferences can be represented graph-
ically by continuous indiﬀerence curves as represented in Figure 2.1. An indiﬀerence
curve shows the consumption of two diﬀerent goods, and simultaneously gives in-
formation about how much utility it provides and which combinations are possible
between the two goods in order to keep the income constant. Its representation
could be made in a cardinal or in an ordinal fashion.
We are given a preference order which we want to scale to the real numbers. The
map from objects to numbers, which preserves order properties, is called a utility
function.
It is common to additionally assume that:
• More is better (monotonicity). So indiﬀerence curves that are downward slop-
ing, ‘thin’ and all elements of the domain are ‘good’ (marginal utility is posi-
tive).
• Indiﬀerence curves are strictly convex and the solution to the maximisation
1The fourth and last axiom, the Independence Axiom (the so-called VNM independence), is also simple, but
more of a technical nature and can be written as: If x1 = x2 then for any number r ∈ [0, 1] we haver(x1, x3) =
r(x2, x3). This axiom is a new restriction that exploits the special structure of uncertainty.
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problem is unique (utility function is strictly quasi-concave).
• If u(x) is a function representing a consumer’s preferences, any monotonic
transformation of that function will also represent the consumer’s preferences,
for instance, αu(x) + β, log(u(x)), or αu(x), when α > 0. That is, utility
functions are ordinal, not cardinal.
Figure 2.1.: Indifference Curve of Individual i. The individual is indifferent between the bundles
x, y, and z.
2.1.4. Revealed Preferences
In a seminal paper written by Samuelson (1938) he makes an attempt to replace
the accepted ordinal theory of utility by introducing the ﬁrst description of the
concept he later called ‘revealed preferences’. He argues that one ought to analyze
the consumer’s behavior without having recourse to the utility at all because the
concept of utility is not a directly observable phenomenon. Samuelson stated what
has since become known as the ‘Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference’ by writing
‘...if an individual selects batch one over batch two, he does not at the same time
select two over one’ (Samuelson, 1938, p.65).
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In 1948 Samuelson accepted that his theory was only a means of revealing con-
sistent preferences and enhancing the acceptability of the ordinal utility theory by
showing how one could construct an individual’s indiﬀerence map by purely ob-
serving his market behavior. Samuelson concluded his article by saying that ‘[t]he
whole theory of consumer’s behavior can thus be based upon operationally mean-
ingful foundations in terms of revealed preference’ (Samuelson, 1948, p.251). This is
only true if we assume the consumer to be rational and to have unchanging prefer-
ences that are complete, asymmetrical, non-satiated, strictly convex, and transitive
(or continuous). The theory, originally intended as a substitute for the utility theory,
has, as Houthakker clearly notes, ‘tended to become complementary to the latter’
(Houthakker, 1950, p.159).
The correction introduced by Houthakker assured integrability, and by that the
theory had according to Samuelson been ‘brought to a close’ (Samuelson, 1950,
p.355). Starting ‘from a few logical axioms of demand consistency... one could derive
the whole of the valid utility analysis as corollaries’ (Samuelson, 1950, p.370). Since
Samuelson had shown the ‘complete logical equivalence’ of revealed preference theory
with the regular ‘ordinal preference approach’, it follows that ‘in principle there is
nothing to choose between the formulations’ (1953, p.1). According to Houthakker
(1961, p.709), the aim of the revealed preference approach is ‘to formulate equivalent
systems of axioms on preferences and on demand functions.’
Despite all these eﬀorts, ordinal utility theory and revealed preference theory are,
following Wong, ‘not two diﬀerent theories; at best, they are two diﬀerent ways
of expressing the same set of ideas’ (Wong, 2006, p.118). And with regard to the
theoretically solvable problem, we may still concur with Hicks that ‘there is in
practice no direct test of the preference hypothesis’ (Hicks, 1956, p.58). Sippel’s
experiments showed ‘a considerable number of violations of the revealed preference
axioms’ (1997, p.1442) and that from a descriptive point of view - as a theory of
consumer behavior - the revealed preference theory was of a very limited value. Mas-
Collel et al. (1995, p.14) conclude their presentation of the theory by remarking
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that ‘for the special case in which choice is deﬁned for all subsets of X, the set
of alternatives, a theory based on choice satisfying the weak axiom is completely
equivalent to a theory of decision making based on rational preferences.’
When talking of determining people’s preferences through observation, Varian,
for example, has ‘to assume that the preferences will remain unchanged’ and adopts
‘the convention that... the underlying preferences... are known to be strictly con-
vex.’ He further postulates that the ’consumer is an optimizing consumer.’ If we are
‘willing to add more assumptions about consumer preferences, we get more precise
estimates about the shape of indiﬀerence curves’ (Varian, 2006, pp.119-123). Given
these assumptions and that the observed choices satisfy the consistency postulate
as amended by Houthakker, one can always construct preferences that could have
generated the observed choices. This does not, however, prove that the constructed
preferences really generated the observed choices, ‘we can only show that observed
behavior is not inconsistent with the statement. We cannot prove that the economic
model is correct. Kreps shares Varian’s view, pointing to the fact that revealed pref-
erence theory is ‘consistent with the standard preference-based theory of consumer
behavior’ (Kreps, 1990, p.30).
As Syll (2013) pointed out, the utility theorists tried to deduce it from axioms
and postulates on individuals’ economic behavior. Revealed preference theory tried
to build a new theory and to put it in operational terms, but ended up with just
giving a theory logically equivalent to the old one. Further, pondering Amartya
Sen’s verdict of the revealed preference theory as essentially underestimating ’the
fact that man is a social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own
preferences only’ (1982, p.66) and Georgescu-Roegen’s (1966, pp.192-3) description
of an assessment of what the theory accomplished should come as no surprise: ‘...
some economists consider the approach oﬀered by the theory of choice as a great
progress... This is simply an illusion, because even though the postulates of the
theory of choice do not use the terms ‘utility’ or ‘satisfaction’, their discussion and
acceptance require that they should be translated into the other vocabulary.’
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We can only observe the decisions that individuals make, while it is not possible to
directly observe their preferences, or even estimate utilities. However, we interpret
their decisions as a revelation of their preferences. Through economic analysis, it
is possible to ﬁnd out that if an individual makes a choice, the chosen option will
be qualiﬁed as the preferred option over other alternatives. Since the language of
revealed preferences appears to be intuitive, this idea has been formalized in the
axioms in Section 2.1.2.
2.2. Alternative Approaches to the Neoclassical
Theory: Stochastic Choice and Random Utility
Theories
Non-stochastic choice models have been demonstrated to be mathematically consis-
tent, but cannot properly describe the choice that individuals made under uncertain
situations. As an alternative, stochastic choice models were introduced. In the
1940s D. Cartwright (Cartwright, 1941a; Cartwright, 1941b; Cartwright and Fes-
tinger, 1943) discovered that subjects are not always certain about the choices they
make and that these choices have a stochastic nature. He asked subjects to choose
between two alternatives. For example, the task of estimating the volume of two
containers would be very diﬃcult, in particular to estimate which container has a
larger volume. In such a case, the individuals have a tendency to associate the
shape or relative (subjective) height of the container with its capacity, and therefore
individuals usually give an erroneous estimation of volume.
Also, by asking the subject to make the choice repeatedly, after some time elapsed,
the experimenter could test the frequency of one alternative in diﬀerent decision-
making problems. The experimenter could now construct what is known as empirical
random choice. Cartwright also measured the response time and then plotted the
average for each decision problem against the minimum frequency of any two choices
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in the same problem. He found that the longest response time was observed when
the minimum frequency was approaching 50%.
In diﬀerent trials, the problems, in which the subject was more likely to select the
predetermined preferred choice, also were the problems that were the most time-
consuming for the subjects. These ﬁndings suggest a model of decision making in
which two opposing forces push in the direction of each of the available options.
When the diﬀerence between these forces is large, the majority of the time the
decision goes in favor of the preferred option and the decision is made rather quickly.
When the forces are the same, the frequency of choice moves closer together and the
time to choose becomes longer.
These kinds of models are very attractive to better approach the individual be-
havior in choice situations, but they do not completely describe certain individual
reactions that are not considered in theoretical models and are diﬃcult to extract
in experimental settings.
Experimental studies on repeated decision making under risk have found that in-
dividuals often do not choose the same alternative when they are faced with identical
binary choice problems that are repeated within a short period of time. For instance,
Camerer (1989) reports that 31.6% of subjects reverse their initial decision on the
second repetition of a choice task. Starmer and Sugden (1989) observe a switching
rate of 26.5%. Hey and Orme (1994) ﬁnd that 25% of repeated decisions made are
inconsistent, even when individuals are allowed to declare indiﬀerence. Ballinger
and Wilcox (1997) report a median switching rate of 20.8%.
2.2.1. Stochastic Choice Models
An overwhelming majority of decision theories are deterministic, i.e. they predict
that an individual will make identical choices if a decision problem is repeated, un-
less she is indiﬀerent. Such a decision theory is typically embedded into a model of
stochastic choice, when there is a need to relate a deterministic theory to stochastic
data. Stochastic data may be either consist of individual choice patterns from re-
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peated decision making (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994) or of aggregate choice patterns
from unrepeated decision making (e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994). Thus, a model
of stochastic choice serves as an intermediary, which translates a deterministic pre-
diction of decision theories in a stochastic choice pattern that can be estimated by
econometric methods on empirical data. Most empirical studies of choice under risk
attribute observed deviations from behavior implied by a decision theory to random
errors made by individuals. Stochastic choice models take various functional forms,
linking the choice probability, s(z) to the value diﬀerential z, between an option and
its alternative. The value diﬀerential is directly deduced from the decision theory.
Three major shapes of the probabilistic choice function are commonly used. First,
Fechner’s (1860) model of random errors used in Hey and Orme (1994) makes use
of a Gaussian cumulative density function (probit). Second, Luce (1959)’s choice
model used by Holt and Laury (2002) implies a logistic curve. Third, the ‘tremble’
model of Harless and Camerer (1994) sets the probability of a misstep to a constant.
The models can be brieﬂy described as follows:
Fechner Model of Homoscedastic Random Errors
Hey and Orme (1994) estimate a Fechner model of random errors, where a random
error distorts the net advantage of one lottery over another (in terms of utility).
Net advantage is calculated according to the underlying deterministic decision the-
ory. The error term is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and
constant standard deviation. According to Hey and Orme (1994), the log-likelihood
of observing N decisions, when individuals choose a risky lottery Loi, i ∈ {1, ..., N}
over a certain monetary amount Oi, can be written as
LoLoR =
N∑
i=1
log(ψ0,σ) · [(u(Loi, θ)− u(Oi, θ)], (2.3)
and the log-likelihood of observing M decisions, when individuals choose a certain
monetary amount Oi, i ∈ {1, ...,M} over a risky lottery Loi, can be written as
LoLoA =
N∑
i=1
log(1− ψ0,σ) · [(u(Loi, θ)− (u(Oi, θ)]), (2.4)
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where ψ0,θ[.] is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a normal distribution
with zero mean and standard deviation σ. Parameters θ and σ are estimated to
maximize the combined log-likelihood LoLoR + LoLoA.
Luce Choice Model (Strict Utility Model)
Luce (1959) proposes a stochastic choice model where the probability, that a risky
lottery Lo is chosen over a monetary amount O for certain, can be written as
u(Lo, θ)1/µ/[u(Lo, θ)1/µ + u(O, θ)1/µ], (2.5)
where µ > 0 is a noise parameter. This model has been recently popularized by Holt
and Laury (2002). It is well-known (e.g. Theorem 30 in Luce and Suppes, 1965)
that the Luce choice model can be rewritten as a Fechner model of homoscedastic
random errors so that the probability, that a risky lottery Lo is chosen over amount
O for certain, is given by λmu[u (Lo, θ)−u (O, θ)], where λmu[X] = 1/1+exp(−x/µ)
represents the cdf of the logistic distribution and u (.) = log(u(.)).
Notice that in this model utility scale is determined up to a multiplication by a
positive constant (Luce and Suppes, 1965, p 335).
Tremble model
Harless and Camerer (1994) argue that individuals generally choose among lotteries
according to a deterministic decision theory, but there is a constant probability that
this deterministic choice pattern reverses (as a result of pure tremble). Let θ be
a vector of parameters that characterize the parametric form of a decision theory
and let u(Lo, θ) denote the utility of a lottery Lo according to this theory. Here
we consider only binary choices between a risky lottery and a degenerate lottery
that delivers one monetary outcome with probability one. According to Harless
and Camerer (1994), the log-likelihood of observing N decisions, when individuals
choose a risky lottery Loi, i ∈ [1, ..., N ] over a monetary amount Oi for certain, can
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be written as
LoLoR =
N∑
i=1
log(1− p) · I(u(Loi, θ) > (u(Oi, θ))
+
N∑
i=1
log(p) · I(u(Loi, θ) < (u(Oi, θ))
+
N∑
i=1
log(1/2) · I(u(Loi, θ) = (u(Oi, θ)), (2.6)
and the log-likelihood of observingM decisions, when individuals choose a monetary
amount Oi, i ∈ {1, ...,M} for certain over a risky lottery Loi, can be written as
LoLoA =
M∑
i=1
log(p) · I(u(Loi, θ) > (u(Oi, θ))
+
M∑
i=1
log(1− p) · I(u(Loi, θ) < (u(Oi, θ))
+
M∑
i=1
log(1/2) · I(u(Loi, θ) = u(Oi, θ)), (2.7)
where I(x) is an indicator function, precisely, I(x) = 1 if x is true and I(x) = 0 if
x is false, and p ∈ (0, 1) is probability of a tremble. Notice that a tremble occurs
when the utility of a risky lottery is less than the utility of a sure amount, but an
individual chooses the risky lottery nonetheless; or when the risky lottery yields
higher utility, but an individual chooses the sure amount. Parameters θ and p are
estimated to maximize log-likelihood LoLoA + LoLoR.
2.2.2. Random Utility Models
In random utility models2 the subject has a set of diﬀerent potential utility functions,
and only one of them is drawn every time the individual has to make a decision. This
momentarily dominant utility determines the choice for that period. Since utilities
are diﬀerent, the choices from the same set of options may be diﬀerent over diﬀerent
times, although in every period the decision-maker picks the best option.
2See McFadden and Richter (1991) for an early axiomatic analysis and Gul and Pesendorfer (2003) for a
complementary development.
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In stochastic choice models, the utility function is the same in each period. The
decision maker does not always choose the option with the highest utility, but is
more likely to choose an option with higher utility when compared to that of other
options. These kinds of models present two important advantages: first, the decision
process comprises of two steps: evaluation and choice. Second: the frequency of the
choices gives a measure of the strength of individual preferences. With these elements
put together, it is possible to identify a cardinal utility function. An early axiomatic
analysis of this problem can be found in Davidson and Marschak (1959) and Debreu
(1958), and a recent characterization through axioms is presented in Maccheroni et
al. (2007).
Loomes and Sugden (1995) argue that individual preferences over lotteries are
stochastic and can be represented by a random utility model. Individual preferences
over lotteries are captured by a decision theory with a parametric form that is
characterized by a vector of parameters θ. We will assume that one of the parameters
θR ∈ θ is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ and the
remaining parameters θ−R are non-stochastic. Let θR(θ−R) ∈ θ denote the value of
parameter θ−R such that given other parameters θR ∈ θ, an individual is exactly
indiﬀerent between a monetary amount O for certain and a risky lottery Lo, i.e.
U(Lo, [θR(θ−R), θ−R]) = U(O, [θR(θ−R), θ−R]). (2.8)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that for all parameter values above
this threshold, i.e., θR > θR(θ−R), an individual prefers the sure amount over the
risky lottery (otherwise we can always deﬁne a new parameter θ∗R = −θR). The log-
likelihood of observing N decisions, when individuals choose a risky lottery Loi, i ∈
{1, ..., N} over a monetary amount O for certain, can be then written as
LoLoR =
N∑
i=1
log(ψµ,σ · [θR(θ−R)]), (2.9)
and the log-likelihood of observingM decisions, when individuals choose a monetary
amount Oi, i ∈ {1, ...,M} for certain over a risky lottery Loi, can be written as
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LoLoA =
M∑
i=1
log(1− ψµ,σ · [θR(θ−R)]). (2.10)
Notice that the probability that an individual chooses a risky lottery over a mon-
etary amount is simply the probability of observing preferences characterized by
parameter θR < θR(θ−R). Similarly, the likelihood that an individual chooses the
sure amount is just the likelihood of observing parameter θR > θR(θ−R). Parameters
θ−R, µ and σ are estimated to maximize total log-likelihood LoLoR + LoLoA .
2.3. Do we Need to Propose a New Model?
Stochastic choice models made a ﬁrst step by considering non-deterministic choices
in lotteries and introducing them satisfactorily to economic theory. However, these
models have been traditionally restricted to modelate choices between lotteries for
mainly three scenarios: The Fechner model approximates the shape of decisions
to a probit function, the Luce model implies a logistic function and the Tremble
model reduces the probability of choice by setting it as a constant. All these models
require the researcher to know or be able to accurately approach the probabilities of
choices. These models describe the phenomena, but are not designed to explain why
people are changing their choices in the way they do, and which intrinsic factors are
involved in the decision-making process.
A better approach can be made from random utility models, but the hypothesis,
that random choice is produced by random utilities, imposes restrictions on observed
behavior. In this class of models, the choice is made from a set of lotteries referred
to as a menu. Since each of these utility functions is linear, the choice is always
in a special subset of the menu (or its boundary in technical terms). By keeping a
ﬁxed threshold as frame where decision can oscillate, the researchers explain choices
between lotteries and sure monetary outcomes. These facts do not allow free choices
without knowing the menu where the choices can be made.
In our model, described in detail in Section 6.1.1, we make use of two components
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borrowed from stochastic and random choice models to approach the phenomenon
of preference instabilities:
1. A probability θ, that our subjects change their decisions after neigbourhood
inﬂuences and additional information after sensory experience.
2. A threshold, here modelated with a random number which will be activated
according to individual attitudes toward the chocolate.
Here again, after information aggregation, our individuals make decisions in two
steps: evaluation and choice. We seek to better approximate real individual behavior
in changing scenarios, where more than one informational source is present. To
give adequate answers to the research questions introduced in Section 1.2, it is
required to explicitly consider attitudes, interactions and knowledge simultaneously
in a multiagent model.
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3. Attitudes and Preference
Formation
Neoclassical economics has assumed that individual preferences are given, that is,
they are not inﬂuenced by markets or other economic institutions, legal rules or
external inﬂuences in general. Additionally, preferences are stable and coherent, and
the individual seeks rationally to maximize those preferences. These assumptions, so
called the axiom of exogenous preferences, are being criticized increasingly (Bowles,
1998, 2004).1 To better approach human behavior, economics takes psychological
elements which diﬀer from the way they are traditionally described by economists.
Psychology systematically explores human judgment, perception of well-being and
behavior in diﬀerent situations.
Preferences are often determined by change in outcomes relative to the reference
level, and not merely by absolute outcomes (see Rabin, 1998). Even if we were
able to modify our standard assumptions about U(x), it is sometimes misleading to
conceptualize people as attempting to maximize in a coherent, stable and good per-
ceived U(x) function. Processes as the accurate evaluation of probabilities, such that
U(x) actually occurs, or the right evaluation of information, require time and eﬀort,
and both are diﬃcult to achieve, because beliefs, attitudes, and human capacities
are not predictable and depend on individual situations.
1Bowles presents an alternative view in the frame of institutional economics (Bowles 1998) by endogeniz-
ing individual preferences. To our understanding, these attempts reflect the growing explanatory reservations of
economists concerning the standard assumptions on preferences (transitivity, non-satiability, convexity, etc.), the
optimization-maximization calculus, and the economic decision making (assumption on perfect information and
perfect rationality).
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3.1. Preference Formation
As introduced in Chapter 2, the term preferences in economics refers to the principle
that guides choices made by individuals. Preferences are most commonly represented
quantitatively through a utility function. In the general decision framework, based
on the seminal work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), probability distribu-
tions are used to weigh the utility values for each of the possible outcomes. Given a
set of options, a rational agent chooses the one that maximizes its expected utility,
that is the one that in expectation leads to the result it prefers and gives the highest
satisfaction level. Preferences therefore, play a signiﬁcant role in decision making,
similar to that of attitudes.
There is no global agreement that exists on a single deﬁnition of preferences, but
a deﬁnition common to various disciplines must be settled. In Chapter 2, preference
was deﬁned as a comparative evaluation of a set of possible choices. In an attempt
to generalize this term to make it applicable to other sciences apart from economics,
Druckman and Lupia (2000) deﬁne preferences as follows:
‘A preference serves as a cognitive marker that reminds people how
to interact with various aspects of their environment. Preferences are
stored in memory and drawn when people make decisions. When for
example people say that they prefer Lincoln to Douglass, they identify
an aspect of their environment that, in their mind, provides them with
greater beneﬁts than other environmental aspects.’ (Druckman and Lu-
pia (2000), p.2).
The objects of preferences can include observable, physical continuous phenom-
ena (such as, for instance, musical instruments) and unobservable, physically dis-
continuous phenomena (such as discussing research ﬁndings). The objects within
a preference are those that a person can imagine as substitutable. For more than
two hundred years, the economic mainstream has been that these objects of pref-
erence are always given externally. In recent years, the evidence against this view
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of cognition has been accumulating. For instance, the perception of color. People
treat color as a basic attribution of other objects, and many people express to have
a favorite color. But colors, as we know them, are as much human creations as
they are exogenous characteristics of our surrounding. The objects of preference are
not simply out in the world waiting to be ranked. They are instead objects that
our perceptive capacity allows us to diﬀerentiate and recall, and that our cognition
capacity allows us to remember and evaluate.
By using Contingent Valuation surveys Kahneman et al. (1999) found that the
answers given by their participants are better understood as expressions of attitudes
than as an indication of economic preferences. He added the concept of attitude
(borrowed from social psychology) and the core process, labeled affective valuation,
as a signal of the emotional response to objects.
3.2. Attitudes
Many diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the word have been proposed (see Campbell, 1963),
but none has been universally approved. In contrast to social instincts and basic
neeeds, as rather unchanging substance of preferences, attitudes conform the most
variable part of preferences.
Attitudes are persistent dispositions to regard certain entities as either favorable
or unfavorable (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, p.6). This concept has a broader range
of application than the concept of preference, because entities include physical ob-
jects, living beings, and abstract concepts, involving anything that can elicit an
aﬀective response. Presumably, if attitudes cause some behavior in any direct way,
the implication of this deﬁnition is that the disposition to regard an object will lead
in a behavioral approach toward the object. Attitudes are mental representations,
not object states of aﬀairs. Utility models considering attitudes could approximate
human behavior in choice situations more accurately, but in economic theory they
have seldom been considered explicitly.
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One of the ﬁrst and most famous contributions to the study of attitudes was given
by Thurstone (1928) who claimed that attitudes can be measured. Thurstone’s
(1931) method involved devising statements pertaining to an attitude object and
then having them rated by a panel of judges on a scale of 1 to 11, on which 1 being
the most unfavorable and 11 the most favorable. In a second phase, the twenty-
ﬁve objects with the highest ‘agreement score’ among all the judges were selected.
The experimenters gave then these items randomly to the people who were asked
to indicate which statement they endorsed. If a person was very favorably disposed
toward the object, the average scale number would be very high. For the opposite
case, the scale number would be low.
Further studies about attitudes were strongly inﬂuenced by Thurstone’s contri-
bution. Likert (1932) for example, created a very reﬁned scale used extensively in
consumer research.2 In his procedure, subjects are given a large number of state-
ments regarding an attitude object and are asked to express their agreement with
each statement on a ﬁve point scale: (-2) for strongly disagree, (-1) disagree, (0)
undecided, (1)agree, (2) strongly agree.
Another direct technique was presented by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957).
They used bipolar dimensions as warm-cold, good-bad, etc and subjects were asked
to rate attitude objects presented to them on a 1-9 scale, according to the favoura-
bility. The problem with these methods is that subjects are, by the experimental
situation, encouraged to answer in a socially desirable way which normally was
inconsistent with their true attitudes.
Other methods in attitude assessment have been proposed by Wrightman (1969)
about opinion formation, and Milgram, Mann and Harter (1965) about sympathetic
attitudes toward social groups. Indirect techniques use physiological measurements
to assess the attitude toward an object, i.e. the pupils of the eye tend to dilate when
an observer is looking at something of interest, also the electrical resistance measured
2In this work, we made use of the Likert’ scale to account for attitude formation and attitude change of the
participants toward the chocolate bar before and after new information has been aggregated. This method is
implemented here in order to disentangle and evaluate the information that was exchanged via chat, where the
attitude is explicitly given. See Sections 6.1.1, 6.5 and Chapter 7.
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on the skin - the galvanic skin response - varies systematically in accordance with
diﬀerent attitudes after the provision of diﬀerent stimuli (Cooper and Pollock, 1959).
3.2.1. Attitude Formation
Following Fishbein and Ajzen and their scholars, attitude formation is a function
of individual beliefs. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, 1980) made a successful proposal
regarding how behavior depends on attitudes, and their results are synthesized in
the Theory of Reasoned Action. The corresponding mathematical expression can be
written as:
B ≈ I = AB ∗ w + [other variable], (3.1)
where B is the Behavior in question, I is the person’s intention to perform behavior
B, AB is the attitude (or evaluation) toward performing behavior B, and w is a
regression weight.
Attitude formation has been conceptualized as a lineal model:
AB =
n∑
i=1
biei, (3.2)
where bi is the strength of the salient belief (the subjective probability) held by
a person that performing behavior B leads to outcome i (this outcome includes
consequences, eﬀorts, costs, characteristics, and other attributes), ei is the evaluation
attitude i, n is the number of salient beliefs the person actually holds regarding
performing behavior B, that means the subjective probability judgments about an
object’s or event’s assess to other objects or events (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975,
p.131). The process can be understood as follows:
‘... [F]rom direct observation, other sources of information and infer-
ence, a person forms beliefs, about the attributes of an object. Beliefs
are the statements about whether or not, or in what ways, the object
possesses certain attributes. Attributes are evaluated independently in
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terms of their favorableness or unfavorableness. Both beliefs and evalu-
ations are taken to be exogenously and independently determined. The
person’s attitude toward an object depends on his beliefs about the at-
tributes of an object together with his evaluations of those attributes.
Attitudes in turn, generate intentions, and intentions determine behav-
ior.’ (Katzner 1989, p.136).
Attitudes are not innate. Attitudes may be formed, and once they are formed they
may change. In the course of a person’s life, all experiences lead to the formation
of diﬀerent beliefs about objects, events and actions. These beliefs result from
direct observation and from inference processes as forms of social learning. Beliefs
internally drive the processes of attitude formation and attitude change. These
processes are apparently similar and closely related, but attracting diﬀerent bodies
of theory: Attitude formation is usually discussed in terms of learning models while
attitude change is often considered to be a consequence of persuasion.
Classical theories suggest that all attitudes are learned according to conventional
‘learning paradigms’. Three of these paradigms are usually cited: classical condi-
tioning, instrumental conditioning and modeling.
Classical conditioning refers to the acquisition of meaning by a stimulus. Thus,
attitudes are formed toward stimuli as a function of pleasantness or unpleasantness
of the environment in which the object is experienced. Classical conditioning was
discovered and studied by Ivan Pavlov in his famous experiments with dogs (see
Hilgard and Bower, 1966), and mainly refers to involuntary behavior which induces a
predetermined unconditioned response or reﬂex. In the case of classical conditioning,
some characteristics limit its scope: Unconditioned responses are part of our innate
behavior and are not subject to change. Furthermore, no new forms of behavior are
learned since innate responses are merely associated with diﬀerent stimuli. Indeed,
classical conditioning thus does not explain how humans acquire complex forms of
behavior.
Instrumental conditioning studies the way in which attitudes develop when their
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impression is followed by a ‘rewarding state of aﬀairs’ (see Hovland et al., 1953).
For example, we may learn our attitudes toward work, what and how to eat, how
to spend money, and so forth, because expression of these attitudes was reinforced
by the approval and aﬀection of our parents, teachers, and social environment. The
diﬀerence between classical and instrumental conditioning (Skinner called the latter
‘respondent behavior’ (Skinner, 1953)) is that the former is a form of passive reaction
while the latter is behavior for which no conditioned or unconditioned stimulus is
observable a priori. Instrumental conditioning allows individuals to learn behavior
leading to certain behavioral consequences. Reinforcement process is a very basic
learning mechanism which allows people to form attitudes toward objects.
Events that follow operant behavior and increase the probability of its future
repetition are called reinforcers (see Skinner, 1953, pp.72-5). There is a diﬀerence
between positive reinforcers (as a very delicious food) which increase the future
operant behavior (wish to repeat some experiences in future periods, like ‘visit again
this restaurant’), and negative reinforcers (as obliged long exposition to cold weather,
or electric shocks). Therefore, reinforcers are strongly related with human wants,
because it can be argued that only these things, that are reinforcing, tend to satisfy
human wants (e.g., Witt, 2001). However, not all individuals search to satisfy the
same wants (e.g. for some people social status is more reinforcing than a good job,
but for others not).
Attitude formation is also studied as a social learning process (see Bandura, 1972).
That means, our attitudes are formed as a result of directly modeling our own behav-
ior, or imitating the behavior that is modeled by others. We may adopt particular
attitudes because we have observed others expressing or behaving in accordance with
those attitudes, especially if the others obtained rewards as a result. Social learning
means that a person acquires some behaviors by observing (and later imitating)
someone else performing that behavior and being reinforced by its consequences. In
classical conditioning, the individual is seen as a black box. Imitational learning
opens this black box, because all the possible assumptions about the underlying
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decision process have to be considered.
In social learning models, two broad phases have been distinguished, the acquisi-
tion phase, where behavior is observed and learned and the performance phase, where
such behavior is proved after learning. Indeed, the learning phase is restricted to
the acquisition phase, reinforcement by performance (behavior) also contributes to
this learning. Imitational learning has been shown to be a very important form of
human learning and has been fruitfully employed in ‘mental training’ in business
life and in marketing (Franke and Ku¨hlmann, 1990).
3.2.2. Attitude Change
Attitude change is very important to psychology and also to economics, because
both human attitudes and the environment are permanently changing and interact-
ing with each other, permanently challenging the decisions that individuals make.
Attitudes evolve over time in part as a result of economic conditions and when they
change, they create further adjustments to the economic environment. Attitude
change is in this study considered as the vehicle to change preferences over time.
Hence, if an individual does not change her attitude, her preferences remain stable
(see Chapter 6).
The literature about attitudes in social psychology can be divided in two broad
categories: The ﬁrst deals with how persuasion by others results in attitude changes
and the other category refers to how attitudes are changed through self-persuasion.
There is a vast amount of literature on persuasion, and many variables, that aﬀect
the degree to which a person can change someone else’s attitude have been identiﬁed.
Early research (e.g. Hovland et al., 1953) also pointed to the conclusion that credible
sources of information are more eﬀective than incredible sources. Thus, information
coming from a credible source appears to be more important in changing attitudes
unless, the subject is uncertain about the credibility, in which case the arguments
play a large role (Jaspers, 1978). Additionally, the credibility factor is thought to not
be externally induced or simply based on the individulas’ own interest. Nevertheless,
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W. J. McGuire (1969) showed that under some circumstances a source does not need
to be disinterested or unbiased to be persuasive.
A very good example of this is advertisement. Everyone has at some point seen
an advertisement where a beautiful girl announces a new photo camera. The girl
has neither credibility nor technical knowledge of this product, but she is very at-
tractive. Then, the potential buyers do not know how to decide in a way that really
satisﬁes their beliefs, because of the perturbing (noisy) factor introduced by the girl.
These irrational impulses to attitude change created by attractiveness were already
studied by Horai, Naccari, and Fatoullah (1974). But attractiveness and credibility
have diﬀerent eﬀects on persuasion (see Norman, 1976). Other factors that inﬂuence
persuasion in a simple and direct manner are the structure of content of the mes-
sage (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1972; Levental, 1970), and the personality of the subject
(Hovland and Janis, 1959; Hovland et al., 1957; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971).
The second area, self-persuasion has been intensively studied and has its origins
in the seminal work of Heider (1958) and Festinger (1957). They found that people
strive for cognitive consistency. When beliefs or attitudes are inconsistent, people
are motivated to dispel the inconsistency in several ways. For example, people
could change or leave the environment in order to avoid that the two sources of
information are longer in conﬂict, they may reevaluate the alternatives or change
an existing attitude to make it more compatible with the reality of the available
information. This last process is the most important here and hundreds of studies
have been conducted regarding diﬀerent aspects of this theory (see Wicklung and
Brehm, 1976 for a review).
Heider (1958) argued that people must consider their social environment to be
predictable. From his thesis the attribution theory has been settled. People make
sense of their world by attributing causes to one thing or another. More importantly
for Heider was that people perceive behavior as caused. A person may do something
because she had to (environmental cause) or because she wanted to (internal cause).
Other fundamental ideas from social psychology, such as role-playing (Janis and
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King, 1954; Janis and Mann, 1965) can also be used to help us understand how
attitudes may change through self-persuasion.
Generally, ‘attitudes that are changed as a result of considerable mental eﬀort tend
to be stronger than those with little thought and thus are more persistent, resistant
to counter-persuasion, and predictive of behavior than attitudes that are as a result
of a process invoking little mental eﬀort in assessing the central merits of the object’.
(Petty and Wegener 1998, p.370). The process of attitudinal change may include an
eﬀect of mere exposure to new stimuli (Zajonc, 2001), for instance, discussions about
a welfare state reform may support the formation of a positive attitude towards the
new system together with the obvious eﬀect that positive expectations from a new
welfare rule carried out. Public agents in the mass media play a decisive role in this
process of attitude change.
3.2.3. Attitude-Consistent Behavior
Social psychology understands attitude as a mediating variable corresponding to
mental processes or states that account for the consistency of an individual’s favorable-
unfavorable and cross-situational responses toward an object. Petty et al. (1994,
p.70) state: ‘attitude is a general and relatively enduring evaluation of some person
(including one-self), group, object, or issue. A degree of endurance implies that the
long-term memory acts as a repository for the evaluation that the individuals have
attached to the attitude object, and generally indicates that it is a global appraisal.’
Their basic deﬁnition is given by Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.1), who refer to an
attitude as a ‘psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular
entity with some degree of favor or disfavor’ (cf. Olson and Zanna, 1993; Tesser and
Shaﬀer, 1990).3 Attitudes develop out of an evaluative responding of one of these
three kinds, are mentally represented in memory, and are activated in the presence
of the object to which they refer (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).
3Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) definition summarizes and extends the definition given by Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975) already introduced in Section 3.2.
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Indeed, the behavior involved in the formation of attitudes does not receive the
largest share of attention from attitude researchers and theorists. Most of the stud-
ies seek to understand how attitudes aﬀect behavior. Since the pioneering concep-
tualization and measurement in the third and fourth decades of the last century
(Bogardus, 1925; Likert, 1932), attitude has been portrayed as an organocentric
predisposition to behave consistently towards the object to which it refers wher-
ever it is encountered. The verbal statements by which attitudes are recorded in
response to questionnaires have been assumed to accurately express the underlying
‘real’ or ‘true’ attitude held in mind and thus predict and explain its non-verbal
manifestations.
3.2.4. Habits: Repeated Prior Behavior
Triandis (1977, 1980) deﬁned habits as ‘situation-speciﬁc sequences that are or have
become automatic, so that they occur without self-instruction’ (Triandis, 1980,
p.204). In a similar way, Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.180) state that ‘the con-
cept of habit implies that a behavior has become so routinized through repetition
that a person has ceased to make any conscious decision to act, yet still behaves
in the accustomed way.’ Another way to express this is that habitual behavior is
maintained by direct contact with the contingencies of reinforcement rather than
instructed through verbal behavior. Eagly and Chaiken also refer to habits as ‘non
attitudinal determinants of behavior’ and as one of several ‘psychological tenden-
cies that regulate behavior’ (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.216, 671). In other words,
individual habits are not susceptible to be manipulated in a short time and they
change only slowly. In the experimental design, we took this fact into account by
measuring habits at the beginning of each experimental setting (see Section 6.3.3).
Ronis et al. (1989, p.216-18) point out that the explanation of habits requires that
attention is given to two component processes: initiation, namely when the behavior
comes about, requiring decision making; and persistence, which implies automatisms
and lack of conscious direction. A decision, almost by deﬁnition, involves conscious
41
thought and reﬂection on one or more alternatives. They associate attitudes with
initiation (novel behavior), but not persistence. They also argue that attitudes could
predict initiation, but not persistence. Prior behavior is a strong predictor of novelty,
and habits predict future behaviors more eﬀectively than intentions do (Ronis et al.
1989, p.221). In other words, attitudes correlate with habitual behavior only under
certain circumstances. Habits are, therefore, an important component to consider
in the process of preference formation and preference change.
3.2.5. Instability of Preferences
Changing beliefs or attitudes will have an eﬀect on a person’s intention to perform a
given behavior. To ﬁnd out the inﬂuence of these changes, the individuals must ﬁrst
identify attitudes and beliefs relevant to the intention and their relative weights,
and second, consider the impact on their intentions. This impact can be seen as an
attitudinal (descriptive) message and as a normative message. Changing behavior
can be seen as a consequence of changes in intentions. As Bowles (1998) explains:
‘...we acquire preferences through genetic inheritance and learning.’
(Bowles, 1998, p.79).
Economic institutions in the form of social groups during the ﬁrst 10,000 years of
biological human societies could aﬀect the gene structure in a particular population,
explaining the preference formation in determined groups as genetically induced
(Feldman and Laland, 1996; Durhan, 1991; Bowles, 1998). But undoubtedly, the
greatest inﬂuence of preference formation and changing is inﬂuenced by cultural
transmissions, such as learning. After cultural learning, such preferences will be
internalized, and thereafter become generalized reasons for behavior. For example,
learned preferences for the tastes of the regional food is learned by a process passed
on from generation to generation and reinforced by attitudes toward determined
recipes from parents and relatives.
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Once formed, preferences may become internalized through a process identiﬁed
by Leon Festinger (1957) called dissonance reduction:
‘...[T]he human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consis-
tency or congruity among his options, attitudes, knowledge, and val-
ues....there is a drive toward consonance among cognitions.’
The dissonance consists of two elements, namely one’s values and a behavior,
as when one is doing something which is inconsistent with one’s values. Festinger
(1957) used this idea to explain specific ideological changes (or shifts of opinions)
which modify a person’s way of life. Following his example of a worker who is
promoted at work and the ﬁrst days giving commands to his former colleagues could
be dissonant, but with time, the change will be internalized and this dissonance will
disappear.
Dissonance reduction provides another explanation for how economic circum-
stances that induce new preferences might become general reasons to explain be-
havior. Apart form that, religious advertising and political activities have a strong
inﬂuence in establishing our new preferences. After some early experiments, disso-
nance reduction was demonstrated to inﬂuence economic behavior. A good example
is the experiment conducted by Brehm (1956). From his results, one can conclude
that in order to justify their decision, subjects in altered their attitude toward
products. Although the products were equally attractive initially, they deemed the
chosen one better in order to reduce the dissonant actions ‘I like the rejected item
one as well as the chosen one and yet I didn’t choose it’.4
Indeed, understanding the decision-making process implies to understand how
attitudes and habits modulate individual choices in everyday situations.
4see Lea et al., 1987, chap 7.
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4. Information Acquisition and
Information Processing
4.1. Data, Information, and Knowledge
Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) Basic Communication Model is the starting point
for analyzing the communication process in terms of the intent of the sender, the
needs of the receiver, and the elements of the communication environment (Shannon,
1949). The communication model in ﬁgure 4.1 shows the basic components present
in a simple two-way exchange of information. Every communication, whether it
is real-time, such as a face-to-face meeting or a telephone conversation, or asyn-
chronous, such as an e-mail and fax, involves the following:
• The environment in which the communication takes place.
• A sender or encoder who starts with a purpose.
• A message created to accomplish the purpose through the content (the words
and/or images) and the media (the format in which the content is presented:
audio, text, video, or multimedia).
• Technology, which is made up of codes and channels (data networks).
• Noise, which is anything that reduces the likelihood of the message being
interpreted the way the sender intended.
• A receiver or decoder who interprets the message.
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• A feedback message that reverses the process.
Figure 4.1.: Basic Communication Model.
Here, the sender sends a message. This message, composed of data, is transmitted
through a channel to the receiver. Then, the receiver, based on the incoming infor-
mation, sends feedback as a response from the received message and a new loop can
begin. A more advanced communication model would consider multiple parties, the
diﬀerent types of each component, and the perceptual ﬁltering of a message done by
both the sender and receiver, that is, the characteristics, thoughts, and emotions of
all parties that contribute to the message’s formation and interpretation.
Decisions arise as the result of processing this information during a period of
time. For some decisions the amount of time required to process information is
longer than the time needed for other decisions. To be able to make a decision,
individuals accumulate information in form of knowledge which will be recalled
when it is needed. The basis of the work in this regard is the conversion of data
into information, and the subsequent transformation of information into knowledge,
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to enable decisions to be made. Thus, if we have better data this will enable us to
have better information leading to better knowledge and hence better decisions.
Indeed, in this work we assume that the amount of information has an impact
on the individual’s behavior in markets. Particularly, we want to explore how the
perceptual system is organized to receive inputs through our senses, and how this
perceptual system inﬂuences the decision-making process, i.e. how the perceptional
system sends relevant information accumulated in form of experiences contributing
to reduce individual uncertainties at the moment to make a choice.
In looking at the use of information in decision making, there is an overriding
causal model underpinning the present analysis. Our basic notion is to assume
a conversion of data into information and information into knowledge to enable
decisions to be made. The terms data, information and knowledge are frequently
used as overlapping concepts. These three concepts are ill- or ambiguously deﬁned
in the literature. In order to make clear its application within the present work, it
is important that we begin by deﬁning what is meant by the terms.
Data. The word data is the plural of Latin word datum, past participle of dare,
”to give”; hence, the meaning is ”something given”. In general, data consists of
propositions that reﬂect reality. A large class of practically important propositions
are measurements or observations of a variable. Such propositions may comprise
numbers, words, or images. ’Measurement is an experimental and formal process
aimed at obtaining and expressing descriptive information about the property of an
object (phenomenon, body, substance, ...)’ (Mari, 2007).
Information. The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes information as ’Knowledge
communicated concerning some particular fact, subject or event; of which one is ap-
prised or told; intelligence, news’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 944). Hence
the way in which the word information is used can refer to both facts as such and the
transmission of the facts. Information is the result of processing, manipulating and
organizing data in a way that adds to the knowledge of the receiver. This deﬁnition
has been mathematically formalized by Claude Shannon (Shannon, 1949).
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Information about the environment is conveyed to the brain from the eyes, hands
and other sense organs. Traditionally, people have referred to the ﬁve senses of
vision, hearing, touch, taste and smell. But our senses are more wide-ranging, com-
plex, and sensitive than we normally realize, and in everyday life we use only a
fraction of their power. It is the range and coordination of the human senses, to-
gether with their sensitivity, that provide us with a unique quantity and quality of
information about the environment. Information is valuable because it can aﬀect
individual behavior, decision making, or outcomes. A piece of information is con-
sidered valueless if, after receiving it, things remain unchanged. From the received
data from the environment we extract information. This information is accumulated
in our brain as knowledge, which will be used to make decisions.
With data, we tend to deal with facts. With information we tend to deal with the
interpretation of facts. When we speak of knowledge, we are dealing with a more
general concept.
Knowledge is usually equated with the best way to interpret facts and use in-
formation. Like the related concepts truth, belief, and wisdom, there is no single
deﬁnition of knowledge on which scholars agree. Knowledge acquisition involves
complex cognitive processes: perception, learning, communication, association, and
reasoning. The term knowledge is also used to describe the conﬁdent understanding
of a subject, potentially with the ability to use it for a speciﬁc purpose. Knowledge
does not exist until people are involved (Ichikawa and Steup, 2012).
Knowledge does not only consists of data. It also contains our beliefs and expec-
tations. As written above, data are the facts of the world. We can perceive these
data with our senses, and then the brain can process it. Human beings have used
data as long as we have existed to form knowledge of the environment surrounding
us. Until humans started using information, all we could use was data directly. If
somebody wanted to know how tall her neighbor was, she would have to come and
look at her. Knowledge was limited by direct experiences. Information allows us
to expand our knowledge beyond the range of our senses. We can capture data in
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information, then move it about so that other people can access it at diﬀerent times.
As an example, we can take a recipe from our grandmother: The ﬂavors in our
mind are knowledge after we experienced the recipe. The recipe written on a piece of
paper is only data, but interpreting it give us information about how to proceed to
prepare the cake, and after we taste it, we accumulate experience-based information
in our brain. If we want to share the recipe, we are sharing only data. Indeed,
information captures and interprets data at a single point (in our example, when
your grandmother wrote the recipe) whereas the data could changes over time (by
improving the recipe).
A decision is a choice made from available alternatives. A decision is a ﬁnal
product of the speciﬁc cognitive process of an individual or a group of persons
which is called decision making, and therefore it is a subjective concept. Because
it is a mental object, it can be an opinion, a rule or a task for application. On the
other hand, decision making is the cognitive process leading to the selection of a
course of action among alternatives. Every decision-making process produces a ﬁnal
choice (Weirich, 2012). It can be an action or an opinion. It begins when we need to
do something but we do not know what. Therefore, decision making is a reasoning
process which can be rational or irrational, and can be based on explicit or tacit
assumptions.
The deﬁnition of these terms clearly indicates that knowledge and decisions are
not solely rational processes. Indeed, it is plausible to think about a decision process
as a result of mixing rational and hedonistic experiences with knowledge about the
objects of choice. For this reason, it is neccesary to introduce concepts from the
cognitive theory in order to understand how this aquisition of information is related
to decision making.
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4.2. Cognition, Perception, and Their Role to Make
Decisions
The term cognition refers to the mental process of knowing, perceiving, and judging
which enables people to interpret the world about them. Humans’ reactions will
be inﬂuenced by the ways in which certain kinds of objects are perceived. Thus,
an individual’s conception of the world will tend to be unique, in the sense that
no two persons have the same set of beliefs and attitudes (Snyder and Fromkin,
1980) (Although a certain degree of uniformity will exist because human beings
share several basic characteristics). These fundamental characteristics may relate
to biological needs such as food and rest, or psychological satisfaction that is to
be found for example in music. The higher the cohesion among people, the more
likely they are to share similar sets of cognition. The subjective view of the world is
reﬂected in a cognitive map (a concept ﬁrst introduced by Edward Tolman (1948)).
These views (beliefs) form the core of an individuals’ personal orientation towards
life in general.
Consumption habits (as introduced in Section 3.2.4) are also likely to be inﬂu-
enced by the cognition that people hold. The environment in which people live is
complex and confusing because of much activity and many stimuli competing for
attention. People exposed to this high amount of noise attempt to build some cog-
nitive structure that helps to interpret the world in a meaningful way (Rosch, 1975).
The individual cognitive map is mainly inﬂuenced by two sources: stimulus (exoge-
nous factors) and personal (endogenous factors). These factors interact to produce
an individual’s personal set of concepts, which aﬀect all her activities, including
economical ones.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we conveyed information from the environment to the
brain through our ﬁve senses. To understand how senses can be satisfactorily applied
in decision making it is important to ﬁrst to understand how they operate. That is
why it is important to clearly introduce the concepts of sensation and perception.
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Both sensation and perception are stages of processing of the senses. Sensation is
when the stimulus impacts upon the receptor cells of a sensory organ. It is mainly
of biochemical and neurological nature.
Perception is the awareness of understanding of sensory information (Grohol,
2005). In latin percepto means apprehension with the mind or senses. Perception is
the ﬁrst element involved in the human information processing that facilitates knowl-
edge construction, and then, use of memory to give this perception a recognition.
Perception occurs through stimuli generated by various sensory inputs incoming in
one or more of our ﬁve senses, i.e., by tasting or smelling. Many cognitive psy-
chologists hold that, as we move about in the world, we create a model of how the
world works following our perception (Garc´ıa Mira and Real, 2005). That is, we
sense the objective world, but our sensations link it to percepts, and these percepts
are interpreted within the context of the environment we ﬁnd ourselves in. As we
acquire this new information and consider it relative to the knowledge we have in
memory from prior experiences, our perceptions shift as we select further pertinent
information to aid our judgments and purchase decisions.
At the same time, perception is both a conscious and a unconscious process. The
perceptual system recognizes the information, assembles it, and draws comparisons
with previously stored material (knowledge). Then, knowledge is used, reused and
hence gets constructed. Perception is a selective process and certain amounts of
information from the outside are selected because not all the information coming
in can be assimilated. Perception is aﬀected by factors such as attitudes, values,
motives, stress and a person’s background.
The additivity of perceptions, and its eﬀect triggering the human behavior in
future decisions, opened a new research area called sensory marketing research (Kr-
ishna, 2009). As perceptions have been stored as memories, they signiﬁcantly con-
tribute to decision making. This perceptual learning is often characterized by a high
specificity to stimulus parameters such as location or orientation.1 Additionally, a
1Selectivity and locality imply that the underlying neural changes are most probably occurring within early
cortical representations that contain well-ordered topographic maps to allow for this selectivity.
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transfer of the newly acquired abilities is often considered an important marker of
that processing level at which changes are most likely to occur: limited general-
ization is taken as evidence for a high locality of eﬀects in early representations.
In contrast, transfer of learned abilities is taken as evidence for the involvement of
higher processing levels as is often observed in task and strategy learning (Recanzone
et al., 1992; Karni and Sagi, 1991).
Feedback provides valuable information about the correctness of a performer’s
responses during the learning (Fahle et al. 1995). One plausible explanation is
that perceptual learning can occur in the absence of external reinforcement, with
the result that internal reinforcement can serve as a learning signal. For instance,
stimuli that are highly discernible can serve as a template that subjects can use to
assess stimuli in more diﬃcult conditions: it has been suggested that fast-learning
studies often do not require feedback but that slow-learning protocols do (Fahle et
al., 1995; Hubert et al., 2009).
One way in which perception becomes adapted to tasks and environments is by
increasing the attention paid to perceptual dimensions and features that are impor-
tant (Goldstone, 1998). This view is shared with models of visual attention that
assume that an eﬃcient stimulus processing relies on an interaction between sen-
sory (controlled) and executive (controlling) processes (LaBerge, 2002; Shipp, 2004).
Within this framework, individual attitude might reﬂect an important factor for es-
tablishing robust perceptual representation, even when conditions are sub-optimal
or not eﬃciently controllable by executive functions (Sarter et al., 2006; Hubert et
al., 2009).
4.3. Sensory Experiences as Perceptual Learning
Information processing and cognition are two fundamental cornerstones strongly re-
lated to decision-making processes as already shown in the previous sections. But
ﬁrst, we need to understand how the diﬀerent senses are concretely involved in the
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process of attitude formation. This understanding is relevant to design an exper-
iment to explore the role of the sensory experiences to overcome instabilities of
preferences.
4.3.1. Information Processing and Sensory Experiences
A sensory experience is the result of the reactions of the senses to diﬀerent ele-
ments from the environment. The reactions that a sensory experience exert in the
individuals is normally used as a valuable instrument in marketing research. These
elements or triggers are called ’stimuli’ in the traditional psychology context.
‘[O]ur senses are ﬁnely attuned to change. Stationary or unchanging
objects become part of the scenery and are mostly unseen. Customary
sounds become background noise, mostly unheard... if something in the
environment changes. We need to take notice because it might mean
danger or opportunity.’ (Hulte´n, et al, 2008, p.18.)
The sense organs mediate diﬀerent kinds of signals, by means of which we can
shape our behavior. A conscious sense impression is assumed to take place when
nerve impulses reach the cerebrum. When information comes to the human brain,
a person becomes conscious of, for example, a light or an odor. The cerebrum is
responsible for directing memory and the mechanism of the thought.
In gestalt psychology, it is commonly held that color and form have a direct impact
on an individual’s perception ability, even without any concurrent conscious thinking
(Schiﬀman, 2000).2 In connection with experience-based purchase and use, the
holistic perspective is emphasized in terms of diﬀerent functional and aesthetics
elements in a sensory marketing (Hulte´n et al., 2009). These elements contribute to
establish diﬀerences that allow customers, for instance, to develop a preference for
a particular brand or speciﬁc taste.
2The holistic nature of perception is one of the central tenets of gestalt psychology, and it is assumed that the
whole, or the gestalt, is greater than the sum of the parts.
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Figure 4.2.: Sensory Interplay Within Sensory Experiences. Source: Hulte´n et al., 2009, p.17
The ﬁve human senses contribute to individual analysis since individual results
appear in a diﬀering manner as generic or stereotyped campaigns. The senses tend
to be used in combination and, to convey experiences for hearing, seeing, smelling,
touching, and tasting. Together, these senses contribute to perception and the
subsequent formation of attitudes towards the attitudes of an object. This sensory
interplay, that is, when a sense stimulates another one (as in ﬁgure 4.2) contributes
to synergies that give customers a deeper holistic experience.
The brain itself can only process information which is encoded in a language that
consists of electrical discharges. The task of a sensory cell is to convert the relevant
stimuli into this brain language in a process called transduction. Transduction diﬀers
greatly between light sensitive cells and cells that detect mechanical stimuli. After
the uptake of a stimulus, the next functional step is the transduction of the sensory
signal. All cells operate with a certain repertoire of intracellular signals that can be
chemical or electrical which trigger the cell’s internal responses to stimulation.
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4.3.2. Our Five Senses and Consumption
According to Peck and Childers (2006), out of the 81 sensory studies done within
the framework of consumer behavior focusing on the taste, smell, touch and hearing,
over one-third of them (28) have been published within the last ﬁve years. Clearly,
sensory perception is a growing ﬁeld inside the consumer behavior research. Because
of the amount of advertisement that consumers see every day for the thousands of
products that are available in the marketplace, it seems that unconscious triggers,
like those appealing to the basic human senses, may be a more eﬃcient way to
appeal to consumers (Sengupta and Gorn, 2002).
In the last three decades, some consumer behavior researchers have been incorpo-
rating mixed elements of vision, touch, audition, smell and taste in their research.
Some of this research has been explicitly focused on the antecedents and conse-
quences of sensory perception for example, the eﬀect of verbal and visual adver-
tisement on ad processing (Houston et al., 1987) or the eﬀects of spoken versus
written advertisement on ad recall (Unnava et al., 1996). Other researchers also
used sensory perception for mood manipulation in e.g. food tastes (Kahn and Isen,
1993), or a certain kind of music (Gardner, 1985). However, despite the focus on
consumer behavior, their works are not cohesive in a unique research stream. First
in 2008 a group of researchers created the so-called ‘sensory marketing’ research
stream (see Krishna, 2009) aimed to investigate the joined inﬂuence of our senses
for decision-making processes.
Vision
The eye is the only human sensory organ where a considerable amount of informa-
tion processing already takes place before it enters the brain circuits that eventually
generate perception (Frings, S., 2012). Once the visual information has entered the
brain it will be classiﬁed. Whenever possible the brain operates by parallel infor-
mation processing. The retina splits the visual information into two main channels:
One contains the information on color and form of an object, the other has the
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information about localization and its movement. These two classes of information
go separate ways through the brain and, only after the analysis has been completed,
they rejoin to allow the perception of the object as a whole.
Of the ﬁve human senses, our sight sense has so far dominated marketing practices
(Lindstro¨m, 2005; Krishna, 2009). It is clear to note that most of the information
from objects is coming ﬁrst through our eyes and the intentions to experience them
with other senses is elaborated ﬁrst after we have seen them. Most studies have
centered their attention on understanding the eﬀects of seeing in human decision
making and what has been used extensively in marketing campaigns. In fact, 83
percent of all marketing studies are limited to the sense of sight alone (Lindstro¨m,
2005). We rely so much on our sense of vision to navigate our way through our daily
life that, in fact, we tend to take our eyes for granted until they fail us. Our eyes
are important instruments used for cognitive purposes, to generate knowledge and
recognition of scenarios stored in our memories.
‘Visualizing is a way of knowing: it is a mode of generating knowledge.
How we see determines what we see: and how we see is embodied in our
mental images. By virtue of their condensing impulse, images have a
kind of power that abstract ideas can never have.’ (Nicholson, 2003).
However, the relationship between the shopper and the environment stems from
selective attention. Our short-term memory span is limited to around seven chunks,
each roughly equal to a word or familiar unit of information (Miller, 1956). Further,
research by Simon (1974) found that each chunk could be a familiar phrase and
subsequent studies found a link to attention allocation. Therefore, it is futile to
bombard shoppers at the point of sale, as too many stimuli result in the information
being discounted (Moray, 1993). Furthermore, research by Simons et al. (2002)
warned about deviating customers’ gaze with other distractions (Soars, 2009).
For instance, a common practice is using colors to manipulate individual mood,
and as a consequence the purchase intentions. RGB (Red/Green/Blue) low-energy
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lighting provides an environment of low-cost possibilities to vary mood as it can
create any shade on the color spectrum. Yellow is generally the ﬁrst color the human
eye notices and light blue has been known to lower blood pressure. However, whilst
most shades of blue have a calming inﬂuence, some encourage reﬂection and hence
have a tendency to make people spend less. By varying lighting levels and color, it is
possible to inﬂuence how much time shoppers need to make a decision.(Lindstro¨m,
2005)
Olfaction
Smelling something usually triggers an emotion. We are constantly exposed to the
smell of other people, animals, earth, food, factories, which is indeed an endless vari-
ety of olfactory objects. We may ﬁnd an olfactory stimulus agreeable or unpleasant.
We may even experience craving or repulsion; but we seldom are indiﬀerent towards
an olfactory stimulus. Smelling seems to inevitably come with hedonic judgment.
Unlike the skin, the ear, and the eye, the nose forces us to make a decision about an
object that we examine by its odor (Frings, 2012). Some of these hedonic responses
are even genetically ﬁxed.
Odor discrimination is a combinatorial process; the sensory information is con-
tained in the combined activity of many sensory cells. Humans have 400 odorant
receptors; each one has a slight diﬀerent structure and hence a preference for a
slight diﬀerent group of odorants (Frings, 2012). As a consequence, the set of re-
ceptor neurons activated by one odorant gradually diﬀers from the set activated by
another one. Instead of looking at the response of a single receptor neuron, the brain
analyzes the pattern of activity that results from groups of neurons responding to
the stimulus (Mombaerts, 2006). How is this map read out by higher levels of the
brain, and how is it translated into perception, hedonic assessment, and memory?
These are research topics from neurophysiology that are still in an early state of
understanding.
Our senses of smell and taste, which are normally considered to be quite diﬀerent,
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are actually very closely tied to each other. In fact, if we did not have a sense of
smell, the food we eat would have very little taste. The receptors for the sense of
smell are high in the nasal cavity in the direct airﬂow through the nose and down
into the lungs. Unless the odor is very strong, we have to sniﬀ in order to force the
air up our noses to the receptors, which are then activated and pass their messages
along to the brain. For instance, wine tasters put their noses into glasses of wine
and inhale deeply.
Perhaps because we rely so heavily on vision and hearing for sensory information,
we tend to overlook the importance of smell, but it is of course the basis of a vast
global industry, both in the production of perfumes, which are used in cosmetics
as well as in scents used in household products such as washing liquid and lavatory
cleaner. Most of the studies in marketing developed by using the olfactory sense
have dealt with the scents of speciﬁc products or ambient scent (Lindstro¨m, 2005;
Downey, 2009).
The Sense of Touch
Touching things or be touched is arguably the most basic sensory experience. The
ﬁrst formally known research in Haptics was done by Aristotle as early as the 4th
century B.C. Aristotle proposed his theory of aisthesis or sensation which suggested
that our senses are ordered hierarchically with touch on the top, and the other senses
are only increasing the acuity of the touch sensation. In his mind, ’touch provided
a true picture of the intrinsic nature of the object. Touch is the very ﬁrst sense to
develop and the last sense one loses with age. Already as embryo, humans have a
very developed touch sense. It can be observed in a fetus’ reaction to touch impulses
from outside the mother womb allowing it to learn its place in the womb and ﬁnd
itself. (see Floyd, 2006; Guerrero and Floyd, 2006). Touch is a fundamental part of
the human relationships and has the power to attract or repel, help or hurt.
Touch is a remarkable sense. Increased research interest has been directed toward
the study of haptics and the most recent trends involve a renewed interest in the
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relationship between touch and vision. Touch can operate very eﬀectively when
needed to grasp objects and discover their important features. The sense of touch
often appears to operate more slowly than vision. But this is largerly dependent
upon the skill of the perceiver and whether or not the individual can use two hands
to feel objects. Scale is also important, since delay and other temporal variables
may be less important for smaller objects. Blindfolded sighted individuals may not
be able to identify pictures as rapidly as blind persons, and familiarity and practice
clearly play a role in object identiﬁcation. If objects are familiar, one would expect a
high level of accuracy and rapid object recognition using touch (Heller et al., 1996).
It is a very important ﬁeld in marketing research, because people become closer
with the product by touching it (Lindstro¨m, 2005). Motivated by the large amount
of Internet sales (only in the USA, Forrester Research estimates sales of over $ 200
billion in 2008) Peek and Childers asked 199 subjects to evaluate a sweater and
a cellphone. Half of the participants were given the chance to touch the product
whereas the other half could only see it through Plexiglas. They try to alleviate the
individual ’need for touching’ by written descriptions of the products. Only in the
case of cellphones, these written descriptions helped individuals to alleviate their
need for touching (by reading the description of weight, the most important haptic
characteristic of it) but could not answer individual inquiries about the sweater
softness.
In research of altruistic behavior it has also been demonstrated that haptics
is a very important factor to increase donations. Peck and Wiggins (2006) gave
brochures for an Arboretum that either had a ’touch element’ with it or did not.
They observed that the people’s willingness to donate increased with the touch el-
ement. Material properties such as texture and hardness are more salient for touch
than other object properties such as form and size (Klatzky et al, 1987). David Katz
(1884-1953) was an early important source in the study of texture (microstructure,
the ﬁne structure of the surface). He combined phenomenological observations with
interesting experimentation.
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Hollins and his collaborators have conducted work showing that perception of
texture is multidimensional (Hollins et al. 1993; Hollins and Risner, 2000). Picard
and her colleagues (Picard et al., 2004) allowed a free exploration of 40 diﬀerent
ecological surfaces instead of the passive stimulation conditions used by Hollins et
al. The results showed that the soft-hard dimension in the texture space is of hedonic
character. Thin-thick was a likely second perceptual dimension orthogonal with the
soft-hard dimension. These two dimensions were stable salient dimensions in all the
stimulus sets. This dimension depended on the stimuli that were included into a
given set.
Hearing
Next to seeing, hearing provides us with information about our environment that
we rely on the most. Our experience and our ability to make sense of the world are
largely shaped by these two senses. In both seeing and hearing, our sense organs
react to waves of energy from the environment. Sound waves are focused by the
outer ear on the eardrum, where they stimulate nerve endings that send messages
to the auditory nerve and from there to the brain.
In terms of hearing and consumer behavior, for the past forty years scientists have
been mainly interested in the eﬀects that background music may have in advertising
and in retail stores. They found that loud music causes people to spend less time
shopping. In contrast, soft music causes people to spend more time shopping but also
to spend more money. The more uncertainty about a purchase, the more positive an
impact music can have (Duncan Herrington, 1996). Because of its potential impact
on atmosphere, background music may inﬂuence choices between stores of the same
type (Baker et al., 1992). A correlation was found between music, emotion and
purchases-customers were more favorably disposed to a product when in a good
mood (Gardner, 1985). Supermarket sales increased by 38 per cent with slow music
compared to fast music (Milliman, 1982).
For many animals, the perception of vibration is more important than touch
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sensation or even seeing. Being touched by a predator marks the moment when
it is often too late to escape. Vibrations, on the other hand, travel over some
distance and can alert the animal under bad light conditions or in darkness before
the predator can strike. It is therefore not surprising that animals have developed
sensory organs for the detection of vibratory signals. The perception of vibrations
is the base of hearing. Only by vibration perception can our brain hear signal from
the outside (Hudspeth, 2008). The human cochlea has the form of a snail-shell with
three turns. Along its entire length, hair cells are positioned in four rows numbering
approximately 3,000 each row (Manley and Ladher, 2007). The cells sit in a tissue,
the basilar membrane, which has a very particular property: it is stiﬀ at the bottom
of the cochlea and ﬂoppy at the top of the snail-shell. Mainly as a consequence of this
gradient in stiﬀness the basilar membrane responds to sound: when we play a triad
on the piano, three distinct sections of the Corti are set into vibration, one vibrating
with the lowest tone, one with the middle tone, and one with the highest tone. All
other areas of the basilar membrane remain motionless (Manley and Ko¨ppl, 1998).
The importance of sound to behavior can be summed up under two headlines: i.
Communication within the same and with other species and ii. Alerting the presence
and location of enemies, food sources and other organisms. It might be expected
that the extend of use of this kind of information by diﬀerent organisms will depend
on their sensory and neural equipment (Pickles, 2008). Communication using sound
can be cheap and eﬀective. Cheap in the sense that, since ears are so sensitive,
the amount of energy necessary to produce detectable sound is very small. Sound
communication can also be carried out in darkness. Communication using sounds
has a number of important advantages in guaranteeing the surveillance of species,
but also in all-day choices (Pickles, 2008).
The way we perceive the acoustic world is the result of both the selectivity of
the hearing organ and the neural processing of auditory nuclei in the brain. These
sensory pathways extract information in diﬀerent ways and the nuclei are to some
extent organized in groups, each group being dedicated to one main aspect (or
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feature) of auditory perception. Thus it can be seen that often within large nuclei,
groups of neurons exist that deal with one particular aspect of the stimulus. Two
of the most obvious questions regarding stimuli are: ‘what is it?’ and ‘where is it?’
(Manley, 2012).
The information transmitted by the sound (‘what is it?’) can be passed on to the
brain using one ear alone. Information on the location of the sound source (‘where is
it?) is dealt by analyzing the relation of the signal to the space , which is perceived
by the two ears, and this requires a great deal of neuronal processing.
Taste, Direct Experience and Perceptions
The fact that every sense has some role in generating taste has received neurophys-
iological support (Rolls 2005; Small et al., 2001). Rolls (2005) shows that the pure
eﬀects of gustatory stimuli are represented in the primary taste cortex (frontal oper-
culum/insula), whereas the convergence of multiple sensory inputs used to represent
taste occurs in part of the orbito-frontal cortex, referred to as the secondary taste
cortex (Rolls, 2005).
The primary sense accompanying taste is olfaction, or how the food smells (Small
and Prescott, 2005). In fact, smell impacts taste both before (orthonasal) and after
(retronasal) food enters our mouth (Rozin 1982). Smell plays such an integral role in
taste perception that without it, it is diﬃcult to distinguish a potato from an apple,
or wine from apple juice (Herz, 2007). The intrinsic visual appearance of the food
also contributes to the sense of taste in generating expectations and perceptions of
ﬂavor (DuBose et al., 1980) and can ultimately dominate gustatory cues altogether
(Hoegg and Alba, 2007). The sound the food makes when bitten plays a key role
in taste perceptions for certain food items (e.g., potato chips, celery, crackers),
impacting perceived freshness as well as quality (Zampini and Spence, 2004). The
texture (de Araujo and Rolls, 2004) and temperature of food can aﬀect taste. Recent
research has shown that temperature sensations on the tongue are directly related
to taste. Speciﬁcally, warming the tongue elicits sweet and bitter tastes, whereas
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cooling the tongue leads to sour and salty taste perceptions (Cruz and Green, 2000).
The receptors for the taste sensations are found mainly in the taste buds on the
tongue. The tip of the tongue is most sensitive to sweet and salt, the sides to
sour, and the back is most sensitive to bitter. Food producers are well aware of
the fact that what we refer to as taste depends heavily on our sense of smell, but
with prepared foods there is not too much they can do about it. This may help to
account for their eﬀorts to stimulate the basic sweet and salty sensations by using
vast amounts of sugar and salt to manufacture these products.
Taste can be conceptualized as a form of direct product experience. Smith and
Swinyard (1983) emphasize the information value ﬁnding a much higher attitude-
behavior correlation after a taste experience than without tasting the product at
all. Scott and Yalch (1980) maintain that their research demonstrates a tendency
for people to accept information consistent with their perceptions about the causes
of their behavior and to reject information when it contradicts these attributions.
Some research considers that product trial through tasting can be diagnostic and
inﬂuences perceptions and choice. Levin and Gaeth (1988) vary the temporal order
of tasting a product (before and after reading a ground beef label) and the valence
of the label information (positive, 75% lean; negative, 25% fat). The framing eﬀect
of the labeling was reduced when consumers sampled the product compared to when
they did not.
Braun (1999) looked at a diﬀerent aspect of taste and memory, by asking the
question of whether advertising received after a direct product experience (in her
study tasting orange juice) altered how consumers remember their experience. She
found that consumer recall of a past direct experience was subject to distortions.
Post-experience advertising made the consumers think they had drunk a better
tasting juice by altering their memories through advertising. Kahn and Isen (1993)
did not include actual tasting but rather tasting perception in their study. They
found that a positive aﬀect manipulation increased variety-seeking behavior relative
to the control of unpleasant or negative features of the items were not made salient.
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Research on the gustatory sense is quite varied and includes administration of
taste tests, change in taste relating to new product formulations, store sampling,
branding, packaging, and taste as a direct product experience (Lindstro¨m, 2005).
We will come back only to the latter because of its pertinence with our research
study.
4.4. Information Processing and Decisions
After sensory information is collected trough the diﬀerent organs, humans experience
three consecutive steps of information processing that occur within micro-seconds:
1. Within the ‘information phase’ the decision-maker gathers certain signals
about her environment, and then categorizes and organizes them into pieces
of (cognitively meaningful) information to be applied further.
2. The ‘deliberation phase’ assumes that the decision-maker mentally processes
the organized and selected information in the form of an intention (or plan of
action).
3. The ‘implementation phase’ is the step where the decision-maker breaks down
and schedules the plans of action, and then acts accordingly, through eﬀectors
and instruments (see ﬁgure 4.3).
The three phases are assumed to take place sequentially.3 By these steps the decision
maker relates herself reciprocally to her environment.
However, humans have limitations in their capacity to create and process informa-
tion (Simon, 1955). Despite many common capabilities, humans exhibit individual
diﬀerences in information processing. Individual diﬀerences may be long term due
to limits in physical or intellectual capabilities, or short term diﬀerences in memory,
attention span, or learning abilities due to fatigue or stress. A large proportion
3In Walliser, B. 2008.
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Figure 4.3.: Phases of Decision by Humans. Source: Own design based on Walliser (2008) and the
precedent discussion.
of the literature in decision making is dedicated to ﬁnding out and explaining the
factors which generate distortions. Some of them are introduced as follows.
4.4.1. Memory Limitations
Beginning with Simon’s (1956) classic notion of Bounded Rationality, scholars have
recognized that the quality of decision making can be aﬀected by the inherent limi-
tations of human memory. These limitations can be classiﬁed as follows:
First of all, behavior tends to be guided by goals that are currently in working
memory (Anderson, 1995). Because they are not reactivated by external (or envi-
ronmental) stimuli, goals in the long-term memory do not tend to control behavior.
Also, because so many goals and tasks can be present at once, some or all may be
forgotten. The human memory must constantly rehearse and evoke such goals in
order to retain them in working memory in order for them to help to guide behavior.
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The tendency for new goals to replace old goals is one of the reasons why setting
proximal goals (e.g. save $1 by this Friday) can be more eﬀective than setting distant
goals (save $200 by the end of the year; see Schunk, 1991).
The second factor aﬀecting our decision ability is that our working memory is
limited to processing all the information about options (Simon, 1986). Choices that
involve two- or three-dimensional options do not necessarily exceed the limits of
working memory, but choices involving four or more dimensions per option may
exceed these limits (Byrnes 1998, Chap. 5 and 6).
If it has been a long time since a decision maker implemented an eﬀective strategy
or if there are some interference eﬀects caused by the existence of competing strate-
gies in her memory (Anderson, 1995), the individual making a decision may not be
able to retrieve the right strategy for the right context. Hence, the individual will
have to rediscover this approach through one of the construction strategies (e.g. by
means of causal reasoning or device seeking; see Byrnes 1998, Chap. 4).
In summary, memory limitations contribute to the tendency of distractions to
promote deviations from the optimal goal path, but these limitations are not dis-
tractions within themselves.
‘Memory problems are not really defects in the way one behaves in
decision making. Instead, memory limitations reﬂect constraints on the
normal operation of the system’. (Byrnes 1998, p.82).
Even when the decision makers share similar values and goals, knowledgeable
decision makers are more likely to succeed in comparison to less knowledgeable
decision makers. The reason is that there is a causal connection between certain
strategies and success. Those who maintain these strategies in their repertoire attain
the goals they desire. Hence, the lack of knowledge reﬂects a problem in the level
of contentment with the decisions made.
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4.4.2. Lack of Calibration
In order to make appropriate choices, the decision maker has to be appropriately
uncertain about her choices (Lichtenstein, Fishhoﬀ and Phillips, 1982). A large
number of studies have shown that adults are generally overly conﬁdent in their
ability to perform well on diﬃcult tasks and show a lack of conﬁdence in their
ability to perform easy tasks (see Lichtenstein et al., 1982; or Sniezek and Buckley,
1995 for reviews). The lack of calibration is a problem for a decision maker because
it increases the likelihood of failure and because it is false, it prompts individuals
to avoid getting involved in easy tasks (when they should) and to engage in hard
tasks (when they should not). This pattern of behavior keeps the individual from
attaining their personal goals as often as they otherwise should. For inadequate
knowledge, the lack of calibration is a moderating factor that aﬀects the content of
decisions and appears to contribute to decision-making strategies.
4.5. Persuasion by Others: Information Exchange in
Groups
Group discussions enable participants to share information so that the group as a
whole can access a larger pool of information than any one acting alone (Shaw et
al., 1981). The fundamental purpose for using groups to make decisions is to enable
a more complex exchange of information and individual preferences about decision
alternatives. However, some information known by some members of the group is
never exchanged. That results in poor decisions.
In order to reach decisions under inﬂuence of group members, participants simul-
taneously engage in three activities (Dennis, 1996): information recall, either from
memory or notes; information exchange, either giving or receiving information; and
information processing, that is, using the information: assessing a cognitive implica-
tion of the information and sorting in memory. Human beings have a limited amount
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of cognitive resources to spread across these activities (Ball and Zuckerman, 1992).
As a consequence, most people can engage in only one activity at a time.
The information exchange in groups is not perfect and not all recalled information
is actually exchanged. Participants must ﬁrst decide to contribute to the discussion
with information and then have the opportunity to contribute it. Social motivation
may reduce the amount of information that subjects choose to exchange and could
produce a cognitive inertia in which group discussions tend to a single topic or train
of thought (this inertia may occur because rehashing information under discussion
can appear more relevant than introducing a new topic that is not closely linked
with the current discussion). Information recall in a group is biased toward common
information because of the laws of probability: common information known by all
participants is more likely to be remembered by at least one individual. Individuals
are also more likely to remember information the more are exposed to it (Stasser et
al., 1989) thus reinforcing the common information bias.
Once information is exchanged, subjects must process it before they can make
a decision. Following Petty and Cacciopo (1986), there are two routes by which
information is processed. In the central route, participants actively assess the infor-
mation and its quality and integrate it into an overall understanding of the situation
and their preferences. This process of opinion formation is also called persuasive
arguments or information inﬂuence. Information influence theory, the ﬁrst route,
argues that unique information should be more persuasive than common information
should be absorbed and considered (Myers and Lamm, 1976). However, empirical
psychological evidence suggested that unique information is more likely to be ig-
nored after it is ﬁrst mentioned (Stasser et al., 1989) Decisions are more likely to
be based on common information received during discussion (Gigone and Hastie,
1993).
During group discussions, participants may lack the opportunity to process the
information they receive because they must pay attention to other participants (cog-
nitive blocking). If they do not pay attention, they will miss the others’ contributions
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(Lamm and Trommsdorf, 1973). Therefore, the received information during discus-
sions is only superﬁcially processed and is not considered as fully as information
acquired before discussion (Dennis, 1996).
Information that supports pre-discussion information and choices is more thor-
oughly processed and integrated into an individual’s cognitive schema (Petty and
Cacciopo, 1986). In contrast, individuals tend to develop counter arguments to in-
formation that challenges their initial decision. Furthermore, when subjects face a
group majority, whose preferences are diﬀerent from her own, the subject assumes
the majority to be correct and focuses on comparing her preference to that of the
majority. In this way, the world of alternatives is reduced to only two possibilities
(Nemeth 1986, p.25). In contrast, when a minority has a diﬀerent preference, it will
be assumed that minority participants are incorrect and they will dismissed. Only if
after discussions the minority meaning shows consistency by presenting information,
the minority could change the others’ minds.
The second route is the peripheral route in which subjects’ preferences are shaped
more by peripheral cues such as the attractiveness or number of people arguing for
a position, rather than the quality of the information itself. This process is also
known as social comparison or normative inﬂuence. When subjects learn new in-
formation from others, they consider this information in the light of their existing
information, which may trigger the recall of related information stored in the sub-
jects’ minds. As a consequence, under information inﬂuence, the information itself,
not the preferences of others, causes the reconsideration and change in preferences.
Several psychological experiments have found changes in preferences in cases where
subjects’ ability to communicate was restricted to objective information (no infor-
mation about others’ preferences), providing evidence that information inﬂuence is
present in group interaction (see Burnstein and Vinokur, 1973).
The second route, the normative influence theory argues that subjects are moti-
vated to conform to the opinions of others to preserve a favorable self-perception
and self-presentation (Myers and Lamm, 1976). From this perspective, to know
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preferences is more important than knowledge about the information on which they
are based. Here we can consider two theoretical connections:
First, after obtaining information on others’ preferences, participants may change
their preference to match that of the others more closely, either through choice
or coercion. Participants may not change their preference but just state a more
socially acceptable preference than their true preference. By doing this, they avoid
stress (without examining any information and without any change in their true
preference; Maas and Clark, 1984).
Second, publicly stating a preference may make the preference stronger for three
reasons: First, public commitment may make changing preferences more diﬃcult
without losing face. Second, such statements may cause stronger internalization to
reduce cognitive dissonance (Myers and Lamm, 1976). Third, hearing one’s public
statements can increase one’s conﬁdence in the choice, for instance, ‘How do I know
what I think until I hear what I say’ (Weick, 1995).
Normative inﬂuence theory holds that individual preference formation is aﬀected
by a social comparison of one’s own preferences to those of others. The theory
claims that exposure to information is necessary and suﬃcient to change partici-
pants’ preferences. While there is some empirical support to this theory, this is not
overwhelming (Myers and Lamm, 1976; Shaw, 1981). Several studies have found
that exposure to subjects’ preferences without supporting information leads to little
preference change (Myers and Lamm, 1976).
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5. Methodological Issues
Experimental economics is an important tool which helps to examine the actions
of individuals. Of course, humans behave not as particles or mouses, whose behav-
ior is highly measurable in laboratory conditions. However, and in counterpart as
aﬃrmed by philosophers about the ‘human free will’ (O’Connor, 2013), experimen-
tal economists have demonstrated that human behavior is highly predictable (see
Guala, 2005, p.13) especially when they make decisions in (large) groups.
In the present work, we design an economic experiment aimed to closely ana-
lyze the inﬂuence of information in the decision making-process. We centered our
analysis in the individual information processing after sensory experiences. In order
to understand the role of cognition, the interaction with other individuals, and the
sensory experiences in the behavior of real individuals deciding about their purchase
decisions experimental setups are required.
5.1. Control of Experiments
The most important advantages of laboratory methods are replicability and control.
Replicability refers to the capacity of other researchers to reproduce the outcomes
of the experiment with an independent veriﬁcation data from naturally occurring
processes (such as ﬁeld data) suﬀering from the disadvantage that often unobserved
factors have an impact on the variables of interest, and these factors are constantly
changing. Hence, comparing ﬁeld data at diﬀerent points of time would be diﬃcult
considering the wide range of factors that must be controlled (Guala, 2005, pp.13-15;
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Smith, 1982).
A relevant part of the experiment is its control, which is the capacity to manip-
ulate laboratory conditions so that the observed behavior can be used to analyze
diﬀerent theories. In some cases, it is impossible to ﬁnd natural ﬁeld data that match
the assumptions of the theory (for example, it might be diﬃcult to ﬁnd economic
situations in which individuals face questions that directly test the axioms of the
expected utility theory). In other cases, the data collected could be too messy to be
able to distinguish between alternative theories (Guala, 2005, p.14).
An important part of laboratory experiments are the ﬁnancial incentives that are
paid to subjects. Subjects actually earn money in order to compensate any kind
of loss incurred during the experiment. The value that people place on the out-
comes is replaced in the laboratory by the possible ﬁnancial payment (loss) that
an individual will get (incur) in an experiment depending upon the outcome of
the process. The institution regulating ﬁnancial incentives for the present exper-
iment is a redesigned Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-mechanism (Becker et al., 1964),
making individuals able to truthfully reveal their preferences in uncertain scenarios.
The introduced changes to the original BDM mechanism and the way in which our
mechanism operates will be explained in detail in section 5.4. With the control
provided by incentives, conﬂicts across the objectives of diﬀerent individuals can be
induced. Here, simple mechanisms for resolving the conﬂicts can be implemented in
a laboratory environment, in a manner that is theoretically understandable.
As we need to known the risk attitudes of our participants in order to be able
to predict behavior, a risk attitude test was designed following the Holt and Laury
procedure (Holt and Laury, 2002). This mechanism will be explained in detail in
section 5.5.
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5.2. Advantages of Computerized Experiments
Given that verbal interactions are not completely eﬃcient in information exchange,
we make use of a computer-mediated communication. By this, subjects commu-
nicate their choices to the experimenter through the computer. As will be ex-
plained in Section 6.3.3, in treatments T2, T3 and T4, our participants were able
to exchange information in groups with diﬀerent size, via chat interfaces. This
computer-mediated communication had three important advantages:
• All participants could enter information at the same time. Their contributions
(information and opinions) are immediately shared with other participants in a
group. Because all participants can type at the same time, they do not need to
wait for others to contribute to the discussion. This feature mitigates cognitive
blocking which inhibits the exchange of information in verbal interactions.1
• All the remarks typed into the computer are stored and remain displayed
during the whole experimental round as a kind of Group Memory. This has
two important eﬀects: participants can refer to this information later during
the discussion and reprocess it in conjunction with new information, and,
second, it solves a key problem present in all verbal discussions: that processes
of listening and information processing are mutually exclusive (Lamm and
Trommsdorﬀ, 1973).
• Participants make contributions without attaching their names or identities.
This motivates them to participate diﬀerently: Anonymity may reduce the re-
luctance to contribute information that contradicts the dominant group pref-
erence (Nunamaker et al., 1991). Additionally, participants also are often
motivated to defend or support their initial preference, so the information
1In verbal discussion, only one person can speak at one time, so all other participants are blocked from contribut-
ing. This blocking significantly reduces the exchange of information because participants wait for the contributions
before discuss, which prevents them from contributing information far from the discussion point or from introducing
a new topic. Also, participants forget their contribution during the waiting time, especially if it is not linked with
the actual discussion topic.
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they choose to contribute favors their preferences or attacks an alternative.
Anonymity may also make subjects more receptive to contrary information.
Thus anonymity may improve the information exchange by increasing the
amount of common and unique information discussed.
5.3. The Ideal Subject Pool
Subjects in an experiment could be university students, bureaucrats, who can partic-
ipate in the decision to implement a policy that they have designed, or, for instance,
other participants such as farmers, water authorities or councils who would be in-
ﬂuenced if a given policy was implemented in the ﬁeld. There is also a lot of work
trying to determine what will be the most suitable subject pool for each research
question (Henrich et al., 2010). Since economical theories normally assume gener-
ality, any subject pool is informative and, therefore, suitable to probe theories or
assumptions with behavioral contains.
Furthermore, new theoretical predictions are more easily to probe in the presence
of cognitive sophistication. Because students are typically above average regarding
cognitive sophistication, they are often a perfect subject pool. Moreover, students,
unlike most other subject pools, are readily available (and more cost eﬀective). Ad-
ditionally, students are used to learning, they are educated, and intelligent. Experi-
ments can therefore be easily be replicated, which is important to establish empirical
regularity and hard to achieve with any other subject pool (for a recent discussion
about this topic, see (Ga¨chter, 2010).
5.4. Predictability and Incentive Mechanisms
5.4.1. The Becker-DeGrooth-Marschak-Mechanism
An important task of experimental economics is to design institutions for eliciting
values that people place on goods. A large number of laboratory tests of demand-
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revealing mechanisms have been carried out aimed to understand the way in which
preferences for such goods are revealed in the real world. For an overview about these
experiments, see Davis and Holt (1993, Chapter 6); for a real-world test, see Bohm
(1984). Another important set of experiments concerns sealed-bid auctions, where
alternatives to the traditional and imperfect demand-revealing ﬁrst-price auction
have been tested (i.e., the second-price auction proposed by Vickrey, (1961)). For
an early summary about the works applying this mechanism, see for example Smith
(1982).
Within the ﬁeld of experimental economics itself, procedures providing incentives
for subjects to truthfully reveal the values they assign to private goods are re-
quired. A leading approach has been the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mech-
anism (Becker et al., 1964). This well-known mechanism consists of telling the
subjects that their stated selling price will be compared to a random price drawn
from some predetermined uniform distribution. Would the random price exceed the
selling price, the subject receives the random price (not her stated price) instead of
the lottery, while in the opposite case she will have to play the lottery and collect
its outcome, whatever it will be.
This mechanism was developed according to the ‘Expected Utility Hypothesis’2
(Becker et al., 1964), that is, it requires the consistency requirements of individual
preferences and beliefs imposed by the Expected Utility Theory (EUT).
The BDM mechanism has been used for eliciting both minimum seller prices and
maximum buyer prices. Most of the work done, as in the original paper by BDM,
focusses on eliciting minimum seller prices for a good. Subjects are each given a
unit of a good and asked to state their minimum price for selling it. A buying price
is drawn from some random distribution made known to the sellers. If the buying
price exceeds or equals the selling price, the seller receives the buying price and gives
up the object; otherwise, the seller retains the object (see, for instance, Becker et
al., 1964; Bohm 1984; Davis and Holt, 1993; Irwin et al., 1998; Kahneman et al.,
2Already introduced in Section 2.1.1.
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1990; Rutstro¨m, 1998; Shogren et al., 2001).
The argument of the BDM mechanism follows the logic of optimal bids in second-
price auctions: suppose the subject’s stated selling price is above the random selected
market price. Then the random number is to fall in-between the true and the
stated selling price with some non-null probability, and the subject will have to play
the lottery while forgiving the option to collect an amount that exceeds her true
valuation. Conversely, by understating the true valuation an individual performs, it
is possible for the random number to be larger than the stated price, but smaller than
the true one. This means that the subject has to collect an amount that is below
her valuation. Therefore, the only dominant strategy under the BDM mechanism is
to bid the true valuation.
The BDM mechanism has been widely employed in economics and is often used to
induce a subject to truthfully reveal the certainty equivalent to a lottery regardless
of her risk attitude in static environments. In the experimental setting by Grether
and Plott (Grether and Plott, 1979), when confronted with the BDM mechanism,
subjects were explicitly told that ‘your best interest is served by accurately repre-
senting your preference. The best thing you could do is be honest’ (Grether and
Plott, 1979, p.637). It is straightforward to show that in the BDM mechanism, sub-
jects have a dominant strategy in revealing the value of non-risky objects truthfully
(see, e.g., Holt, 1986; Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 461). Additional evidence of this
feature is to ﬁnd in (Irwin et al., 1998; Kahneman et al., 1990; Rutstro¨m, 1998;
Shogren et al., 2001; Keller et al. 1993).
Despite critical research against this elicitation method carried out by Holt (1986)
and Karni and Safra (1987), its validity persists if the experimental design attains
to ensure that individual beliefs fulﬁlled the requirements summarized in the Kol-
mogorov axioms (required to apply the standard probability theory.
Despite the theoretical appealing, there are three concerns about the incentive
compatibility of the BDM mechanism that have been raised in the ﬁeld: (i) subject
bids are sensitive to the boundaries of the distribution for the market price (see,
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for instace Bohm et al., 1997; Lazo et al., 1992). (ii) subjects’ preferences may not
conform to the expected utility theory. This is particularly a problem if the value
of the good is uncertain, as this can lead to preference reversals (Karni and Safra,
1987), but it may also be a problem even if the value of the good is certain (Horowitz,
2006). (iii) subjects may not be able to compute their optimal bid (Harrison, 1992).
Irwin et al. (1998) investigate the interaction between payoﬀ dominance (reward
saliency) and cognitive eﬀorts in a decision task. They ﬁnd that it is not necessary
to have a steep payoﬀ schedule to induce optimizing behavior when a subject is able
to deduce their optimal strategy from the initial information provided.
In spite of these apparent shortcomings, we chose to apply the BDM method
because of its several appealing properties as a tool of empirical research. The
following are three relevant points supporting our decision:
1. As introduced above, it provides an exact measure of willingness to pay and
it is incentive compatible under weak assumptions under the condition that
subjects behave conform to the expected-utility theory.
2. The best strategy for the subjects is to sincerely choose their WTP (see, among
others, Grether and Plott, 1979; Holt, 1986; Davis and Holt, 1993).
3. This mechanism allowed us to compare the results of diﬀerent experimental
treatments.
We modify the original BDM-mechanism in order to overcome the problems listed
above. We account for the evolution of preference uncertainty induced by environ-
mental changes in a dynamical scenario with the sequential introduction of new
information by means of sensory experiences. In our experimental design we include
a systematic sensory experience in ﬁve steps, each one devoted to trigger one of
the ﬁve human senses. As the subjects become closer to the object of choice by
these experiences, they increase their knowledge about it, that means, there will be
periodically accumulate criteria to better choose.
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5.4.2. Redesigned Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-Mechanism
As will be explained below in Section 6.3.3, at the beginning of the experiment each
participant will receive an initial endowment of 500 ECU.
After each step, our subjects should reveal their maxWTP and minWTP for the
chocolate bar. According with the habits, attitudes, and consumption preferences
of our subjects, one of the following three possibilities could appears after subject
i draws a WTP-Range (the diﬀerence between maxWTP and min WTP, WTP −
Range = maxWTP −minWTP ):
1. if
ui(0, 500ECU) > ui(1, 500ECU − zi), (5.1)
that is, if subject i prefers the bundle without the chocolate bar, she will choose
a WTP-Range resultzing in maxWTP < 100ECU . By doing so, she ensures
that after the BDM-mechanism is applied, the randomly generated market
price, zi is located above her maxWTP. If the randomly generated market
price is higher than the Full-information maximal price (z > maxWTP ),
the subject will buy nothing and retain her initial endowment. This case is
illustrated in ﬁgure (5.1).
2. if
ui(0, 500ECU) < ui(1, 500ECU − zi), (5.2)
that is, if subject i prefers the bundle containing the chocolate bar, she chooses
her minimal WTP in a way that minWTP < 100ECU . By applying the
re-designed BDM-mechanism, she is certain to buy the chocolate bar at the
randomly drawn market price yielding additionally a consumer surplus because
her minWTP > zi. If the randomly generated market price is lower than
the Full-information minimal price, minWTP > z, the individual will buy
the chocolate bar at the randomly generated market price and receive the
diﬀerence with her endowment. See ﬁgure (5.2).
78
Figure 5.1.: First Case of the BDM Mechanism.
Figure 5.2.: Second Case of the BDM Mechanism.
3. if
ui(0, 500ECU) = ui(1, 500ECU − zi), (5.3)
that is, if subject i is indiﬀerent between the two oﬀered bundles, i should choose a
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maxWTP and a minWTP (to form her WTP-Range) such that herminWTP < zi <
maxWTP , or better said, she draws an interval around the potential market price.
If the randomly generated market price z is located between the Full-information
maximal price and the Full-information minimal price, maxWTP > z > minWTP ,
the participant will automatically participate in a lottery, giving her the chance to
buy the chocolate with a 50% probability at the randomly generated market price.
Here, the decision is made by two lotteries, the ﬁrst one, in which the market
price for individual i, zi is drawn, and the second lottery, where two outcomes are
drawn. Each lottery has the same chance: to buy (50%) or not to buy (50%) the
chocolate bar. The mechanism is known by the subjects and the three cases are
explained before beginning this part of the experiment. Additionally, well-informed
participants are expected to make a good approximation to the real market price.
Figure 5.3.: Third Case of the BDM Mechanism.
We expected that, if people are certain in their choices, they are also certain
about their WTP for the chocolate bar. That is, maxWTP = minWTP, therefore,
the WTP-Range is an interval with a length of zero and remains stable despite new
information being aggregated.
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No price was given within the experiment, it is formed individually within the
information aggregation process, i.e, within the deliberation phase, just after each
sense is triggered. For each participant, the program randomly generates a market
price zi at which the chocolate bar is sold. By means of the proposed mechanism, our
participants will buy the chocolate bar at the individual randomly chosen market
price, or retain their initial endowment.
5.5. Eliciting Risk Attitudes
When faced with a purchasing decision, a consumer perceives a certain degree of
risk involved in the decision to purchase a particular product or brand (Stem et
al., 1977). The ﬁrst measurement of consumer perception of pre-purchase risk was
reported by Cunningham in 1965 (Cunningham, 1965) followed by a signiﬁcant
amount of research (see Bettman, 1973; Spence et al., 1970; Cox, 1967) down to the
present day.
Measuring the intensity of risk preferences is very important for theoretical pre-
dictions. Also, in experiments, individuals’ decisions are often (partly) driven by
their risk preferences. Therefore, we can state that risk attitudes are a good proxy
of individual behavior in experimental settings. Risk preferences are important to
decisions varying from career choice to stock picking (Barsky et al., 1997), as well as
production decisions (Birol et al., 2006). If risk-neutrality is not a general character-
ization of the sample under investigation, it is important to know the subjects’ pool
preferences over risk. Several studies in the literature have examined many issues
on risk preference elicitation, e.g., the stability of risk preferences across elicitation
methods (Anderson and Mellor, 2009), risk preferences and physical prowess (Ball
et al., 2010) as well as the complexity of the elicitation method (Dave et al., 2010;
Andersen et al., 2010, 2011).
As introduced above in section 5.4, we modify the original BDM mechanism en-
abling it to elicit individual preferences in changing environments. Despite the
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original BDM mechanism operating well regardless individual risk, changing scenar-
ios introduce an additional uncertainty modifying the individual risk attitude for
each experimental round, challenging the individual WTP for the object of choice.
In the present experimental setting, our subjects are periodically acquiring infor-
mation challenging their preferences for the oﬀered good. This information induces
additional uncertainty by changing the environment where the subjects make their
decisions. In this new context, it is important to elicitate the risk attitudes of the
subjects. In order to do so, we choose the price-lists-test proposed by Holt and
Laury (2002) (hereafter HL) to ﬁnd the risk preferences of our participants.
The HL procedure tests for risk attitudes across individuals by making choices
from ten paired lotteries. If individuals choose more than ﬁve safe choices, (in this
work the lotteries of type A), before changing to the more risky lotteries (here labeled
as of type B), it indicates the presence of risk aversion, whereas fewer safe choices
indicate individual preferences for risky choices. Individuals with risk-neutrality will
exactly choose ﬁve safe choices.
The method of Holt and Laury (2002) has become the standard procedure in
experimental economics. Major advantages that led to the popularity of the Holt
and Laury procedure include its transparency to subjects (easy to explain and im-
plement), its incentivized elicitation, and that it can be easily attached to other
experiments where risk aversion may have an inﬂuence. The advantages of the
method are due to its design. It is very easy to explain to subjects since they only
have to choose between option A and option B in each row. As a common practice,
one of the ten rows is randomly selected and paid out for real. And because it is so
easy to implement, the HL table can be attached to other experiments where risk
aversion may play a role.
Nevertheless, the method proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) has also its draw-
backs. The major disadvantage is that it requires a speciﬁc utility framework such
as the expected utility theory (EUT) in order to classify subjects as more or less risk-
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averse.3 If the individuals’ risk preferences are heterogeneous in the way that some
act according to EUT while others rather act according to non-EUT, it becomes
problematic to use the HL tables in order to classify the subjects’ risk attitudes.
The reason is that the HL method is not based on a general notion of increasing
risk which is satisﬁed by EUT and non-EUT models.
Because we want to explore the inﬂuence of information on the decision-making
process, i.e., if information helps to reduce the individual uncertainty to choose, we
implement the HL procedure to determine the risk attitudes of our subjects. Risk
aversion is considered to be a strong inﬂuential factor to not reveal freely real pur-
chase behaviors/intentions. Several studies show that prior subjective knowledge
inﬂuences the level of the consumer’s perceived risk (Laroche et al., 2003). Namely,
the majority of studies suggest that prior subjective knowledge reduces the con-
sumer’s perceived risk (Laroche et al., 2003). On the other hand, some authors have
found an unexpected positive link between the two constructs (Srinivasan, 1987).
The ten paired lotteries applied in this experiment were designed by the experi-
mentalist following the mechanism proposed by Laury and Holt (2002), where the
probabilities of earnings and the outcomes were systematically manipulated. The
screen presented to the participants within the experiment can be seen in Appendix
E. The same set of lotteries was applied in the four treatments.
3Holt and Laury (2002) use specific parametric forms of EUT in order to classify subjects.
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6. Hypotheses, Model, and
Experiment
The process of assimilation of new information and how it is individually incor-
porated to decision-making processes has been exhaustively studied in the litera-
ture (see Chapter 4), but so far, no satisfactory answers have been given to totally
describe this phenomenon. A trial to extend the literature concerning this topic
is given in the present work. This chapter introduces at the beginning the main
Working Hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 7. These hypotheses are formulated
in accordance with the research questions (see Chapter 1) and reﬂect the principal
motivation of this thesis: to better understand the relevance and implications of
sequentially changing information within the decision making process.
As introduced in Chapter 4, information can be approached from many perspec-
tives, but the human mind is always at their center. Two important processes will
be studied: ﬁrst, the individual processing of information in isolation and second,
the influence that neighbors have on this individual process. As has been remarked
in previous sections, we want: (i) to observe how aggregated information operates
within a decision-making process to improve individual choices and (ii) to study how
additional information sources, in this case aggregated information via sensory expe-
rience and information exchange in groups, reduces/increases individual preference
uncertainties at the moment of choice, yielding better individual outcomes.
This chapter is devoted to explaining in detail the mathematical model, the work-
ing hypotheses and the experimental design. A series of secondary hypotheses (z-
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hypotheses) which will be tested as well can also be found here. These are seeking
to complement the ﬁndings after testing the three working hypotheses providing a
closer insight into our population and will be described below in accordance with
the experimental design.
6.1. Model
6.1.1. Mathematical Model
The underpinnings of the utility function, as introduced in Chapter 2, are the pos-
sible set of choices that individuals could attain constrained by the budget that
individuals determine to expend, that is, this function contains all the facts that
individuals take into account for their decisions. Consumption is deﬁned as the ﬁnal
using up of goods and services (the term excludes the use of intermediate prod-
ucts) and is diﬀerent from buying acts. Consumption depends on time and space.
Consumption habits are strongly related to cognitions (see Section 4.2) owned by
individuals characterizing their behavior. The habit stock at time t is represented
as a general adaptive process of the form:
ht = ht−1 + ζ · (ct−1 − ht−1). (6.1)
Here, if consumption is positive and 0 < ζ < 1, h will always be positive. The
parameter ζ indicates the speed with which habits ‘catch up’ with consumption.
The individual utility function Ui could be written in general terms as:
Ui = βui(c, h, Ai, Aj), (6.2)
where the own attitudes Ai are playing an important role adapting consumption to
the individual preferences in a given time. The neighbors’ attitudes Aj also con-
tribute to the choice process providing the individual with an external source of
information additional to the market. Because individuals are not living in iso-
lation, this external inﬂuences are distorting the pure individual choice in almost
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all situations, and (sometimes) are contributing to improve the individual choice,
yielding higher utility levels. Indeed a consumer has the goal to solve the problem:
max
T∑
s=t
U is = max
T∑
s=t
βs−tui(cs, hs, Ai, Aj), (6.3)
where hs is the habit stock and cs represents the consumption stock. The discount
factor β is strongly related to the consumer’s ability to adapt her consumption in
time, therefore β will be tuned by the learning function Li introduced below.
Given the hypothetical case where individuals make decisions without prior social
interaction, that is, only collecting infromation by their own and forming alone her
attitudes toward the object of choice, Equations 6.2 and 6.3 must be rewritten as a
degenerate model in the form:
Ui = βui(c, h, Ai), (6.4)
and its maximization takes the form:
max
T∑
s=t
U is = max
T∑
s=t
βs−tui(cs, hs, Ai) (6.5)
This apparently simpliﬁed version of the model without taking into account at-
titudes from the neighbors Aj could be in reality more eﬀort-demanding from the
DM herself. This case is designed for our experiment as the control treatment T1,
which will be explained in Section 6.5.1.
6.1.2. Multiagent System
Multi-agent systems have become a standard way to model populations of individ-
uals in economics (Tesfatsion et al., 2006) and for this reason we use this technique
in order to simulate the behavior of the individuals in a virtual experiment. For this
simulation, we made the following assumptions:
First Each individual is equipped with senses that allow her to interact with her
environment.
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Second She owns a cognitive system that allows her to store and exchange infor-
mation with neighboring individuals. With this two assumptions we want to
ﬁrstly theoretically approximate the eﬀect of the storage of information, and
secondly the eﬀect of the interaction with her environment.
Third The eﬀect of the interaction between individuals.
Stochastic choice models, brieﬂy introduced in Section 2.2, contain elements that
can be further applied in our model, but should be adapted to allow the modelation
of choices when the menu to choose is unknown or simply not given. Our aim in this
research work is to understand the inﬂuence of attitudes themselves and attitude
changes in the preference formation process. To achieve this, this model endowed
individuals with the ability to process and store information. The information owned
by our subjects is triggered by an external sensory experience (Tasting, Touching,
Hearing, Seeing, or Smelling) introduced to the system in ﬁve diﬀerent experimental
rounds.
Information processing may introduce attitude changes aﬀecting the individual
preferences, an aspect that has an ulterior eﬀect on the maximization of the individ-
ual utility function (see Chapter 3). An attitude can be measured as the aﬀective
valuation of that individual (Kahneman et al., 1999). This valuation is a measure
of the intensity of the emotional response to objects by using a Likers’ like scale.
Other aspects, as, for instance, how cognitive processes and persuasion may have
an inﬂuence on the attitudes (Greenwald et al., 1968), are not considered in this
model.
In a similar way as deﬁned by Kahneman et al. (1999), in our experiment, a scale
reﬂects the intensity of the individual response towards chocolate. This scale has four
diﬀerent steps representing diﬀerent grades of intensity in the sensory experience.
The modeling of the intensity in the sensory experience is not represented within
this model, since more details about the cognitive characteristics of the individuals
are required; instead we represent changes in this intensity in a discrete way, i.e.,
when an individual decides to change (or not to change) her aﬀective valuation. To
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represent this changes, we deﬁne a state Ai assigned to each individual representing
this attitude change. If there is a change, then Ai = 1; otherwise Ai = 0. We
additionally assume that if there is a change in the individual WTP from one round
to the next, then there is a high probability to observe an attitude change, with the
result that the WTP and the attitude (aﬀective valuation) are related.
A central problem is to relate the attitude change Ai with the mathematical
deﬁnition of information. Naturally, in a mathematical model it is rather diﬃcult
to represent the way in which the individual interaction with the environment is
stored in the individuals’ mind (see Section 4.2). Similarly, the interaction between
individuals, and the complexity of the cognitive aspects involved in the interpretation
of the natural language, are problems that surpasses the goals of the present model
(see, for instance, Perlovsky, 2011). For this reason, it is necessary to explicitly
model some relevant mechanisms involved in the information processing (such as
learning).
The individual i can learn from her sensory experiences. The learning process is
deﬁned in a similar way as a machine that is able to store one sensory experience
s in a corresponding neuron-like state σsi (where s corresponds to the number of
sensory experiences); this one is similar to the deﬁnition of a percepton in learning
theory (Engel and Broeck, 2001). This representation is also similar to a machine
that has diﬀerent sensors S, each sensor being connected to a single memory chip
σsi, which can store (σsi = 1) or cannot store (σsi = −1) the incoming information
from the sensor.
We introduce a learning function which is deﬁned as an interaction between the
diﬀerent neurons in the following way:  Li =
∑Λ
s=1 σs−1,iσsi + LS, where Λ is the
total number of neurons, and LS is the input of an external stimulus. Based on
the Shannon deﬁnition of information (Engel and Broeck, 2001; Shannon, 2001),
the total stored information is given by Ii = e
kL˙i , where k is the so-called learning
factor (Engel and Broeck, 2001).
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Once the individual i has a sensory experience S, the experience is stored in the
neuron (her memory) σsi. If there is a sensory experience S, then σsi can change
from σsi = −1 (no information stored) to σsi = 1 (information stored) if Ii ≤ r,
where r being a random number between 0 and 1. The number of the neurons Λ
depends on the number of sensory experiences S. Observe that the factor k deﬁnes
the disposition of the individual to learn: if k = 0, there is no change in the learning
function because Ii = 1. We arbitrary set in this model k = 0.5, which allow us a
continuous information storage. In other words, a sensory experience can be stored
if the individual has a disposition to learn. The storage and subsequent reaction of
the individual is related to the optimization of the stored information (Perlovsky,
2011).
The ﬁnal step is to connect the stored information with the disposition to change
the individual attitude Ai (remember that if Ai = 1, the agent has a disposition
to a change of attitude; Ai = 0 otherwise). We assume that the learning function
inﬂuences this attitude change: If Li
Λ
< 0.5 then Ai = 1; if not Ai = 0.
Similarly, if the agent considers the attitude change of her neighbors, then if
Li
Λ
+
∑NR
j=N
Lj
NR
· Λ > 0.5 then Ai = 1, where NR is the total number of neighbors j.
In other words, with this deﬁnition, the individual uses her sensory experiences as
well as the sensory experiences that she obtains (observes) from other individuals.
Finally, we relate WTP with the attitude change assuming that the gaps of WTP
are similar to
∑
iAi.
The ﬁrst step is relevant for the control treatment (making decisions in isolation),
whereas the second deﬁnition is relevant for the other three treatments. Thus, in-
formation processing is related to the optimization of the learning process (Engel
and Broeck, 2001) (by learning individuals could optimize their attitudes). There-
fore, the individual’s utility will be optimized through the attitude change (see, e.g.,
Manski, 1977).
90
6.2. Hypotheses
6.2.1. Working Hypotheses
Before now it was thought that one reason buyers search for information prior to
purchase was to reduce their uncertainty about the decision to tolerable levels (Cox,
1967; Hansen, 1972). Greater uncertainty presumably should lead to a more exten-
sive search (Lanzetta, 1963). The uncertainty reduction theory introduced by Berger
and Calabrese (1975) argues that individuals are motivated to seek information to
reduce uncertainty. The concept has implications for exploring communication as a
means for resolving incompatibilities and inconsistencies in human relationships as
well as experiences and behaviors in various settings. ‘Human beings by nature do
not like the unknown. Therefore we are endowed with an innate will and motivation
to reduce it in order to feel more comfortable and at ease’ (Berger and Calabrese,
1975, p.102). The persuasive power of information that triggers our senses play
a very important role here. As already summarized in Chapter 4, there is plenty
of research evidence suggesting that information gathered by the human senses is
crucially to choose (see, for instance, Hulte´n et al., 2009; Krishna, 2009; Lindstro¨m,
2005; Soars, 2009) and that the better use of information can improve decision
making (Petty and Cacciopo, 1986; Samuelson, 1938; Varian, 2006).
In the 1950’s two contradictory views on decision-making processes were explic-
itly expressed: On the one hand, there is the Homo Economicus who makes rational
choices after processing large amounts of information. This concept of perfect ratio-
nality, underlying neoclassical theory, states that the better informed the subjects,
the more accurate their choices. On the other hand, there is the concept of bounded
rationality, introduced by Simon (1955). He argues that since the individual capac-
ity to process information is limited, individuals cannot make reasonable choices. In
Simon’s (1971) words, ‘a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention’.
The following general hypotheses will be tested experimentally:
• H1. Information helps to reduce individual uncertainties. Individual
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preference uncertainty decreases if new information is aggregated within the
choice process. Therefore, individual choices are changing over time to close
the uncertainty gaps and reach better outcomes from their decisions.
Groups of people are more complex than the individual herself, because of het-
erogeneity in individual behavior, which makes the outcomes of social processes
uncertain. However, controlling social interaction could help individuals to improve
utility outcomes. Therefore, it is relevant to test the following two hypotheses by
a sequential experimental procedure, in which interactions between participants are
allowed. The allowed forms to interact will be explained in the experimental design
section.
• H2. Interaction as reinforcement of additional information has strong
effects on uncertainty reduction. Interaction with neighbors implies that
individuals exchange their impressions in between receiving additional infor-
mation to decide. This way, the process of interaction strongly decreases the
individual preference uncertainty.
• H3. Interaction among individuals contributes to forming consump-
tion trends. Information exchange about individual attitudes towards ob-
jects of choice reduces the heterogeneity in individual choice behavior because
of consensus formation.
Population dynamics imposed by preference interdependence are manifest in situ-
ations where individual preferences are the combined result of two components, one
of which is intrinsic1 and the other is collective2 (Schelling, 1978). The neighbor’s
inﬂuence decreases with geographic and social distance.3 Identiﬁcation, including
localization, is extremely diﬃcult in many cases, especially when unobserved het-
1Intrinsic components make reference to individual behavior and own attitude formation.
2Collective components are social influences as, for instance, interpersonal comparisons or opinion sharing.
These are also called ‘Neighborhood effects’ or ‘Contagion’ in the literature (see Lesourne et al., 2006).
3Glaeser et al. (1996).
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erogeneity is present.4 Also, an increment in the rate of adaptation destroys syn-
chronicity between agents and produces small interdependent clusters of similar
choice behavior, with the collective decision showing small ﬂuctuations around the
average.5
6.2.2. Secondary Hypotheses
Furthermore, the literature in consumer behavior remarks a series of facts inﬂuencing
the individual decision making that can be tested by means of collected informa-
tion. In which follows we present a short list of secondary hypotheses based on the
following ﬁndings:
1. Risk Aversion and Gender Differences
The literature in consumption research strongly support the argument of diﬀerences
between females and males. For example, in the document from OECD: Men and
Woman in OECD countries (OECD, 2008) one can ﬁnd the following research re-
sults: Single women (ie., women living alone) spend 10% of their food expenses on
vegetables; 8% on fruit, milk, cheese and eggs. Single men on the other hand spend
7% on vegetables; 5% on fruit, milk, cheese and eggs. Men spend more on bread, rice,
pasta, meat and alcoholic beverages (which constitutes 6% of their food expenses).
Women tend to spend more on sweets (sugar, fruit and honey) and seafood. Men
and women spend as much on oils. Other experimental results indicate, for instance,
that women are more susceptible to starting point bias6 than men, while men are
more susceptible to hypothetical bias than women. This seems to be interrelated
with women inherently being more uncertain than men when choosing from a choice
set (see Ladenburg and Bye Olsen, 2010).
4‘...[I]ncreased heterogeneity of beliefs will act to mitigate the potential for social factors to cause a community
to form a consensus’ (Brock and Durlauf, 1997, p. 17).
5This process is also known as ‘Social Percolation’ (Weisbuch and Stauffer, 2003).
6Starting point bias refers to starting bids by auctions that may apply (incorrectly) the appropriate range of
bids for evaluating an environmental good. Therefore, the respondent may give different values for a good based on
the initial bid suggested to her.
93
With regards to risk, theoretical evidence has found fewer women in sectors with
variable pay instead of ﬁxed wage (see Bonin et al., 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011).
There is evidence that risk aversion has a genetic basis (Miles et al., 2001) and also
that women tend be more risk-averse than men (Byrnes et al., 1999). From the
evolutionary perspective, risk aversion is likely to have been selected for in women:
A cautious, risk-averse mother would have had better chances of protecting her
children, and therefore passing on her genes to future generations. A tendency
toward risk taking, on the other hand, would have beneﬁted ancestral men as they
engaged in the competition for resources and mates (Wilson and Daly, 1985). For
instance, women put more time and eﬀort into shopping for Christmas presents than
men (Fischer and Arnold, 1990), avoiding the risk of giving an unpleasant gift.
Women enjoy shopping in general more than men do (Rook and Hoch, 1985).
Studies also show that women process information in advertising and product infor-
mation messages in a more detailed and comprehensive manner than men (Meyers-
Levy and Sternthal, 1991; Kempf et al., 2006; Laroche et al., 2000). Women also
tend to make more impulse purchases than men (Coley and Burgess, 2003; Dittmar
et al., 1995; Rook and Hoch, 1985). Kruger and Byker (2009) found that women
tend to carefully scrutinize products before buying them, prefer to choose from an
assortment of products, and are more likely than men to pay attention to when
items are likely to be on sale.
Thus we can formulate the following secondary hypotheses:
• Z1. Women are likely to pay more for chocolates than men.
• Z2. Women are more uncertain in their preferences than men.
• Z3. Women are more risk-averse than men.
• Z4. The higher the risk-seeking behavior, the higher the individual WTP.
• Z5. The more risk-averse the individuals, the thinner the WTP-Range interval
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2. Habits and Sensibility
Cigarettes and cigars contain chemicals that blunt the ability of the taste buds to
register each of the four types of ﬂavors, but do not destroy it altogether. Since
a signiﬁcant amount of smoke is exhaled through the nose, these same chemicals
aﬀect the olfactory nerve endings in a similar manner. The onset of these changes
is suﬃciently gradual to leave smokers unaware of them most of the time.
A study published in the journal BMC on Ear, Nose and Throat Disorders (Pavlos
et al., 2009) reported the eﬀects of smoking on the sensitivity of the tongue to a mild
electrical current that produces a distinctive metallic taste. Out of 62 participants
in the study, 28 were smokers, and this group scored signiﬁcantly worse than did
the 34 non-smokers. The researchers noted anatomical diﬀerences in the blood-ﬂow
supply to smokers’ taste buds as well as the taste buds’ shape. Indeed, we can
formulate the following hypotheses:
• Z6. Smokers will also be less sensible to sensory experiences and, therefore,
their WTP will remain more stable than for non-smokers.
• Z7. The WTP for Smokers is lower than for non-smokers.
3. Advertising and Signals from the Market
The old saying that any publicity is good publicity illustrates the belief that, even
if viewers respond negatively to forced advertising exposure, they are still being
exposed to the message, which will positively impact purchases. Ads do increase
consumers’ brand recall (De Pelsmacker et al., 2002; Mehta, 2000; Yoo et al., 2004),
recognition (Drze and Hussherr, 2003), and awareness (Pieters et al., 2002), and
could foster positive attitudes towards brands (Burns and Lutz, 2006; Cho and
Cheon, 2004; DePelsmacker et al., 2002), translating into increased sales (Barry
and Howard, 1990; Yoo et al., 2004). Deighton et al. (1994) describe this chain
of cognition of an ad, attitude formation, and purchase behavior, as a hierarchy
of eﬀects (Aaker and Day, 1974). This description of ideal individual behavior in
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markets, in particular to process information in the way that adverstisers desire, is
reﬂected also in our experimental design. Then we are able to prove the following
two hypotheses:
• Z8. Taking care about advertising leads to higher WTP.
• Z9. Taking care of market prices results in lower WTP.
Complementary to Z8 and Z9 and with regards to the knowledge about the ob-
ject of choice, individual consumption attitudes and the enjoyment exerted by our
participant by consuming chocolate, we can test the following secondary hypotheses:
• Z10. Individuals with a high level of initial knowledge about chocolates are less
likely to change their WTP within the experiment. That is, the eﬀect of the
newly added information to the system does not aﬀect the initial individual
decisions.
• Z11. A more frequent consumption drives individuals to better know the
purchased good. For this reason, it is expected that individuals with high
consumption frequencies of chocolates are less likely to change their WTP for
the chocolate.
• Z12. A more frequent consumption of chocolates reduces uncertainty in pref-
erences about chocolates.
• Z13. Individuals with a high level of enjoyment when consuming chocolates
are more likely to increase their WTP as sensory experiences are accumulating.
• Z14. The preference uncertainty of individuals with high level of enjoyment by
consuming chocolates is more likely to increase as new senses were triggered.
• Z15. The more habits are followed, the lower the individual uncertainty level
at the moment of choice.
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6.3. Collection of Experimental Data
This economic laboratory experiment was entirely programmed using Z-Tree7 and
conducted at the Labor fu¨r experimentelle und empirische Wirtschaftsforschung at
the University of Bremen in two blocks, the ﬁrst one on 30th June and 1st July and
the second on 10th and 11th December 2009.
This experiment was designed in four parts: In a ﬁrst part, we have asked for
habits, general knowledge and attitudes towards chocolate, in order to learn the
participants’ consistency between preferences and choices, and to observe the inﬂu-
ence of new information on their choices. In a second part, subjects had to choose a
Willingness-to-pay interval (maximal and minimal WTP to get the individualWTP-
range, see Section 5.4) designed to catch the uncertainties at the moment to decide,
and the uncertainty evolution after new information was aggregated. This second
part was designed in ﬁve rounds, each experimental round aimed to aggregate a
new piece of information to be integrated into the ﬁnal decision. The third part was
devoted to get a measure, or better say a classiﬁcation of the individual risk prefer-
ences of our subjects. To conclude, our participants ﬁlled out a social-demographic
questionnaire. These parts will be explained below in greater detail.
6.3.1. The Laboratory
The Labor fu¨r experimentelle und empirische Wirstchaftsforschung is located at the
faculty of economics at the campus of the University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany.
It consists of 20 computer stations working as a network and a central computer
to control them. The computers were separated from each other by a wooden wall,
isolating the participants. In this way, they were able to individually make choices,
and only if the experimentalist allows, they could communicate in between by means
of the computer interface. For each one of our eight experimental sessions, we
made use of the full laboratory capacity. Furthermore, the lab has video and sound
7Zurich Toolbox for Ready made Economic Experiments; Fischbacher, U., 2009; version 3.3.6
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facilities.
For our study we made use of 180 subjects recruited via ORSEE, the On-line
Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2004). Thanks to this
On-line-Tool, we got students from the diﬀerent faculties at the university campus,
40 students for each of the four treatments and a reserve of 20 subjects.
6.3.2. Chocolate: The Object of Choice
We deal with a very well-established product, which at least the majority of our
participants should be familiar with (in general, the objects which inﬂuence the de-
cisions of the participants may be no artiﬁcial products because the object of choice
must have the possibility to be linked with ‘real own experiences and memories’).
Moreover, the objects should bring the possibility to guarantee identical tasks by the
experimental subjects. Chocolate does not require any special explanation because
most consumers are familiar with it. The countless features and taste directions
owned by chocolate oﬀer a wide range of actions which is crucial to develop the
present project. Additionally, chocolate is suitable for direct consumption and al-
lows a systematic sensory experience through all of one’s senses (seeing, touching,
hearing, smelling, tasting). These facts play a determinant role in the decision pro-
cess and supply us with important knowledge for this research. However, we choose
a not very common sort of chocolate, to makke sure that the individuals have to
follow the whole sensory experience to make a more certain buying decision.
The consumption is conditioned by past experiences and new inventions are dif-
ﬁcult to accept. Consumers always tend to unconsciously choose things which they
are familiar with. Nevertheless, over the years the way in which individuals have
consumed chocolate has changed and has become specialized. New ﬂavors and new
ingredients with diﬀerent concentrations have been introduced, oﬀering more possi-
bilities to the consumers. Indeed, the number of consumers who consciously search
chocolate bars made with high quality cocoa (and other ingredients) has increased
in recent years. However, this kind of consumers remain a small minority. Maybe
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it exists a strong resistance to change consumption habits, despite the eﬀorts of
chocolate producers.
6.3.3. The Basic Design
Considering the features introduced in Chapter 2, 3, and 4, the designed experiment
is based on the processing of informational contributions of the ﬁve human senses,
which are systematically stored in our memories after sensory experiences, and then
used in upcoming choices. The importance of additional information to improve
or distort choices contributing to reduce uncertainties is accounted for by allowing
individuals to exchange information in between.
At the beginning of each session, subject were given audio instructions, followed
by two welcome computer screens (in Appendix B). The experiment was divided in
four parts as sketched in Figure 6.1.
BASIC EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
1. Knowledge, Attitudes and Habits
2. Sensory Experience & Preference Elicitation
3. Test of Risk Attitudes
4. Socio-Demographic Questionnaire
Figure 6.1.: Basic Experimental Design. Own Design.
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6.4. Knowledge, Attitudes, and Habits
6.4.1. Measuring Subjects’ Knowledge
As introduced above, in the ﬁrst part of the experiment our participants had to
answer a series of questions aimed at revealing their general knowledge about choco-
late, their attitudes towards the object of choice and the purchase habits they are
normally following. Individual answers giving in this part of the experiment will
be introduced as controls for the statistical analysis. The ﬁrst two questions were
designed to reveal the initial level of knowledge owned by our subjects about choco-
late.8
1. Knowledge, Attitudes and Habits
Knowledge about provenance, designation of 
origin of cacao, and Firms.
Frequency and enjoyment level of 
chocolate consumption
Habits to buy a chocolate bar
FIRST PART
Figure 6.2.: First Part of the Experiment.
• First, they must choose from a list of names to discern which of them are real
names of cacao.
8A translation of this set of questions into English can be found in Appendix B .
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• Then, they were confronted with a list of countries to choose the one producing
the best cacao.
6.4.2. Hedonic Questions: Attitudes
The second set of questions were aimed at inducing the subject to reveal the fre-
quency and level of enjoyment of chocolate consumption.
• Here, our aim was to extract how often do individuals consume the product.
In other words, are they familiarized with its consume? For this purpose,
we used a frequency scale from 0 to 4, 0 indicating no consumption, and 4
indicating a very frequent consumption (at least once a day).
• How pleasant is the consumption of the product for the subjects? For answer-
ing this question the subjects qualify in a hedonic scale from 0 to 7 the amount
of pleasure they perceive when they consume chocolate.
This set of questions demands perceptually (and cognitively) a diﬀerent task and
should therefore not be mixed with a sensory analysis. That is why we apply these
questions in the ﬁrst part of the experiment and before the subjects participate in
sensory experiences.
6.4.3. Habits
The next set of questions was designed to identify which habits the participants
employ to make purchase decisions about a chocolate bar.9 Normally a ‘conscious’
consumption is more likely to yield higher satisfaction levels and thus is easier to
attain through familiarity. That is why habits predict future behavior better than
intentions do (see Ronis et al., 1989, p.221). The more habits the individuals are
following, the higher the aﬃliation with the consumed good and therefore, there
will be a low desire to replace the habitually consumed good with a new one (switch
9See Appendix B for the translation into English of the applied questions.
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preferences to a new good). Furthermore, the more habits, the stronger the rela-
tionship of the consumer with the product and, therefore, the consumer has a high
level of knowledge about this product.
6.5. Sensory Analysis and Sensory Experience
Each of our ﬁve senses, sight, smell, touch, hearing and taste, contributes to a
diﬀerent experience. The sum of the contributed experience of each of our senses as
a whole concept is called a sensory experience. A sensory experience is the result
of the reactions of the senses to diﬀerent impulses or triggers normally used in
marketing research. These triggers are called stimuli in a traditional psychological
context.
In order to understand under which informational conditions the subjective prefer-
ences are stable and which kind of information generates instabilities in individuals,
we directed the participants through a sensory experience with high quality choco-
late. In the same way as a wine tasting is conducted, we divided this part into ﬁve
experimental rounds, each round being devoted to incentivize (trigger) one of the
ﬁve human senses, as shown in Figure 6.3.
Following Figure 4.3, each round was subdivided into three parts. In the ﬁrst part,
we trigger one of our subjects ﬁve senses (information phase), in the second part
the subjects process this experience and produce new information to be added to
the purchase criteria (deliberation phase). In the third part, the subjects make
declarations about their willingness to pay for a whole chocolate bar of 100 gr
of the same sort they had ‘experienced’ (implementation phase according to their
preferences and memories.
6.5.1. The Four Treatments
We conduct four diﬀerent treatments aimed at understanding the way in which
new information (after subjects have gone through sensory experiences) aﬀect the
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2. Sensory Experience & Preference Elicitation
SECOND PART
Taste the piece of chocolate
Hear the piece of chocolate
Touch the piece of chocolate
Smell the piece of chocolate
See the piece of chocolate
After 5th. Round Apply BDM-like-Mechanism
State WTP
State WTP
State WTP
State WTP
State WTP
Figure 6.3.: Second Part of the Experiment: Information Aggregation Through Sensory
Experiences.
stability of individual preferences and aﬀect individual uncertainties. As already
introduced in Chapter 4, information is crucial to make decisions and the higher the
persuasive power of information, the more likely it becomes that individuals improve
their subjective utilities. In Section 6.1.1, we made use of four diﬀerent dynamics
of information aggregation, implementing one of them in each experimental treat-
ment. By these diﬀerent information dynamics, the information exchange between
subjects and the amount of aggregated information were controlled by changing the
composition of groups and the assignation of partners for the diﬀerent treatments.
We allowed our subjects to receive information from two diﬀerent sources: from
the experimenter, via computer screens, leading the participants through a sensory
experience, and via information exchange through chat interfaces which appear au-
tomatically on their computer screens after the corresponding sense was triggered.
The first treatment has been designed as benchmark treatment, in which subjects
were not able to exchange information with anyone else. Instead, they only receive
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Experience Choice
Information Information Information
Response Response Response
First Step Second Step Fifth Step
FINAL 
CHOICE
.......
maxWTP
minWTP
maxWTP
ExperienceExperience Choice Choice
minWTP minWTP
maxWTP
Figure 6.4.: Design of control treatment. After aggregation of information, individual i makes a
choice and gives a response (in terms of maximal and minimal WTP). After i has
given five responses, she must make her final choice. Dashed lines and boxes indicate
the process in the subject’s mind during each experimental round.
information from the experimenter and the decisions are made individually (see
Figure 6.4). This treatment is called T1.
For the second (T2), third (T3), and fourth (T4) treatments, we allow the subjects
to communicate with a randomly selected partner via chat. After each round of
information aggregation, a chat interface appears. Through this chat interface, they
are allowed to exchange attitudes, impressions, or even their individual decisions
in form of a cheap talk where bidirectional communication was possible. Figure 6.5
shows the process of information exchange between participants for one experimental
round.
The T2 treatment has been designed under a partner protocol, that is, groups of
two people were matched at random for the ﬁrst round and remained ﬁx within the
ﬁve rounds. The time assigned to each chat session (each experimental round) was
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limited to 60 seconds. To guarantee anonymity, revealing an individual’s identity
was not allowed. Participants were encouraged to feel free to express their feelings,
expectations and attitudes with their partners. After the information exchange via
chat, each subject made her decisions individually.
Figure 6.5.: Basic Design of T2, T3 and T4. After information is aggregated, individual i is able to
share experiences with her partner j. Then, they give individual responses (in terms
of WTP). After the fifth and last round they individually make a final choice. For
T3, individuals become a new partner for each experimental round.
T3 diﬀers from T2 only in the protocol applied to match participants: a stranger
protocol. By this, groups are selected at random from the participants pool sepa-
rately for each round. The used chat interface, the group size (two persons), the
time to chat and the rules are the same as in T2. Subjects make all their decisions
individually. This slight diﬀerence introduces a diﬀerent dynamic, in which individ-
ual i does not remain ﬁx (thus, she cannot learn from her partner j or easily imitate
her behavior in more than a round) inhibiting the raising of a trust feeling among
the group within time.
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For the treatment T4, we increase the group size to ﬁve people. Here, after the
ﬁrst round of information aggregation, ﬁve people are allowed to communicate with
each other within the group via chat. As the group size was increased, the time
to chat was incremented to 150 seconds. Here, as in the Partner treatment, our
subjects our subjects follow a partner protocol, in which the group members remain
the same along the ﬁve rounds. The decisions at the end of each round are made
individually.
Table 6.1 summarizes the experimental design showing the similarities and diﬀer-
ences across treatments. We run each of the four treatments with 40 participants in
two sessions; each session was held with 20 participants and lasted approximately 40
minutes. Each participant received a ﬁrst endowment of 500 ECU; 1 ECU=1/100
EUR, enabling her to make purchase decisions without spending her own budget.10
Additionally, we ensured the same initial budget conditions for all our subjects. In
all treatments, each experimental round decisions were made individually.
Table 6.1.: Experimental Design by Treatments
Treatment Number of Subjects Group Size Chat Interaction Group Matching
T1 40 1 not allowed no matching
T2 40 2 yes Partner protocol
T3 40 2 yes Stranger protocol
T4 40 5 yes Partner protocol
No show-up fee was paid. Payment was based on the buying behavior (preferences)
plus an extra payment earned in a lottery designed to estimate the individual risk
attitude following Holt and Laury (2002), as introduced in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.
One of the chosen lottery from ten pairs proposed is randomly drawn and played.
If an individual wins, she additionally receives the lottery outcome. Otherwise she
receives only the outcome from the sensory experience part.
10This fact is particularly important to be remarked, because people spending their own budget behave more
cautious avoiding losses. We expect that choices are made freely from this feelings by giving some money to our
participants at the beginning.
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6.5.2. Questionnaire
4. Socio-Demographic Questionnaire
FOURTH PART
Gender
Regular Behavior to Buy
Smoking Habits
Innovative Products
Following up Trends
Influence of Marketing 
Figure 6.6.: Fourth Part of the Experiment.
At the end of the experimental session, and after our subjects completed the whole
lottery task, they would complete a social-demographic questionnaire, corresponding
to the fourth part of the experiment, as presented in Figure 6.6, aiming at a better
characterization of our subject pool, and their general purchase attitudes. The
results and ﬁndings will be described in the next chapter and computer screens
applied in the experiment with the original questions can be seen in Appendix F.
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7. Results and Discussion
7.1. Generalities About Our Population
The chocolate experiment was completed by a total of 160 subjects, divided into
four treatments. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for each group of
subjects allocated in the diﬀerent treatments are summarized in Table 7.1. The
participation of female and male subjects were relatively balanced (nearly 50% for
each gender). The treatment with the highest percentage of women participating
in it was T4 with 55%. The percentage of smokers was relatively small, with a
remarkable diﬀerence for T1, in which the smokers represented more than a quarter
of the total. The averaged number of companies producing chocolates that our
participants knew was almost the same for all treatments and the dispersion of
these data was also similar across treatments.
Table 7.1 summarizes the answers given to the questionnaire applied at the end
of the experiment. To analize the attitudes and certainty of a subject’s preferences,
we applied two diﬀerent categories of questions: the ﬁrst set of questions was aimed
to measure the individual attitudes at the moment when a chocolate bar is bought.
Here we ask about the individual sensibility to advertisement of chocolates and the
market price of them. The second category was devoted to revealing individual
attitudes inﬂuencing purchase choices in general as well as the individual tendency
to consume innovations, follow up trends and/or to positively react to advertisement
via mass media.
To buy chocolates, our participants react stronger to the market price (up to 90%)
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Table 7.1.: Summary of Socio-demographic Statistics
All Treatments Alone Partner Stranger Group
Gender (female=1) 46.88% 42.50% 45% 45% 55%
Smokers 16.25% 27.50% 7.50% 15% 15%
Average of Brands Known 4.30 4.40 4.42 3.97 4.42
(1.96) (1.85) (2.06) (1.94) (2.06)
Subjective Attitudes to Purchase
Reaction to Chocolates’ Advertisement 40.62% 50% 42.50% 25% 45%
Reaction to Chocolates’ Market Price 95.62% 97.50% 97.50% 90% 97.50%
General Reaction to Innovations 2.04 1.47 2.32 2.35 2
(0.98) (0.55) (1.09) (0.97) (0.98)
General Reaction to Follow Trends 1.88 2.07 1.72 1.72 2
(1.01) (0.82) (1.02) (1.54) (0.98)
General Reaction to Advertisement 1.67 1.65 1.85 1.62 1.67
(1.09) (1.12) (1.,12) (1.02) (1.14)
Individual Risk Attitudes
Average of Option A following H&L Test 4.75 5.27 4.22 4.90 4.60
(2.37) (2.08) (2.39) (2.35) (2.58)
Notes: This table reports the percentage of the sample belonging to a particular category
or sample means (with standard deviations in parentheses).
than to advertisement. The participants in T3 were the less sensitive (only 25% of
this population took advertisement into account). With regards to general subjective
attitude to buying (in a scale from 0 to 4), we found out that our participants reacted
stronger to innovations introduced to the market and to trends than to advertisement
in general. This last result conﬁrms the low level of reaction to advertisement of
chocolates.
As already mentioned in Section 5.5, the subjective risk was measured through the
procedure suggested by Holt and Laury (2002). In average the more ‘risk seeking’
participants were found at T3, whereas the more conservative group were the par-
ticipants in T1. However, this averaged results present a high standard deviation.
The results of this part will be applied to the econometric analysis as controls (see
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mainly tables A.1, A.2, and A.4) and discussed in greater detail in Section 7.1.3.
7.1.1. Knowledge, Enjoyment and Habits Apriori
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, we seek to outline a portrait about how individu-
als normally behave when they are confronted to a chocolate purchase decision. For
this purpose, as introduced in Section 6.4, we divide this part into three subparts,
the ﬁrst being devoted to examining the knowledge level of our individuals about
chocolate, the second subpart is focused on the enjoyment and frequency in which
they usually consume chocolate, and in the third subpart, individuals chose from a
list the attributes taken into account at the moment of buying a chocolate bar.
Pre-Knowledge
In the ﬁrst subpart of the experiment, we ask a couple of questions aimed to reveal
the level of knowledge of our participants about our object of choice (see Section
6.3.3 and Appendix B).
In the ﬁrst question, individuals were asked about the names designating cocoa
after its provenance (designation of origin of cacao). For this purpose, individuals
have to choose from a list of ﬁve diﬀerent names. In general, individuals do not have
a signiﬁcant level of knowledge about these designations. Only for chocolate from
Venezuela (Chocolate Maracaibo) the amount of right answers was relatively high.
The percentage of people choosing the ‘No-Idea’ option was relatively high, especially
for T1.1 In average, for T1, our participants showed the lowest initial knowledge,
while the highest level was found in T3 (Stranger Treatment). The results for the
four applied treatments are displayed in Table 7.2. The right possible answers are
in black, the wrong in red and the ‘No-Idea’ ﬁeld was oﬀered to encourage people
to be honest in their answers.
The second question was designed to explore the level of knowledge about coun-
1It is interesting is to note that individuals have chosen this last option after they had already chosen other
options from the list. This fact explains why our results are over 100%.
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Table 7.2.: Names of Chocolate (%)
Treatment Trinitario Amazonas Guarana´ Alpujarra Maracaibo no idea
T1 9 10 10 7.5 22.5 70
T2 10 18 20 12.5 42.5 38
T3 10 23 33 5 47.5 38
T4 10 13 28 5 37.5 47
All 9.75 16 22.75 7.5 37.5 48.25
Treatment Bolivia Grenada Venezuela Ivory Coast Madagascar no idea
T1 42.5 2.5 45 0 22.5 35
T2 47.5 0 45 23 30 25
T3 40 2.5 48 28 22.5 10
T4 45 2.5 55 28 25 15
All 43.75 1.87 48.25 19.75 25 21.25
tries producing high quality cocoa around the world. The results are summarized
in Table 7.2 (red for wrong options, and black for right options). The percentage of
people choosing wrong options was higher than for the ﬁrst question, but in general
individuals were more conﬁdent to choose the ’no-Idea’ option less frequently. In
average, the higher level of initial knowledge about cocoa names and its provenance
is to ﬁnd in the Group treatment.
Initial Attitudes Towards Chocolate Consumption
As already introduced in section 6.4, we also asked also our participants about the
frequency in which they consume chocolates and the level of enjoyment that they
experience by consuming them. We employ a consumption-scale between 0 and
4, with 0=‘never’; 1= ‘at least once a year’; 2= ‘at least once a month’; 3= ‘at
least once a week’; 4=‘at least once a day’. We found out that, in average, our
individuals consumed chocolate quite often. The highest rate of consumption was
found in the subjects participating in the Partner treatment with a comsumption-
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frequency-average of 3.2 The lowest consumption rate was found in T1, with an
average consumption of 2.65 (relatively high consumption) between ‘At least once
a mounth’ (2) and ‘At least once a week’ (3). These results are shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3.: Enjoyment of Chocolate
Treatment Frequency Consumption (0-4) Enjoy Scale
T1 2.65 (Relative often consumption) 71.47
T2 3 (Often consumption) 81.92
T3 2.92 (Often consumption) 72.25
T4 2.97 (Often consumption) 79.87
All 2.88 (Often consumption) 76.377
With regards to the hedonic question about the level of enjoyment experienced
by chocolate consumption, in a scale from zero to hundred (0 = no pleasure at
all; 100 = inﬁnite pleasure) we found out that in average, the level of enjoyment
is relatively high. The highest pleasure was found in the individuals participating
at the Partner treatment (in concordance with the results of the question about
frequency of consumption) with an average level of 81.925 points. The lowest level
was given for the participants in the Alone treatment with 71.475 points. The
averages for the four treatments are summarized in Table 7.3.
Consumer Buying Habits Regarding Chocolate
The next step was to ask our participants about some attributes to take into account
when they face purchase decisions about a chocolate bar. The list of these attributes
is presented in Appendix B.
In average, the attributes ‘Percentage of Cocoa’, ‘Recommendation from other
people’, and ‘Appearance’ of the chocolate bar are the attributes more taken into
account for our participants, with ‘Appearance’ has the highest percentages. The
2See Appendix B for the translation of this set of questions.
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Table 7.4.: Habits to Buy Chocolates (%).
Treatment Cocoa Fat Organic farming Recommended Appearance Provenance
T1 57.5 15 10 47.5 77.5 5
T2 77.5 20 25 45 77.5 2.5
T3 52.5 10 25 50 65 12.5
T4 52.5 10 15 37.5 70 5
All 60 13.75 18.75 45 72.5 6.25
participants in T2 appear to make in average more conscious choices, as they at-
tain the highest scores of answers, despite the last asked attribute, the ‘Provenance’
appears to be negligible for them (for the four groups of participants, the less impor-
tant attributes are ‘Fat’ and ‘Provenance’). The averaged results are summarized
in Table 7.4.
7.1.2. Preliminary Information and Decisions
To account for the amount of pre-information owned by our participants and the
way this information was accumulated, the following method has been applied: As
explained in the former section, in the ﬁrst part of the experiment we asked the
participants about their knowledge about chocolate, i.e., about its provenance and
the habits they are following up to buy a chocolate bar. We asked our participants
two questions about knowledge. For the ﬁrst question there were three right answers
and for the second there were two. For each right answer, each individual earned one
‘informational’ point. Additionally, we gave them a list of six habits and their only
task was to reveal which of these habits they are following up to buy chocolate. For
each habit they would also earn one point. It is possible to approximate individual
answers to earned points taking into account that each accepted information could
be reduced to a ‘bit’ of information. We account only for ‘habits’ and ‘knowledge’
categories given the hedonic nature of the enjoyment of consumption. This mech-
anism was only applied to analyze the answers in these categories and it had not
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inﬂuence in experimental earns.
Table 7.5.: Full Pre-informed (‘ideal’) Consumer.
Knowledge Habits
11111 111111
If individuals reach a maximum of eleven points, we can call them ’well-informed’
participants, who are not likely to change their decisions when additional information
is given, because they already ‘know’ what they want (this case is illustrated in Table
7.5). Averaged answers given within the experiment have been summarized in Tables
7.2 and 7.4. ‘Habits’ and ‘knowledge’ are more likely to be directly inﬂuenced by
new information, whereas the level of enjoyment will change only after repeated
trials of the product.3
The distributions of the initial information in these two categories of our partici-
pants as percentage of the eleven and total informational points and its distribution
among the population is summarized in Figure 7.1. We found out that, despite a
high degree of heterogeneity, the individuals have similar low levels of preliminar
information. The maximal frequency of answers summarized in the histograms is
around 30%, that means, we could only give three to four points for right answers
and habits from a total of eleven.
The highest level of heterogeneity among the population is to ﬁnd at the T1 in
which the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the left of the ﬁgure. For T2,
the distribution appears to be ‘more distributed’ around the mean, and the left and
right tails are relatively more symmetric and shorter, indicating a clusterization of
individual answers. Flat-topped distributions reveals a higher heterogeneity for T3
an T4. A summary of the descriptive statistics for these data is to ﬁnd in Appendix
3To evaluate the pre-informational level of our participants, we are only taking into account the amount of
habits and the general knowledge. However, given the kind of information we were aggregating, and the way we
chose to make it, the individual attitude will be also susceptible to change according to the individual enjoyment
and vice-versa.
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Figure 7.1.: Pre-Information Owned by Our Participants and its Distribution (Percentage).
G in Table G.1.
Table 7.6.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Initial Information. H0: The data set is normally
distributed.
Treatment W p-Value H0
T1 0.92** 0.016 reject
T2 0.921*** 0.008 reject
T3 0.956 0.128 not reject
T4 0.953* 0.094 reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
A Shapiro-Wilk normality test for each treatment was conducted (see Table 7.6).4
These results do not allow us to handle the data as usual. To analize the variances of
the initial information between treatments, a Friedman Test was run, yielding a p-
4W ∈ [0, 1]. The closer W is to one, the more ‘normal’ are the data distributed. However, the level of statistical
significance is more helpful to interpret it.
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value of 0.1991. At a significance level of 5%, we cannot conclude that the variances
of the initial information are different between treatments. In a nutshell, for our four
treatments we have had a heterogeneous subject pool with a low level of knowledge,
a relatively high level of consumption and of enjoyment by consuming chocolates.
Additionally, all the treatments are sharing similarities in their composition.
7.1.3. Risk Attitudes
The individual risk attitude of our participants is distributed as in table 7.7. The
average for the four treatments is around 5, indicating that in average, the partici-
pant is changing from the sure option A to the other option B after the 5th par of
lotteries was oﬀered. The most risk-neutral participants are to ﬁnd in T1, whereas
the more risky ones are to ﬁnd in T2, where the average of option A lies at only
4.22. In T1, our benchmark treatment, the majority of subjects chose the safe op-
tion when the probability of the higher pay-oﬀs was small, and then crossed over
the option B without even going back to option A. Option A, the safe option, yield
in average 5.27.
Table 7.7.: Distribution of Risk Attitudes in the Participants Following the Laury and Holt Test
(2002).
Treatment Risk Averse Risk Neutral Risk Seeking Average Zeros
T1 22 8 10 5.27 0
T2 20 7 13 4.22 5
T3 18 8 14 4.90 5
T4 14 9 17 4.60 5
Mean 18.5 8 13.5 4.75 3.75
Comparing the results for this part of the experiment between treatments, we
found out that for T1, in which individuals made all decisions without prior infor-
mation exchange, individuals are more risk-averse than in the other three treatments.
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For T2, where a partner protocol was implemented, the information exchange makes
people more conﬁdent about changing their risk attitude. In T3, where individuals
got a new partner for each round, the result again that the subjects were increasing
the risk attitude, and for T4, where individuals interact in groups of ﬁve people,
their self-conﬁdence level increases again. The column named ‘Zeros’ shows the
amount of people in each treatment that never choose the sure option A.
Figure 7.2.: Risk Attitude of the Population.
In decision environments like the present experiment, risk attitudes over a wide
range of payoﬀs help to characterize the population and to predict their behavior.
Here, we can expect that the most risky participants, namely those in the partner
treatment, are more likely to change their decisions after new information is given.
Our payoﬀ for the lotteries were between 0.13 EUR and 5 EUR, and the probabilities
of the lotteries where increased in 10%. For detailed information, see Figure E.2.
Figure 7.2 shows the risk attitudes of our participants for the four treatments.
We found a higher amount of risk-averse participants for T1. It is interesting to
observe that this decrease in risk aversion remains unchanged as we move across
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7.2.1. Maximal WTP for the Four Treatments
The Treatment T1 shows in average a lower maximal WTP compared to the other
three treatments (see Figure 7.3). Comparing the ﬁrst (R1) and the ﬁfth and last
rounds (R5), we observe that for T1, T2 and T3 treatments the maximal WTPs
increases, whereas the participants in T4 are reducing their maximal WTPs as
individuals’ senses are triggered. The highest average of maximal WTP was found in
T2 where the average of maximal WTPs increased after each round. It is interesting
to note that in average the maximal WTP does not reach 150 ECU (its maximum
is reached in the fourth round of T3 and is exactly 147.175 equivalent to 1.47 EUR,
still below the real market price of the chocolate applied in the experiment). A
F-Test (F (19, 781) = 1.843, p = 0.015) showed that the variances of the maximal
WTPs diﬀer from treatment to treatment.
Figure 7.4.: Distribution of the Maximal WTP Among the Population of i Individuals for the Five
Experimental Rounds and T1, T2, T3 and T4.
The distributions of the maximal WTPs among the population as a function of
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time (ﬁve subﬁgures from R1 to R5) for the four treatments are shown in Figure 7.4.
Here, several changes in the structure of the histograms can be observed, especially
for the three treatments where information exchange was allowed (T2, T3 and T4).
For T2 and T4, we found a high frequency of answers around 50 ECU, 100 ECU
and 200 ECU. However, for T2 the higher frequency was found around 100 ECU
and for T4 around 50 ECU and 200 ECU.
The evolution of T1 and T3 within the experiment is similar: almost all individual
answers in R5 have been concentrated around an interval. However, in T3 we found
a higher concentration of answers around 100 ECU and there are less outliers in
comparison to T1, where the answers are less concentrated oscillating between 0
ECU and 150 ECU. Here one could observe a clear diﬀerence in the answers in
each treatment, where the structure and the dynamics of the information exchange
inside each network generates diﬀerences in the individual answers. The descriptive
statistics for these data are summarized in Appendix G, in Tables G.2, G.4, G.6,
and G.8.
A Shapiro-Wilk normality test was conducted for the four treatments and the ﬁve
experimental rounds to closer study the shapes of their histograms. For the ﬁve
rounds of T3, one can reject the normality hypothesis at a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
For the other treatments the p-values oscillate between 0 and 0.18. These results
are summarized in Tables G.3, G.5, G.7, G.9 in Appendix G.
After the qualitative analysis of the data collected in the four treatments, a formal
econometric analysis needs to be done in order to test the statistical signiﬁcance of
these results. With the aim to prove the diﬀerences in individual behavior across
treatments and the inﬂuence of personal characteristics and attitudes in the compo-
sition of groups, we conducted an ANCOVA regression analysis with the Maximal
WTP as dependent variable. To allow for heteroscedasticity of the error term, we
apply an OLS regression with a White’s hetereroscedacity robust covariance matrix.
Table A.1 summarizes the results for eight diﬀerent econometric models. Models
I to IV contain only the dummy Alone (corresponding to T1). Here the models
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are only diﬀerent in in including or not including the personal characteristics and
attitudes of our participants as controls. This treatment represents the hypothetical
situation of decision making in isolation. The models V to VIII contain the three
dummy variables Partner, Stranger and Group and also diﬀer in the inclusion of the
control variables Personal Characteristics and Attitudes. The experimental design
does not allow to include the four treatments in the same group of regressions for
three reasons:
1. It is expected that the allowed information exchange in T2, T3 and T4 modiﬁes
the individual attitudes and therefore, their ﬁnal choices. Therefore, own (Ai)
and incoming (Aj) attitudes (revealed through the chat interface), and the
times of individual interactions in each experimental round must be included
to prove the modulation eﬀect of these three variables on individual choices.
2. T1 treatment was conceived in the design as benchmark and must be handled
as standard from which the other treatments diﬀer.
3. To avoid perfect multicolinearity in the panel data.
Models I and V only consider the dummy variables. Models II to IV and VI
to VIII also include the controls for attitudes and personal characteristics of our
participants. The treatment variables considered in the regression for models I to
VIII were:
• Period: refers to the experimental rounds.
• Alone: Dummy variable for T1, where the participants take their decisions
in isolation. It will be analyzed in models I to IV and considered as the
benchmark variable for models V to VIII.
• Partner: Dummy variable for T2 where the interaction with an individual
was allowed. As its name indicates, this treatment was conducted under a
partner protocol, where the assigned partner remains the same over the ﬁve
experimental rounds.
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• Stranger: Dummy variable for T3. Here, as in the Partner treatment, our
participants could interact with a partner. For each experimental round, a
new partner was assigned.
• Group: Dummy variable for T4. Within this treatment, individuals exchange
information in groups of ﬁve people. This treatment was conducted under a
partner protocol.
• Attitude of i: Quantiﬁes the attitudes of individual i exchanged by the
chat interface within T2, T3 and T4. After disentangling the information
exchanged, we account for attitudes by using a Likert’s scale (see Section
6.3.3) and add the scale values.
• Attitude of j: Quantiﬁes the attitudes of individual j exchanged via chat in-
terface within T2, T3 and T4. After disentangling the information exchanged,
we apply a Likert’s scale.
• Interactions: Times that each individual interact in chats for each experi-
mental round. It is a measure of individual information gathering aimed to
reduce uncertainty.
The variables entering regressions in models II to IV and VI to VIII (see Table A.1)
are mainly divided into two groups: Personal Characteristics and Attitudes. As
already introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the personal characteristics can
be subdivided into three subcategories: the ﬁrst two items physically characterize
our participants, the following three items extract their knowledge about chocolate
and the next two items ask about chocolate consumption. The Attitudes can also
be divided into three subgroups, where the ﬁrst item describes the risk attitudes
for lotteries of our participants following the methodology proposed by Laury and
Holt (2003). The following ﬁve items in the list are depicting the subjective risk
self-conception by asking for their attitudes by facing decisions in the marketplace.
The last six items refer to the habits followed by our subjects’ individual purchase
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decisions for chocolate bars. Additionally, Table A.5 summarizes regressions for
these variables for the subsamples, that is, for the four treatment variables, and the
variables are listed in Table 7.9.
We found out that the critical values of F are always smaller than the F-values
in the regressions, the statistical hypothesis that a regressor is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero should be rejected. This result indicates that a dependence exists between
the independent and the dependent variables in the regression. To quantify the
severity of multicollinearity in the data, we calculate the Variance Inﬂation Factor
test, VIF. Here, the highest value was 3.079 (see Table 7.8), enough to ensure that
the collinearity present in the data sets will not cause problems in the regressions.5
Table 7.8.: Variance Inflation Factor for Models V to VIII
Partner Stranger Group Attitude of i Attitude of j Interactions
VIF 2.257 2.276 3.079 1.057 1.010 2.201
For the eight models considered, the four treatment dummies have statistically
signiﬁcant parameters (see table A.1). The Alone variable presents negative and
signiﬁcant parameters for the four estimated models, whereas the other three treat-
ment dummies are always positive (except the Group parameter in model VI). As
already shown in table 7.3, there is an increment in the maximal WTP for the
Partner, Stranger and Group treatments.
With regard to the attitude of the information exchanged in chats, it can clearly
be seen that the own attitudes have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect by determining
the individual maximal WTP. It is interesting to observe that the parameters of the
others’ attitudes are negative and non-signiﬁcant for all models. The size is small
in respect of the own attitude parameters.
As statistically expected, by including the individual attitudes and personal char-
5V IF > 10 reveals severe multicollinearity, enough to cause problems in the regression. V IF > 30 indicates
problems in the data. (See Kutner et al., (2004), for an in-depth discussion about this topic.)
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acteristics, the ﬁt of the regressions increases. However, the eﬀect of these variables
is not only due to the increasing amount of regressors. By including the individual
characteristics in the diﬀerent regression models, we wanted to analyze the homo-
geneity of these characteristics for each group participating in each treatment and,
at the same time, its inﬂuence to choose the maximal WTP. By introducing the
individual attitudes, it is possible to better modulate the individual preferences of
our participants. For this purpose, we introduce the questions applied before the
sensory experience and the answers to the questionnaire.
By means of the incremental F-Test, it can be seen that changes of R
2
in model
II, III and IV (corresponding to T1 with personal characteristics), model VI, VII
and VIII (considering together T2, T3, and T4) are signiﬁcant, revealing that the
introduction of new variables improves the ﬁtness of the models.6 However, the
introduction of these controls for both regression sets implies a loss of explanatory
weight of the treatment variables.7 Here, we also found several interesting eﬀects,
summarized in Table A.5.
The attitude coeﬃcients in the models can be interpreted as follows: if attitude of
individual i increases in one unit, the maximal WTP of i will increase in 0.15 EUR
with a signiﬁcance level of 0.01. If the incoming attitude from j to i increases in
one unit, the neighbor’s attitude implies that the maximal WTP of i will decrease
to 0.022 EUR, non-signiﬁcant. These results reveal that individual maximal WTP
depends on the group structure in which individuals interact to exchange information
and changes of own attitudes towards the object of choice will alterate the final
purchase decision.
6The importance of this fact can be summarized as follows: R
2
is used as a conservative reduction to R2 to
penalize for adding variables and is required when the number of independent variables is high relative to the number
of cases. R
2
is an adjustment for the fact that when one has a large number of independents, it is possible that R2
will become artificially high simply because chance variations of some independent variables “explain” small parts
of the variance of the dependent variable.
7The magnitude of beta weight reflects its relative explanatory importance controlling for other independent
variables in the equation. The magnitude of a variable’s R2 increment reflects its additional explanatory importance
given that the common variance it shares with other independents entered in earlier steps has been absorbed by
these variables.
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Table 7.9.: Variables in Regressions of Personal Characteristics and Attitudes.
Variable Answer given as (experimental task) Introduced in the regression as
GENDER dichotomous variable 1=woman, 0=man Dummy
SMOKING dichotomous variable 1=smoking, 0=not smoking Dummy
Knowledge about Companies producing Chocolates Write down a list with the companies they know scalar*
Knowledge about Cocoa Names Multiple-choice z-value
Knowledge about countries cultivating high quality cocoa multiple choice z-value
Frequency of Consumption Enter number from the interval [0,4] z-value
Pleasure of Consumption choose from [0,7], 7= maximum of pleasure scalar*
Risk Attitude by Lottery choice enter number between 1 and 10 z-value
Care about Advertising dichotomous variable (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Care about Price dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Consumption of Innovations Enter number from the interval [0,4] z-value
Follow up Consumption Trends Enter number from the interval [0,4] z-value
Consumption obeys Marketing Enter number from the interval [0,4] z-value
Care about the Contain of Cocoa dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Care about the Amount of Fat dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Care about Organic Cultivation dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Care about Recommendations dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Care about the Appearance dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Care about Provenance dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=not) Dummy
Notes: The variables marked with * can be entered as scalars (z-value is not needed) .
We collected lists with up to 11 companies.
The variable Pleasure of consumption was intern transformed so that we observe a scala from 0 to 100.
7.2.2. Minimal WTP for the Four Treatments
The averages of the minimal WTPs for the four treatments and the ﬁve experimental
rounds reach their maximum in the Stranger treatment (in the same way as the
maximal WTPs) in the second experimental round, reaching a mean value of 76.70
ECU. The highest average was found in the Stranger treatment, in R2, R4, and R5.
These answers have lower variances compared to the maximal WTPs.
The distributions of the minimal WTPs for the four treatments and the ﬁve ex-
perimental rounds are summarized in Figure 7.6. Here, the distribution of minimal
WTPs among the participants obtained for each treatment are shown (the his-
tograms were ﬁtted with a polynomial regression). Our control treatment T1 shows
no signiﬁcant changes in its distribution in time. For T2, we found out an increment
of the variance of the minimal WTP. In R3, one can distinguish a clear formation
of two clusters, one around zero and the second around the statistical mean value
(66.05).
The strongest eﬀect of the added information over the minimal WTP could be
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Figure 7.6.: Distribution of the minimal WTP Among the Population of n = 40 Individuals for
T1 (upper case left), T2 (upper case right), T3 (lower case left) and T4 (lower case
right) for the Five Experimental Rounds.
within the experiment. OLS regressions were conducted and are summarized in table
A.2, where Models I to IV are designed to analyze T1, the benchmark treatment
of the experiment and Models V to VIII were made to catch the treatment eﬀect.
Model I only regress the dummy Alone, Model V regress the dummies’ Partner,
Stranger and Group, and in models II to IV and VI to VIII personal characteristics
and individual attitudes, as for maximal WTP, are also entering.
Negative and statistically signiﬁcant parameters were calculated for the Alone
dummy in the four regressions. For Model I, this parameter is strongly signiﬁcant
with a relatively high weight. This inﬂuence weight and the signiﬁcance are de-
creasing as more variables have been aggregated to the regressions. The inclusion
in Model II of personal characteristics, individual attitudes (Model III) and both
variable sets (Model IV) increase the R
2
in the regression. Through the Incremental
128
F-Test, we observe that these variables contribute to a better ﬁtness of the models.
For the next set of regressions in models V to VIII, the dummies are positive
and signiﬁcant for all treatments. The coeﬃcients of Attitudes from individual i
are positive and signiﬁcant, revealing the inﬂuence of these variables in the indi-
vidual decisions. The attitudes from j, the neighbor’s inﬂuence is negative and not
signiﬁcant. The variable Interactions is positive and signiﬁcant for models V and
VII, revealing the inﬂuence of seeking information to make decisions. The Incre-
mental F-Test shows a signiﬁcant improvement of the ﬁtness of the models VI, VII,
and VIII thanks to the inclusion of personal characteristics and attitudes. Here,
as shown in Table A.2, the treatment dummies of the treatments runned under a
partner protocol, T2 and T4 have less weighted parameters than Stranger (dummy
variable of T3, runned under a stranger protocol), conﬁrming the result already
found for maximal WTP: the way in which information is exchanged leads
to different individual decisions.
7.2.3. The Averaged Willingness to Pay
The average of WTP (hereafter avWTP) was calculated as the average between
maxWTP and minWTP (maxWTP + minWTP/2). This middle point is used
as uniﬁed measure of the WTP of our participants and enable us to compare the
evolution of individual WTP in time and to compare this with the whole sample.
We need to introduce this new variable in order to better understand the way
in which individual decisions change after sensory experiences. As this measure
preserves the original dimensions of maximal and minimal WTP, it is a good proxy
to straighforward conclude after statistical treatments. In the same fashion as for
maximal and minimal WTP, Table A.3 summarizes OLS regressions of the average of
WTP. Following the same structur, Models I to IV include only the Alone variable,
whereas models V to VIII consider the other three treatment variables, Partner,
Stranger, and Group, joined by the attitudes revealed in chats after each sense was
triggered.
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Models I and V only consider the dummy variables and for the other six mod-
els the variables of Personal Characteristics and Attitudes have been systematically
aggregated. The coeﬃcients of Alone (Models I to IV) are always negative, signif-
icant at a 0.01 level and have a relatively strong inﬂuential weight. By including
the variables in the categories Personal Characteristics and Attitudes, the inﬂuence
weight remains relatively stable and their signs are preserved. The incremental F-
Test shows that by entering personal characteristics and attitudes (Model IV), there
is no improvement of the regression ﬁtness.
For Models V to VIII, parameters of dummy variables are always positive and
only in some cases signiﬁcant. However, the magnitude of these parameters is dif-
ferent, revealing a treatment eﬀect.9 The own attitudes also had a positive inﬂuence
on the average of WTP and the parameters of attitudes of j are negative and non-
signiﬁcant. The interaction variable also seems to play an important role here be-
cause of its positive and signiﬁcant parameters. By comparing Model V with Model
VIII through the incremental F-Test, the entrance in the regression of Personal
Characteristics and Attitudes has a positive eﬀect on the ﬁtness of the regression.
7.2.4. Information and Preference Uncertainty: WTP-Range
The WTP-range were calculated from the maximal and minimal WTPs for each
individual and each treatment by subtracting the minimal WTP from the maximal
WTP. This measure represents the uncertainty that individuals face at the moment
to decide. The process of uncertainty reduction could be observed in the evolution
of the WTP-range . For T1, the distribution of the WTP-range becomes ﬂat in time
(see Figure 7.7 where the WTP-range for the four treatments in the ﬁve experimental
rounds are shown), that is, the level of uncertainty is more distributed among the
participants. For T3, the distribution of WTP-range is more concentrated around
the [0ECU, 100ECU] interval and, despite the presence of fat tails, one can observe
9For each treatment the answers are different, although the general environment of the experiment were the
same, except for the protocol used to exchange information and the group size in which individuals exchanged
information and attitudes.
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a reduction of uncertainty among these participants (Figure 7.7).
On the other hand, for T2 and T4, the uncertainty appears more distributed in
almost the whole interval [0ECU, 150ECU], that is, the uncertainty is increasing in
time (the initial peak around zero disappears). The consequences of the aggregation
of information on uncertainty reduction clearly depend on the structure and dynamic
of the exchange of information between the individual and her neighbors (and thus,
on the structure of the network).
Figure 7.7.: Distribution of WTP-range Among the Population. Upper case left: T1, upper case
right: T2, lower case left: T3, and lower case right: T4.
In T3, the uncertainties in the population decrease as time is passing, despite a
longer right tail (compare this ﬁnding with the results summarized in Figures 7.3
and 7.5). Comparatively, in R5, the distribution of uncertainties in T1, T2 and T4 is
more ﬂat-topped, revealing the presence of several individuals with several levels of
uncertainty. T4 (conducted by means of a partner protocol in the experiment, where
people belonging to a group of ﬁve people were ﬁxed for the ﬁve experimental rounds)
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should be related to a higher uncertainty reduction. A summary of descriptive
statistics for this part is shown in section G in Tables G.19, G.21, G.23.
From these results two aspects can be extracted: ﬁrst, the distribution of WTPs is
changing if individuals change their attitudes. These attitude changes could obey the
inputs that individuals receive from their neighbors through the exchanged sentences
in chats.10
The second aspect is that after our subjects exchange information, some individ-
uals may also change their attitudes by being persuaded by others. This is clearly
observed in deviations of the WTPs from the mean value. Here by contagion or
herding the changes in attitudes could increase signiﬁcantly, if new groups with own
trends appear. These variety of new opinions split the population leading the group
far from a consensus.
Table A.4 summarizes OLS regressions of WTP-range. As for maximal WTP and
Minimal WTP, Models I to IV include only the Alone variable, whereas Models V
to VIII consider the other three treatment variables, Partner, Stranger, and Group,
joined by the attitudes revealed in chats after each sense was triggered.
The coeﬃcients of Alone (Models I to IV) are always negative, signiﬁcant at a
0.01 level and have a strong inﬂuence weight in the regression. By including the
variables in the categories Personal characteristics and Attitudes (asked before and
after the sensory experience was conducted), the inﬂuence weight remains relatively
stable and their signs are preserved. The incremental F-Test shows that by entering
personal characteristics and attitudes, the improvement of the regression (Model
IV) ﬁtness is driven for the representativeness of these variables for the regression.
For Models V to VIII, parameters of dummy variables (Partner, Stranger and
Group) are always positive, strongly signiﬁcant and highly inﬂuential on the regres-
sion. However, the magnitude of these parameters is diﬀerent, revealing a treatment
eﬀect.11 The own attitudes have also been positively inﬂuencing the size of the
10Imitation/comparison between individual (intrinsic) attitudes and others’ opinions (external informational
sources) influencing the individual decisions.
11For each treatment the answers are different, despite the general environment of the experiment were the same,
except for the protocol used to exchange information and the group size in which individuals exchanged information
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WTP-range and the parameters of attitudes incoming from the neighborhood are
negative, but no signiﬁcantly. By comparing Model V with Model VIII through the
incremental F-Test, the entrance in the regression of Personal Characteristics and
Attitudes has a positive eﬀect on the ﬁtness of the regression (increments of R
2
).
7.3. Test of Hypotheses
7.3.1. Working Hypotheses
H1. Information helps to reduce individual uncertainties. In order to test
this hypothesis we make use of the variable WTP-range. We compare the results
of the OLS regression for T1 and All-Treatments in Table A.4. As we already
described above, Model IV (corresponding to T1) and Model VIII (All-Treatments),
both consider Personal Characteristics and Attitudes to be the models that better
ﬁt our experimental data. Comparing the four dummy variables, we can state that
for T1 the WTP-range decreases, whereas in the other three treatments WTP-range
increases. This eﬀect is stronger for T2 and T4, suggesting that the exchange of
information with the same partner within the whole experiment does not contribute
to reduced uncertainties.
The behavior of T1 suggests that when individuals receive information from only
one source, this information helps to alleviate uncertainties. Looking at the per-
formance of information exchange, the variable Attitude of i is positive, strongly
weigthed and signiﬁcant, showing that individuals increase their uncertainty level
by following their own attitudes. Comparing this aspect with T1, we can con-
clude that information exchange appears to puzzle personal attitudes toward the
chocolate. The variable Attitude of j is negative and lightly weighted, suggesting
a contribution of this to reduce WTP-range, but this interaction is not signiﬁcant.
The last variable, Interactions, here is also small and non-signiﬁcant.
We can conclude that sensory experiences as have been conducted in the exper-
and attitudes.
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Table 7.10.: Summary WTP for Gender
T1 T2 T3 T4
R1 vs R2 1.114 0.780 0.899 1.194
R2 vs R3 0.918 1.002 1.597** 0.710*
R3 vs R4 0.866 1.255 0.674* 1.243
R4 vs R5 1.707** 1.115 0.932 0.970
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
iment contribute to reducing the uncertainty level, but when other informational
sources are aggregated, it results in confusion. However, the performance of T3
suggests that individuals can make more accurate decisions if the additional infor-
mational source is more diverisﬁed. These results corroborate the behavior of the
distributions of WTP-range in Figure 7.7, where the evolution within the ﬁve rounds
shows better performances for T1 and T3.
H2.Interaction as reinforcing of additional information has strong ef-
fects on uncertainty reduction.
We calculate a set of F-Tests to compare the variances from one experimental
round to the next of the WTP-range for each treatment, and we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
results for T1 from R4 to R5 (F(1,39)=1,707, p=0.049; the variance increases and is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from R4 to R5), T3 from R2 to R3 (F(1,39)=1.597, p=0.074;
where the variance increases) and from R3 to R4 (F(1,39)=0.678, p=0.095; the
variance decreases from R3 to R4 signiﬁcantly) and for T4 from R2 to R3 (F=0.710,
p=0.099; the variance decreases). The other results oscillate between increases and
decreases regarding the variance, but they are not signiﬁcant (see Table 7.10).
To test this hypothesis, we analyze regressions of the variable WTP-range for each
period of time and for each treatment. A total of 16 models have been proposed
and shown in Tables A.9, A.10, A.11, and A.12. Models I to IV refer to T1, models
V to VIII to T2, models IX to XII to T3, and models XIII to XVI to T4. Models
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I, V, IX, XIII and XVII only consider the dummy variables corresponding to each
treatment (Alone, Partner, Stranger and Group). Additionaly, for the treatments
with interpersonal communication, T2, T3 and T4, we include the variables Attitude
of Individual i, Attitude of Individual j, and Interactions. The other models include
the variables Personal Characteristics, Attitudes and both. For each model, we
consider ﬁve OLS regressions including the same set of independent variables, but
diﬀerent experimental rounds, i.e., each equation regressing one experimental round.
H3. Interaction among individuals contributes to forming consumption
trends. Taking a closer look at the evolution of the variance for maximal and
minimal WTP, we observe in Figure 7.8 that the variances increase in time as more
information is aggregated to the system. That means that the aggregation of new
information, in contast to what we want to test in hypothesis H3, is the reason
why the diﬀerences in their answers increase over time, which makes it impossible
to form a ‘global opinion’ among individuals. Here, the variances of the maxWTPs
in all the treatments are less stable and higher than the results for the variances of
the minWTPs.
We expected that by allowing information exchange between individuals, we would
contribute to forming a consensus in consumption, but for T2 the variance increases
in time (see Figure 7.8. The same was observed in T4, where after an increment
of the variance in R2 and a reduction in R3, it increases in the subsequent rounds
overpassing the variance measured in R1. For T3 the dynamic is diﬀerent. Here a
subsequent raising of the variance in R2 and R3 was followed by a large decrement
in R4 under the variance of R1. However, the variance measured in R5 is larger than
in R1.
As we want to test the variance reduction of the individula decisions by infor-
mation exchange between individuals, we calculate a new variable: Stdv. This is
the standard deviation of the WTP-range for the ﬁve experimental rounds and has
been calculated for each individual and for each treatment separately and for T2,
T3 and T4 simultaneously. Additionally, we introduce the variables Cummatti and
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Figure 7.8.: Average of Variance of the Maximal (above) and Minimal (below) WTP as a Function
of Time.
Cummattj corresponding to the cummulated attitudes in time of an individual i
and her neighbor(s) j after having disentagled the utterances exchanged in chats.
We calculated again 20 models, four corresponding to each treatment, shown in
Tables A.13, A.14, A.15, A.16, and A.17. The negative sign appearing in the coeﬃ-
cient of StdvT1 indicate a reduction of the individual variance for the four proposed
models for our benchmark treatment. For T2 and T3 we found a positive coeﬃ-
cient. However, the coeﬃcient of T2 is smaller indicating a better performance of
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additional information to reduce uncertainties. For T4 the coeﬃcient is negative.
However, these results in T2, T3 and T4 are not signiﬁcant. The variable cummatti
is positive, small and signiﬁcant for the three treatments with interaction between
individuals. The variable cummattj has the same size and signs of the variable
cummatti for these treatments but without statistical signiﬁcance, suggesting that
interactions between individuals do not contribute directly to improve the uncer-
tainty at the moment of choice.
For the last group of models (XVII to XX) we regress the variable standard devi-
ation of the WTP-range for each individual at T2, T3 and T4, StdvT2, StdvT3 and
StdvT4, simultaneusly. From here we can observe that the greater contribution to
reduce the individual standard deviation of the WTP-range is given by the treat-
ment T4. However, if we analyze the reduction of the variance in all the population
we found out that the treatment with the better performance is T3, as have been
already shown in Figure 7.7 for the WTP-range of the diﬀerent treatments. We
can conclude that the individual behavior diﬀers from the group behavior, but there
are not a formation of consumption trends, that is, the heterogeneity to consume
chocolates observed at the beggining of the experiment does not dissapear despite
the fact that the individuals became the same information and that information
exchange within the experiment was allowed.
7.3.2. Z-Hypotheses
As introduced in Section 6.2.2, this set of hypotheses was carefully chosen to closer
study the inﬂuence of attitudes and personal characteristics of our participants in
the decision that they made. In order to prove this set of hypotheses we made a
series of panel data regressions of the Attitudes and Personal Characteristics of our
participants for each treatment in time of the maxWTP (in Table A.5), minWTP
(Table A.6), avWTP (summarized in A.7) and WTP-range (see Table A.8).
• Z1. Women are likely to pay more for chocolates than men. In Table 7.11, we
summarized the results corresponding to the variable Gender. We can observe
137
Table 7.11.: Summary WTP for Gender
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
maxWTP 18.922*** 0.431 -1.640* 16.758*** 4.101*
minWTP 9.464** 5.545* -2.441* 7.391** -5.745*
avWTP 15.40*** 3.159* -1.308* 11.329*** 2.224
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
that except for T2, all three variables are positive and almost all of them are
signiﬁcant. The variable Gender is for the regression of avWTP is positive
and signiﬁcant for the regression of avWTP containing all scenarios, revealing
that in general women are willing to pay signiﬁcantly more (0.155 EUR) for
the chocolate bar than men. For the treatment regressions, the same eﬀect
is observed in T3 (0.113 EUR; signiﬁcant at 0.01) and in T4 (0.023 EUR;
not signiﬁcant). For T1, women are willing to pay more (0.032 EUR; not
signiﬁcant), but for the Partner treatment the eﬀect is reverted (0.131 EUR
less; not signiﬁcant). Then for T1, T3, and T4 the hypothesis can be accepted.
Correlating the variables Gender and maxWTP, we obtain ρ = 0.162, n =
800; Gender and minWTP ρ = 0.142, n = 800; and Gender and avWTP,
ρ = 0.164, n = 800. Then, we accept Z1 at α = 0.01
• Z2. Women are more certain in their preferences than men. To prove this,
we examine the regression results in Table A.8 of the variable Gender. For T1
(-5.825***) the hypotheses can be accepted, whereas for the other three treat-
ments, it cannot (the results are all positive and, except for T2, signiﬁcant).
To prove the hypothesis in the whole population and to be able to reject Z2, we
conduct a Pearson correlation test of the variables Gender and WTP-range.
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Table 7.12.: Summary WTP for H&L
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
maxWTP -10.022*** 3.268* -10.681*** 3.046* -5.673**
minWTP -2.150* 2.635** -4.667*** 2.109* -2.236*
avWTP -6.434*** 3.253** -7.451*** 1.083 -4.039**
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
We obtain ρ = 0.107, n = 800, at a signiﬁcance level of α = 0.01. This
positive correlation allows us to conclude that women are more uncertain in
their preferences for chocolate than men.
• Z3. Women are more risk-averse than men. Examining the mean value of the
H&L test separately for women and men, we obtain a value of Mmen = 4.89,
SDmen = 0.262 and Mwomen = 4.6, SDwomen = 0.268, showing that women are
only slightly more risk-averse than men. Statistically comparing both mean
values through t-tests (2 tails) we obtain t = 0.40, p = 0.70. As pcritic = 2.027,
we reject hypothesis Z3 that Mwomen > Mmen.
• Z4. The higher the risk seeking behavior, the higher the individual WTP.
Comparing the results from Tables maxWTP, minWTP and avWTP for the
variable H&L, only in T1 and T3 increases the WTP in accordance with the
risk attitude. See Table 7.12.
Conducting a Pearson test of correlation between the results of H&L and
maxWTP, minWTP and avWTP, we obtain: ρ(maxWTP,HL) = −0.131; ρ(minWTP,HL) =
−0.043 (signiﬁcant for α = 0.01); and ρ(avWTP,HL) = −0.103. These negative
results indicate that if H&L increases (the risk attitude increases), the WTP
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decreases. Indeed, hypothesis Z4 should be rejected.
• Z5. The more risk-averse the individuals, the lower the WTP-range interval.
To prove this hypothesis, we study the results for the variable H&L in the
WTP-range regression in Table A.8. Here, the WTP-range decreases for T2
and T4 and also for the regression of all treatments. For T1 and T3, the
result is positive but close to zero. More formally, by a Pearson correlation
test, we found a ρWTP−range,HL = −0.155, p > 0.05. The negative correlation
suggests that hypotheses Z5 could be accepted. The interaction eﬀect was
non-signiﬁcant.
• Z6. Smokers will also be less sensible to sensory experiences, and, therefore,
their WTP will remain more stable than for non-smokers. Looking at Tables
A.8, and A.7 we observe that this variable changes for all treatments. Thus
we cannot be sure that smokers have a lower sensitivity to sensory triggers to
state their WTP and Z6 must be rejected.
• Z7. The WTP for Smokers is lower than for non-smokers. We extract the
results from the variable Smoking in Tables A.5, A.6, and A.7. We observe that
for maxWTP, smokers pay less than non-smokers in T2, T3 and T4. Also the
result regress of all treatments combined is negative. MinWTP shows another
dynamic, where the result is positive and signiﬁcant for T3. The regression for
the averaged WTP shows that the variable smoking has also a representative
weight in all regressions, revealing that smokers are willing to pay less than
non-smokers, except for T1. These results are signiﬁcant for the regression
with all scenarios and T2 at a 0.01 level, for T1 at a level of 0.05 and for T3
and T4 this parameter is not signiﬁcant. This result is negative for T2 and
T4, but also for all treatments. Thus we can only accept this hypothesis only
for T2 and T4 (see summary of results in Table 7.13).
Running a correlation test between the variable Smoking and the maxWTP
and minWTP, we found out: ρSmoking,maxWTP =−0.056, p > .05; ρSmoking,minWTP
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Table 7.13.: Summary WTP for Smoking
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
maxWTP -20.077*** 13.604** -29.551*** -1.352 -9.972*
minWTP -13.184*** -1.732 -12.925*** 7.391** -5.745*
avWTP -10.945*** 8.981** -17.540*** 1.784 -4.169**
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
= −0.057, p > .05. The negative signs indicate that smokers are likely to ex-
pend less money in chocolates than non-smokers. However, the interactions are
non-signiﬁcant. Taking into account the average of maxWTP and minWTP,
our avWTP variable we get a ρSmoking,avWTP = −0.061, p = .05, then we do
accept hypothesis Z7.
• Z8. Taking care about Advertising drives to higher WTP. Examining the sum-
marized data in Table 7.14, this hypothesis is only valid for T4. However,
increments in WTP have also been observed for maxWTP and avWTP for T1
and the regression of all treatments combined.
A Pearson test indicates that only the maximal WTP increases with statistical
signiﬁcance due to advertising (ρAdvertising,maxWTP = 0.065, p < .05. The
minimal WTP decreases, but not signiﬁcantly (ρAdvertising,minWTP = -0.022,
p > .05).
• Z9. Taking care of market prices result in a lower WTP. The results cor-
respond with this hypotheses in treatment T3 and for all treatments, both
being statistically signiﬁcant. The results for the corresponding regressions
are summarized in Table 7.15.
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Table 7.14.: Summary WTP for Advertising
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
maxWTP 7.682** 8.319* -6.786 8.617*** 14.547***
minWTP -13.305*** -0.812* -9.169*** -9.019*** 5.706
avWTP 2.329 4.899 -6.097 -8.458*** 11.985***
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 7.15.: Summary WTP for Prices
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
maxWTP -65.468*** 11.997 6.945* -79.793*** 9.736
minWTP -25.463*** 1.412* -2.820* -28.365*** 4.987
avWTP -19.911** 9.874* 11.966* -66.811*** 22.061***
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 7.16.: Summary WTP for Knowledge
Variable All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
Know Brands WTP-range -1.335 -1.690*** -0.139* -3.996*** 1.095
avWTP -0.621 1.549** -1.042 -3.559*** 2.430**
Know Cocoa Name WTP-range -2.155 1.964* -2.258* 2.354 -0.187
avWTP -5.320*** -5.549** -1.042 -3.559*** 2.430***
Know Provenance WTP-range 1.119 0.678 -2.396* 0.694 2.665*
avWTP -1.447 0.983 -4.697*** -1.181 3.448
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
For T1, T2, and T4, the results were positive, suggesting that knowledge about
market prices is irrelevant to decide the amount to expend for chocolates at
the moment to decide. For the whole sample, we found out a signiﬁcant
but weak negative correlation ρavWTP,Prices = −0.01, p < .01 (n = 800; t =
−2.782, p = 0.003), conﬁrming only a small eﬀect of the variable Prices in the
WTP reduction.
• Z10. Individuals with a high level of initial knowledge about chocolates are less
likely to change their WTP within the experiment. That is, the eﬀect of the
newly added information to the system does not aﬀect the initial individual de-
cisions. Table 7.16 summarizes the results of regressions for avWTP andWTP-
range for the variables belonging to this category: Knowledge about Brands
producing chocolates, knowledge of cocoa names after their denomination of
origin and knowledge abut countries producing cocoa. Both, WTP-range and
avWTP are changing for this three variables, indicating that this hypothesis
cannot be accepted. However, the variable Knowledge about Countries for T1
and T3 and the variable Knowledge about Brands are small.
Comparing statistically these variables, we found out a signiﬁcant and positive
interaction between the variables Knowledge and WTP-range (F (1, 799) =
650.55, p < .01) and for the variables Knowledge and avWTP (F (1, 799) =
849.19, p < .01), indicating that Knowledge about the market and the object
of choice does not contribute to more stability in preferences, but tends to
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Table 7.17.: Summary WTP for Frequency
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
avWTP 7.456*** -3.585* -3.744 9.607*** 5.178**
WTP-range 2.192 -4.193*** -0.365 4.713** 1.933
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
increase the WTP in average and the uncertainty. Information could result
in confusion at the moment of choice. This is why hypothesis Z10 should be
rejected.
• Z11. Individuals know more about a purchased good if they consume it on a reg-
ular basis. For this reason it is expected that individuals with high consumption
frequencies of chocolates are less likely to change their WTP for the chocolate.
From Tables A.8 and A.7, we observe that this hypothesis cannot be accepted.
Despite a high frequency of consumption, we found out important changes in
avWTP and WTP-range (see Table 7.17). These results were conﬁrmed by a
F-Test between avWTP and Frequency (F (1, 799) = 5302.87, p < .01) and be-
tween WTP-range and Frequency (F (1, 799) = 4.076, p < .01), showing that
a more frequent consumption will increase the WTP for the chocolate bar.
• Z12. More frequent consumption of chocolates reduces uncertainty in prefer-
ences about chocolates. Table 7.17 summarizes the results of regression of the
WTP-range presented in Table A.8 for the variable Frequency of consump-
tion of chocolates. We found out an uncertainty reduction only for treat-
ments T1 and T2, the last being non-signiﬁcant. Statistically, we obtain a
F (1, 799) = 4076, 87, p < 0.01 calculated for all treatments and all periods
of time, suggesting that a more frequent consumption contributes to stable
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Table 7.18.: Summary WTP for Pleasure
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
maxWTP -10.839*** -17.891* 15.271* -13.428 5.747
minWTP -16.539*** -12.649*** 14.392** -17.736** 0.106
avWTP 6.887*** -5.494** 25.715*** -28.703** 15.369
Notes: Extracted from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7. Values are in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
preferences (M(freq) = 2.88, SD = 0.78).
• Z13. Individuals with a high level of enjoyment by consuming chocolates are
more likely to increase their WTP as sensory experiences are accumulating.
This hypothesis can be accepted only for treatments T2 and T4. However,
for T4, it is not signiﬁcant. The summary of the results of the regressions for
maxWTP, minWTP and avWTP can be seen in Table 7.18. The correlation
values for all treatments and all periods of time are ρ(maxWTP,P leasure) = 0.130;
ρ(minWTP,P leasure) = 0.114 (signiﬁcant for α = 0.01); and ρ(avWTP,P leasure) =
0.132. Hence, higher levels of pleasure by consuming chocolate lead to higher
minimal WTPs (signiﬁcant) but tend to increase the maximal and, therefore,
the average of the WTPs.
• Z14. The preference uncertainty of individuals with a high level of enjoyment
by consuming chocolates is more likely to increase as new senses are triggered.
In the regression of WTP-range in Table A.8, we observe that the enjoyment
variable has a positive inﬂuence on the WTP-range for all treatments, except
for T1. These results are, however, non-signiﬁcant. After a t-test of the whole
sample between the variables Enjoyment and WTP-range we get a t(799) =
39, 25, p < 0.01 (M = 0.783, SD = 0.81), showing that the exerted pleasure
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by eating chocolates will increase the preference uncertainty.
• Z15. The more habits are followed, the lower the individual uncertainty level
at the moment of choice. Correlating the two variables WTP-range and Total
of habits, we get a statistical value of ρ = 0, 127, n = 800, which is statistically
non-signiﬁcant. The variable Total of Habits was not included in the regression
in Table A.8. For its calculation, each one of the habits followed to buy
chocolates for each individual was marked with a point. The sum of these
points (maximal six) constitutes this variable.
After a t-test (µ1 6= µ2) between Habits and WTP-range we are able to
conclude that Habits contribute to reduce the uncertainty to choose: t =
38.46, p < 0.01; (M(Habits) = 2.14, SD = 1.1).
Figure 7.9.: Distribution of WTP-range Among the Participants. Upper case left: T1, upper case
right: T2, lower case left: T3, and lower case right: T4.
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With the formulation of the mathematical model in Chapter 6 we basically want to
modelate the individual behavior, i.e., to approach a herding behavior, as assumed
in the third hypothesis. Depending on the treatment we can reproduce diﬀerent
collective behavior: from T1 (a heterogeneous distribution of WTP among the in-
dividuals) to T4 (a tendency to the formation of a normal distribution of WTPs),
indicating a collective behavior which reproduce consumptio trends. In Figure 7.9
we compare the theoretical predictions with the experiments. However, it is qual-
itatively clear that in the experiments there is only a weak tendency to form a
consumption trend. The computational experiments show a better agreement in
T2 (and T3) than in T4, indicating that individuals are inﬂuenced by infromation
exchange with only one partner rather than by a group of individuals. This result
is econometrically corroboated by the results in Tables A.13, A.14, A.15, A.16, and
A.17, by showing only a low statistical signiﬁcance.
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8. Conclusion
8.1. Satisfaction, Utility and Attitudes
The history of economics has been mainly dominated by the concept of utility, and
the implicit assumption that individuals continuously try to optimize it in a rational
way. However, the core of the economic theory has been challenged by the fact that
agents are much more than rational machines continuously computing the optimal
value of a utility function. If agents are not simply rational, which is thus the role
of the psychology of the agents? Can the agents have an attitude towards products,
and can this attitude, which is essentially irrational, inﬂuence their willingness to
pay?
This work contributes demonstrate that the concept of utility must be combined to
the concept of attitude. Despite both concepts stem from diﬀerent disciplines, there
exist as parallel lines of development of the concepts in each discipline. The concept
of valuation, specially after choices, is common to both, utilities and attitudes.
The aim of a decision-making process is to attain the highest possible satisfaction
level, and here individual valuation plays a decisive role. Satisfaction, as stated
by economic theory, is a way of making a decision about a set of alternatives with
respect to the limitations of human time and knowledge.
However, some forms of satisfaction can still require a large amount of deliberation
from the decision maker, for instance to set an appropriate aspiration or reference
level in the ﬁrst place, or to calculate how a current option compares to the aspi-
ration level (Simon, 1956). Economic decisions must be made between alternatives
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and based on information about those alternatives. In diﬀerent situations, those
alternatives and pieces of information may need to be found through active search.
By integrating both attitudes and utility, and using the concept of the utility
function, we ﬁnd a way to alleviate individual uncertainties in the marketplace.
Here, attitudes appear as individual reactions to added information and to sensorial
triggers toward one object of choice, in our case, a chocolate bar.
The ﬁndings in this work corroborate the limited capacity to process and store
information owned by human beings. The more information is incorporated to the
system, the higher the risk that uncertainty levels increase yielding poor outcomes
from choices pushing down the resulting utility. These ﬁndings agree with several
studies about information processing and decision making [cite?]
As has been shown in chapter 6, the kind of information given to the participants
was designed under a ’chocolate tasting protocol’ by using the same procedure as
a wine tasting. By this method, the information was not only based on statements
that the participants have to memorize and react upon. Our participants receive
sensory impulses by dealing with a real product. Each sensory impulse goes to the
human mind, recovers memories and then a reaction is expressed as a response,
in our case a WTP interval enabling us to evaluate the eﬀect of the aggregated
information through sensory triggers.
Hence, the provided information has an external origin, but is internally recon-
structed. In order to get a close analysis to real human behavior in choice situations
and in permanently changing environments by acquisition of new information, we
designed four diﬀerent environments with diﬀerent amounts of incoming informa-
tion. T1, our control treatment, seeks to imitate a poor information environment,
in which only one source of information was provided. In opposition, T4 represents
a rich information environment, in which ﬁve informational sources were provided,
one from the experimenter side and four from other partners to exchange informa-
tion in chats. The other two treatments, T2 and T3, are allocated in the middle,
with only two informational sources.
150
However, the amount of incoming information is not only determined for the
structure of the network, but also (and mainly) for the amount of interchanged
information, that is, the dynamic inside each network. The learning, or better said,
the capacity of absorbing information from the environment, and the individual
adaptation to the new environment were reﬂected in the personal decisions the
individuals made. The evolution of the individual behavior was registered several
times by stating preferences as WTPs.
As explained in Section 6.3.3, individual attitudes reﬂecting their beliefs were ex-
changed through a computer interface. Each message could be classiﬁed as positive,
negative or neutral. However, it was not the amount of messages exchanged, but
the cummulated attitudes received by participants that had a major impact on the
individual answers. Given the size of the group, we expected more dynamic in T4.
As observed in Figure 7.7, the uncertainty levels are more heterogeneous. Addi-
tionally, in A.4, the T4 dummy is positive and highly weighted,showing that more
information will increase the uncertainty.
Therefore, H1. Information helps to reduce uncertainties should be re-
jected.
8.2. Attitudes
The capacity of any organism to respond to external and internal stimuli such as
weather changes or new environments is called ‘behavior’. The essential part of this
mechanism are the sensory elements receiving signals and the processing system
consisting of simple chemical feedbacks to cognitive processes. The combination of
these two elements could result in behavioral changes.
Learning was introduced into economical theory as a way to explain why the be-
havior of individuals and groups is changing over time. When a situation is changing,
normally individuals adjust their behavior in a well-known process called adaptation.
This learning mechanism appears as a non-linear process. Adaptation is important
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for economics, and for this project, because through adaptation, individuals can ﬁx
their preferences after having changed their behavior. The problem to implement
this mechanism is the required time horizon, because it can not be universally de-
ﬁned: some people require more time than others to adapt themselves to changes.
A plausible alternative, which is widely used, is the mechanism of imitating the suc-
cess of other agents typically followed as a mechanism to achieve the own success.
However, the questions as how can we eﬀectively learn to be successful, or how can
we choose the most suitable behavior to imitate in each situation, remain without
answers. The experiment here presented is an attempt to approach these questions
from another perspective by understanding how attitudes, being an irrational part
of human beings, inﬂuence the decision-making process to be either successful or
fruitless.
Usually, we cannot distinguish how attitudes determine individual choice. We
argue that individual behavior is strongly related to individual attitudes: as the
variance of individual attitudes is very high, preference could change very fast.
Therefore, the behavior at the moment of choice is changing. This fact points out
that there are cognitive inﬂuences generating diﬀerent intensities of the relationship
between cognition and choice.
The results from this experiment show us that our own attitudes operate as a
strong modulator to change decisions, whereas the attitudes from others (neighbors)
are not statistically signiﬁcant revealing poor inﬂuences on ﬁnal decisions. However,
the observed process of changes in one’s own attitude and its consequences does not
reveal the inﬂuence that the attitude of others may have.
The own attitudes in T2, T3, and T4 are statistically signiﬁcant and their inﬂuence
weight is strong, whereas the attitude of the neighbors for these treatments is less
weighted and not statistically signiﬁcant to choose for a maximal WTP (see Table
A.1). The same situation is observed in the minimal WTP summarized in Table
A.2.
Regarding the habits, ‘recommendations’ are strongly weighted and statistically
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signiﬁcant in the regressions in Tables A.8, A.6, and A.5, as a signal that recom-
mendations are important to make purchase decisions, suggesting that the direct
inﬂuence of attitude exchange has a weaker eﬀect than people asking the neighbors
or relatives about their opinion regarding a certain good or service before they faced
the choice situation. It reveals again a poor capacity to process information in short
time intervals.
8.3. Homogeneity and Trend Formation
Here, we implement a sequential aggregation of information with a subsequent in-
teraction in groups after each information unit has been added. In the literature,
it is shown that this process of information aggregation causes an externality ef-
fect that gives rise to the emergence of informational cascades. This informational
cascades are situations in which people herd because they don’t take into account
their private information revealed by the history of past actions (see for example,
Banerjee, 1992). We expected that bearing of trust feelings could give rise to such
cascades in T2 and T4.
In opposition to this cascade formation the individuals in our experiment do
not enter one by one to take an irreversible decision. They belong to a group
of interacting subjects who can exchange their decisions in time, but individuals
in the group are not forzed to follow the group’s trend. Additionally, during the
experiment, information was available to all participants, and all of them received
the same amount of information. Therefore, no costs for information search arose.
As already pointed out in Section 7.2.4, the distribution of WTPs is changing
as individuals change their attitudes. Here, the amount of incoming information
plays an important role. However, as can be seen in Figure 7.7, individuals are
increasing their uncertainty as time is passing in all treatments. Hence, the way
in which individuals exchange and aggregate information (the network structure and
dynamics) applied in T3 reduces the uncertainties of the individuals participating in
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it.
8.3.1. Does Social Influence in Form of Direct Opinion Sharing
Between Individuals Decrease the Heterogeneity of
Individual Preferences?
T3 appears as the more suitable form of opinion sharing, promoting the reduction
of uncertainties to choose from the ﬁrst to the last round. This result could appear
because when an individual exchanges information with a stranger, it is diﬃcult to
form an opinion, whereas within a partner design, this opinion is reinforced by the
group members and will bias the individual answers. Additionally, if individuals are
trying to remember the whole history of their actions, they will fail in their decisions.
Economical models so far make use of this assumption. By this way, the commonly
known history of actions, as in T2 and T4, can dominate private beliefs and prevent
agents from revealing their private information. However, this assumption goes too
far when the number of periods considered is large or if for each experimental round
the subjects are exposed to a large amount of information. If the common memory
prevents the diﬀusion of private information, a restriction to the observation of past
actions may be eﬃcient. This was imposed in the applied experimental design for
T3. The diversity of observations may facilitate social learning because there is no
common public history that dominates all individual beliefs.
In general, if individuals observe only a part of their past actions, the convergence
to social learning may be faster. This phenomenon is observed in T3, where only
the information of the present period (experimental round) was available to be
exchanged between couples, and for each experimental round, a new partner was
assigned. Here, the reduction of the size of the WTP-ranges was given faster than for
the other treatments (see Figure 7.8). Human memories are limited and selected the
most accurate information to decide. If the history to be taken into account is too
large, important private information won’t be revealed, resulting in an increase of
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the individual uncertainty. In general we can conclude that, to learn, one needs
to forget .
H2. Interaction as reinforcing of additional information has strong
effects on uncertainty reduction can partially be rejected. It depends by and
large on the network structure where the additional information is exchanged.
We face a paradox. Despite all participants in the treatments, in which infor-
mation exchange was allowed, having the same right to communicate among their
groups, i.e., there were no hierarchy or order of entrance to exchange information,
only few individuals received the necessary attention to inﬂuence decision by chang-
ing the attitudes of their contacts. The exchanged information does not impose
obligations to the participants to ﬁx or change their decisions in order to attune
them to someone else’s opinion.
This pluralistic system, where all individuals could decide freely without exter-
nally imposed controls, shows that individuals are not able to form consumption
trends, i.e., members have not a greater persuasion power to fall into line with her
decision. Also the rise of trust feelings, as expected for T2 and T4, does not took
place and the attitudes from others were almost neglected in the decision-making
process.
Therefore, H3. Interaction among individuals contributes to form con-
sumption trends can be rejected. The heterogeneity levels have not been improved
by interaction. The inﬂuence of the amount of interaction in our results appears
almost non-signiﬁcant.
8.3.2. Findings from Our Subjects
In order to understand the processes underlying the decision that individuals make,
we also studied some features to delineate a picture of our participants. From the
studied Personal Characteristics and Attitudes, it is important to remark that:
Women are willing to pay more for the chocolate bar than men for the maximal and
minimal WTP categories. The result of the regression of this variable for avWTP
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conﬁrms that women are willing to pay more for the chocolate bar than men, and the
distance between maximal and minimal WTP increases as time is passing, tending to
increase the uncertainty. These results are in line with the design and the literature
already introduced in Chapter 6.
Smokers’ coeﬃcients are negative for the two directly asked WTPs (maximal and
minimal) regressions inﬂuencing the WTP-range. Because of scientiﬁc studies on a
lost of sensibility of the sense of taste by smoking, these result were expected.
Habits have shown diﬀering impacts. Recommendations, Appearence and Organic
Cultivation have positive weights in the regressions, whereas Cocoa and Provenance
have negative weights. We expected that the more the habits were followed, uncer-
tainty would exert. However, the results are not at all on line with our expectations.
Subjects worring about the amount of fat inside the chocolate are willing to pay
more. The same trend is observed in subjects which are looking for organically
cultivated cacao. These results are in accordance with contemporary marketing
research. Provenance has positive signiﬁcant parameters indicating that subjects
are willing to pay more for the chocolate bar. The amount of cacao and organic
cultivation parameters have a stronger positive inﬂuence on regressions. The amount
of cacao showed negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects in T3 and T4, whereas a positive
inﬂuence showed regarding the other three regressions (‘All treatments’, T1 and
T2). In a nutshell, following habits implies a positive potentiality to increase the
willingness to pay in changing environments. This result appears as a contradiction,
because habitual consumption implies more stable preferences.
The subjective risk preferences elicited by Laury and Holt (2002) are expected. As
the parameters show negative signs, the higher the risk aversion, the more cautious
are consumers about stating a WTP. These results are particularly remarkable for
T2 and T4, showing that the exchange of individual attitudes with the same partner
does not contribute to improving individual risk attitudes, but appears to have the
opposite eﬀect.
The variable ‘Care about Advertising’ increases the uncertainty (WTP-range).
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This behavior is expected as individuals, who take into account what advertisers are
saying, are expected to be less risk-averse. This eﬀect is especially remarkable for
T1 and T4, the treatments with the lowest and the highest number of informational
sources.
On the other hand, we expected that the variable ‘Care about Prices’ reduces the
uncertainty as individuals taking it into account tend to act more cautious in the
market place. However, this phenomenon is only observed in T3. The other studied
scenarios show an increased WTP-range as signal of an increment in individual
uncertainty to choose. ‘Follow-up Trends’ tend to increase the uncertainties, which
was also to be expected, because of the uncertainty involved when people only act
as a consequence of herding behavior.
Consumption by ‘following-up marketing campaigns’ has negative coeﬃcients
showing a positive inﬂuence to reduce the uncertainty. This result is not at all
expected: on one side, marketing campaigns try to permanently persuade new con-
sumers to buy, but on the other side, this helps consumers to learn more about the
market place, including about products and prices. The same result is observed in
all studied scenarios.
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A. Regressions
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Table A.1.: OLS for Maximal WTP.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 135.904*** 127.141*** 130.484*** 110.386*** 106.101*** 103.816*** 113.530*** 96.307***
(6.238) (12.704) (15.068) (17.217) (7.174) (13.262) (15.771) (18.030)
Alone -34.018*** -26.607*** -32.665*** -27.530***
(5.965) (6.122) (5.760) (5.869)
Partner 19.360** 15.826** 17.014** 15.181**
(8.499) (8.584) (8.239) (8.240)
Stranger 22.018*** 21.516** 18.253** 18.076**
(8.537) (8.530) (8.605) (8.575)
Group 14.301* 12.648* 17.540* 15.443*
(8.843) (7.822) (9.628) (8.492)
Attitude of individual i 15.609*** 23.989*** 23.556*** 22.104***
(2.904) (2.875) (2.761) (2.731)
Attitude of individual j -2.268 -2.001 -2.490 -2.484
(2.848) (2.801) (2.699) (2.649)
Interactions 3.579*** 2.473* 3.335*** 2.623**
(1.320) (1.315) (1.275) (1.266)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.037 0.087 0.145 0.195 0.139 0.172 0.234 0.268
F 16.49*** 8.64*** 11.50*** 10.26*** 19.33*** 12.09*** 14.60*** 12.31***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 32.43*** 83.13*** 11.50*** 195.54*** 126.19*** 166.41*** 232.05.17*** 277.10***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Maximal WTP for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables. OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
16
0
Table A.2.: Pooled OLS Regression for minimal WTP.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 59.788*** 54.017*** 38.216*** 25.668** 44.757*** 39.378*** 27.195*** 14.817
(3.960) (8.154) (9.630) (11.131) (4.624) (8.617) (10.244) (11.809)
Alone -17.166*** -13.866*** -15.189*** -12.832***
(3.787) (3.929) (3.688) (3.794)
Partner 8.558* 7.463 3.288 2.441
(4.478) (5.576) (5.352) (5.396)
Stranger 16.841*** 16.661*** 12.752** 11.869**
(5.504) (5.542) (5.590) (5.616)
Group 2.236 1.768 4.210 2.810
(6.411) (6.382) (6.253) (6.218)
Attitude of individual i 13.269*** 12.774*** 12.326*** 11.667***
(1.873) (1.868) (1.793) (1.789)
Attitude of individual j -0.692 -0.747 -0.528 -0.765
(1.836) (1.819) (1.652) (1.635)
Interactions 1.877** 1.286 1.941** 1.699
(0.851) (0.854) (0.841) (0.829)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.025 0.055 0.12 0.155 0.101 0.123 0.189 0.212
F 11.49*** 5.73*** 9.71*** 8.03*** 13.81*** 8.46*** 11.35*** 9.30***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 22.74*** 56.10*** 119.11*** 156.91*** 972.10*** 120*** 185.95*** 217.70***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Minimal WTP for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
161
Table A.3.: Pooled OLS Regression for averaged WTP.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 97.847*** 90.580*** 84.351*** 68.027*** 75.429*** 71.597*** 70.362*** 55.163***
(4.779) (9.744) (11.541) (13.215) (5.493) (10.160) (12.067) (13.824)
Alone -25.593*** -20.237*** -23.928*** -20.182
(4.570) (4.695) (4.420) (3.794)
Partner 13.959** 11.645* 10.151 8.811
(6.507) (6.575) (6.310) (6.317)
Stranger 19.200*** 19.089*** 15.502** 14.972**
(6.538) (6.534) (6.591) (6.575)
Group 8.269 7.208* 10.875* 9.127
(7.613) (7.123) (6.373) (6.278)
Attitude of individual i 19.148*** 18.380*** 17.941*** 16.886***
(2.224) (2.202) (2.116) (2.094)
Attitude of individual j -1.479 -1.374 -1.509 -1.625
(2.080) (2.045) (2.067) (2.031)
Interactions 2.728*** 1.879* 2.637*** 2.161**
(1.010) (1.007) (0.977) (0.970)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.036 0.084 0.145 0.192 0.139 0.171 0.235 0.268
F 16.28*** 8.38*** 11.47*** 10.05*** 19.37*** 12.05*** 14.59*** 12.20***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 32.02*** 80.77*** 138.97*** 191.94*** 126.39*** 165.97*** 231.94*** 275.15***
Notes: Dependent Variable is avWTP for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.4.: Pooled OLS Regression for WTP-Range.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 76.116*** 73.123*** 92.267*** 84.718*** 61.128*** 48.968*** 99.020*** 88.512***
(4.228) (8.721) (10.332) (11.924) (5.003) (8.299) (10.396) (12.236)
Period -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -1.204 -1.078 -1.163 -1.050
(1.237) (1.220) (1.179) (1.156) (1.220) (1.211) (1.165) (1.148)
Alone -16.851*** -12.741*** -17.475*** -14.697***
(4.042) (4.203) (3.956) (4.065)
Partner 10.521* 8.058* 13.424** 12.428**
(5.918) (5.042) (5.808) (5.856)
Stranger 5.431* 4.648** 5.253 5.969**
(5.449) (6.009) (6.069) (6.099)
Group 11.824* 10.636 13.051** 12.370**
(6.929) (6.919) (6.790) (6.752)
Attitude of individual i 11.740*** 11.189*** 11.242*** 10.447***
(2.027) (2.029) (1.950) (1.945)
Attitude of individual j -0.164 0.150 -0.725 -0.602
(1.679) (1.668) (1.601) (1.583)
Interactions 1.757** 1.236 1.455* 0.980
(0.918) (0.824) (0.877) (0.898)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.019 0.045 0.109 0.144 0.071 0.086 0.154 0.178
F 8.80*** 4.84*** 8.55*** 7.41*** 9.62*** 6.06*** 9.07*** 7.65***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 17.47*** 47.63*** 105.77*** 145.95*** 65.28*** 87.81*** 151.90*** 183.19***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.5.: Influence of Personal Characteristics and Attitudes on the Maximal WTP.
All Treatments Alone Partner Stranger Group
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Personal Characteristics
Gender 18.922*** 0.431 -1.640 16.758*** 4.101*
(5.126) (4.098) (5.141) (5.316) (5.422)
Smoking -20.077*** 13.604** -29.551*** -1.352 -9.972*
(6.490) (5.184) (6.510) (5.863) (6.866)
Knowledge about Companies producing Chocolates -1.624** 2.241** -1.363 -5.379*** -2.844**
(1.304) (1.041) (1.307) (1.352) (1.379)
Knowledge about cocoa names -4.931* -2.472 -1.057 0.556 -1.853
(2.457) (1.951) (2.464) (2.548) (2.579)
Knowledge about countries cultivating -1.667 1.060 -6.435*** -0.523 4.203*
high quality cocoa (2.466) (1.970) (2.473) (2.557) (2.601)
Frequency of consumption 8.984*** -4.794* -3.542 10.568*** 6.634**
(0,...,4) (3.309) (2.643) (3.319) (3.432) (3.401)
Pleasure of consumption -10.839 -17.891* 15.271 -13.428 5.744
(11.893) (9.506) (11.929) (12.334) (12.581)
Attitudes
Risk attitude by lottery choice -10.022*** 3.268* -10.681*** 3.046* -5.673**
(2.461) (1.961) (2.468) (2.051) (2.602)
Care about Advertising 7.682** 8.319* -6.786 -8.617 14.547***
(4.762) (4.579) (5.779) (5.975) (6.095)
Care about price -65.468*** 11.997 6.945 -79.793*** 9.736
(10.885) (9.652) (10.917) (11.289) (11.515)
Consumption of innovations -0.579 -6.027*** -0.424 -10.734*** -6.264**
(0,...,4) (2.659) (2.154) (2.667) (2.757) (2.813)
Follow up consumption trends 6.160** 0.692 -1.478 -2.443 9.387***
(0,...,4) (2.766) (2.211) (2.774) (2.869) (2.626)
Consumption obeys marketing -9.838*** -3.075 5.261 -5.002* -6.925**
(0,...,4) (3.083) (2.461) (3.093) (2.198) (3.262)
Care about the contain of cocoa -0.938 8.306** 20.207*** -17.168*** -12.286**
(5.251) (4.192) (5.265) (5.444) (5.553)
Care about the amount of fat 11.206* 4.234 2.966 12.810** -8.747
(6.726) (5.370) (6.741) (6.870) (7.109)
Care about organic cultivation 23.439*** -12.641*** 20.131*** 14.965** 0.996
(6.357) (5.072) (6.376) (6.593) (6.725)
Care about recommendations 22.597*** 8.425*** -1.764 25.230*** -8.943**
(4.955) (3.954) (4.970) (5.139) (5.242)
Care about appearance 9.590* 4.952 14.212*** -9.970* 0.300
(5.659) (4.497) (5.676) (5.869) (5.986)
Care about provenance -0.203 -5.992 -26.126*** 30.059*** 1.985
(9.866) (7.864) (4.895) (10.232) (10.436)
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.400 0.347 0.294 0.336 0.276
F 26.39*** 23.40*** 16.92*** 20.28*** 14.16***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 430.26*** 360.89*** 300.94*** 349.31*** 259.01***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Maximal WTP for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.6.: Influence of Personal Characteristics and Attitudes on the Minimal WTP.
All Treatments Alone Partner Stranger Group
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Personal Characteristics
Gender 9.464** 5.545* -2.441 7.496*** -1.108
(3.381) (2.277) (2.644) (2.749) (2.829)
Smoking -13.184*** -1.732 -12.925*** 7.391** -5.745*
(4.281) (2.881) (3.348) (3.482) (3.582)
Knowledge about Firms producing Chocolates -0.284 0.554 -1.219* -1.375** 1.752**
(0.860) (0.578) (0.672) (0.699) (0.719)
Knowledge about cocoa names -2.770* -0-503 1.205 -1.793 -1.661
(1.620) (1.084) (1.267) (1.318) (1.356)
Knowledge about countries cultivating -3.579 0.389 -4.031*** -1.480 1.555
high quality cocoa (1.626) (1.094) (1.272) (1.323) (1.361)
Frequency of consumption 6.775*** -0.616 -3.192* 5.839*** 4.685***
(0,...,4) (2.183) (1.469) (1.707) (1.775) (1.726)
Pleasure of consumption -16.539** -12.649** 14.392** -17.736** 0.106
(7.845) (5.283) (6.134) (6.381) (6.564)
Attitudes
Risk attitude by lottery choice -2.150* 2.635** -4.667*** 2.109* -2.236*
(1.523) (1.089) (1.269) (1.211) (1.358)
Care about Advertising -13.305*** -0.812 -9.169*** -9.019*** 5.706
(3.800) (2.545) (2.972) (3.091) (3.180)
Care about price -25.463*** 1.412 -2.820 -28.365*** 4.987
(7.180) (4.820) (5.614) (5.839) (6.007)
Consumption of innovations 0.798 -3.110*** -1.327 3.956*** -1.457
(0,...,4) (1.754) (1.180) (1.371) (1.426) (1.467)
Follow up consumption trends 1.561 -2.918** 0.484 -0.615 4.693***
(0,...,4) (1.824) (1.228) (1.427) (1.484) (1.526)
Consumption obeys marketing 2.236 0.375 6.031*** -1.718 -2.426
(0,...,4) (2.034) (1.367) (1.591) (1.654) (1.702)
Care about the contain of cocoa 5.105 5.959*** 11.311*** -5.425** -6.707**
(3.463) (2.331) (2.708) (2.616) (2.897)
Care about the amount of fat 9.068** -3.579 2.956 10.706*** -0.861
(4.433) (2.984) (3.466) (3.605) (3.709)
Care about organic cultivation 12.261*** -5.815** 5.749* 8.723*** 3.774
(4.193) (2.819) (2.279) (3.410) (3.508)
Care about recommendations 10.252*** 6.971*** -0.520 9.343*** -5.390**
(3.268) (2.201) (2.556) (2.658) (2.735)
Care about appearance 8.326** 4.326* 7.434*** -3.948 0.666
(3.733) (2.499) (2.919) (3.035) (3.123)
Care about provenance 2.752 4.576 -11.869** 11.611** -1.209
(6.508) (4.371) (5.089) (5.292) (5.445)
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.484 0.605 0.558 0.545 0.468
F 36.71*** 66.38*** 49.03*** 46.62*** 34.56***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 550.86*** 769.63*** 674.48*** 651.74*** 527.19***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Minimal WTP for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.7.: Influence of Personal Characteristics and Attitudes on the Average of WTP.
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Personal Characteristics
Gender 15.403*** 3.159* -1.308 11.329*** 2.224
(4.071) (3.114) (3.786) (3.929) (4.049)
Smoking -10.945*** 8.981** -17.540*** 1.784 -4.169
(5.313) (4.064) (4.941) (5.126) (5.284)
Knowledge about chocolates brands -0.621 1.549** -1.042 -3.559*** 2.430**
(1.033) (0.791) (0.961) (0.998) (1.028)
Knowledge about cocoa names -5.320*** -1.365 -0.164 -1.702 -2.089
(1.935) (1.480) (1.799) (1.867) (1.924)
Knowledge about countries cultivating -1.447 0.983 -4.697*** -1.181 3.448
high quality cocoa (1.957) (1.497) (1.820) (1.888) (1.947)
Frequency of consumption 7.456*** -3.585* -3.744 9.607*** 5.178**
(0,...,4) (2.623) (2.006) (2.439) (2.531) (2.609)
Pleasure of consumption 6.887** -5.494** 25.715*** -28.703** 15.369
(10.195) (7.800) (9.481) (9.836) (10.640)
Attitudes
Risk attitude by lottery choice -6.434*** 3.253** -7.451*** 1.803 -4.039**
(1.949) (1.491) (1.812) (1.880) (1.938)
Care about Advertising 2.329 4.899 -6.097 -8.458** 11.985***
(4.551) (3.482) (4.232) (4.391) (4.526)
Care about price -19.911** 9.874 14.966* -66.811*** 22.061**
(9.603) (7.346) (8.930) (9.265) (9.550)
Consumption of innovations -1.497 -4.916*** -0.440 8.895*** -5.036**
(0,...,4) (2.139) (1.636) (1.989) (2.063) (2.127)
Follow up consumption trends 3.306 -1.460 -1.031 -0.747 6.545***
(0,...,4) (1.998) (1.681) (2.044) (2.120) (2.186)
Consumption obeys marketing -4.525* -1.374 5.145** -4.025* -4.672**
(0,...,4) (2.437) (1.865) (2.267) (2.351) (2.424)
Care about the contain of cocoa 4.117 7.186** 16.342*** -10.895** -8.518**
(4.126) (3.179) (3.865) (4.010) (4.133)
Care about the amount of fat 16.287*** 2.825 6.174 8.580* -1.290
(5.430) (4.154) (5.049) (5.008) (5.400)
Care about organic cultivation 25.829*** -6.297* 16.869*** 8.574** 6.682
(5.179) (3.901) (4.815) (4.995) (5.149)
Care about recommendations 20.587*** 9.425*** 0.685 15.160*** -4.684
(3.974) (3.040) (3.696) (3.834) (3.952)
Care about appearance 17.926*** 8.058** 15.457*** -10.694** 5.106
(4.685) (3.584) (4.356) (4.519) (4.659)
Care about provenance 14.976* 6.141 -10.543** 10.613 8.763
(8.350) (6.388) (7.765) (8.055) (8.305)
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.172 0.054 0.114 0.168 0.063
F 9.73*** 3.36*** 6.38*** 9.46*** 3.79***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 170.16*** 62.87*** 115.60*** 165.82*** 70.70***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the avWTP ((Maximal WTP + Minimal WTP) / 2) for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.8.: Influence of Personal Characteristics and Attitudes on the WTP-Range.
All Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Personal Characteristics
Gender 9.471** -5.825*** 0.814 9.275*** 5.223*
(3.578) (2.217) (3.044) (3.164) (3.073)
Smoking -6.816 15.415*** -16.548*** -1.370 -4.149
(4.531) (2.804) (3.854) (4.007) (3.891)
Knowledge about chocolates brands -1.335 1.690*** -0.139* -3.996*** 1.095
(0.910) (0.562) (0.774) (0.804) (0.781)
Knowledge about cocoa names -2.155 1.964* -2.258* 2.354 -0.187
(1.715) (1.055) (1.259) (1.516) (1.473)
Knowledge about countries cultivating 1.919 0.678 -2.396* 0.964 2.655*
high quality cocoa (1.721) (1.066) (1.464) (1.523) (1.478)
Frequency of consumption 2.192 -4.193*** -0.365 4.713** 1.933
(0,...,4) (2.311) (1.431) (1.965) (2.043) (1.984)
Pleasure of consumption 5.925 -5.014 1.104 4.533 5.863
(8.303) (5.143) (7.063) (7.342) (7.130)
Attitudes
Risk attitude by lottery choice -7.864*** 0.641 -6.007*** 0.944 -3.429**
(1.717) (1.061) (1.461) (1.519) (1.475)
Care about Advertising 21.007*** 9.153*** 2.402 0.421 8.861**
(4.022) (2.477) (3.421) (3.357) (3.454)
Care about price -39.761*** -3.161 10.010* -51.184*** 4.993
(7.599) (4.693) (6.464) (6.719) (6.525)
Consumption of innovations -1.401 -1.660 -1.774 6.756*** -4.828***
(0,...,4) (1.856) (1.149) (1.579) (1.641) (1.594)
Follow up consumption trends 4.589** 3.599*** -1.974 -1.839 4.782***
(0,...,4) (1.931) (1.196) (1.642) (1.707) (1.658)
Consumption obeys marketing -12.071*** -3.448*** -0.767 -3.281* -4.495**
(0,...,4) (2.152) (1.331) (1.831) (1.903) (1.848)
Care about the contain of cocoa -6.040* 2.350 8.900*** -11.739*** -5.575*
(3.665) (2.268) (3.117) (3.241) (3.147)
Care about the amount of fat 2.198 7.875*** 0.070 2.164 -7.825*
(4.691) (2.905) (3.991) (4.148) (4.029)
Care about organic cultivation 11.248** -6.754** 14.451*** 6.311* -2.708
(4.438) (2.744) (3.775) (3.924) (3.811)
Care about the recommendations 12.383*** 1.313 -1.204 15.924*** -3.514
(3.459) (2.142) (2.942) (3.059) (2.970)
Care about the appearance 1.344 0.708* 6.858** -5.941* -0.285
(3.950) (2.433) (3.361) (3.493) (3.392)
Care about provenance -2.785 -10.395** -14.087** 18.618*** 3.359
(6.887) (4.255) (5.859) (6.090) (5.914)
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.468 0.633 0.483 0.505 0.475
F 34.56*** 73.54*** 36.60*** 39.86*** 35.51***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 527.19*** 821.25*** 549.66*** 584.28*** 537.73***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the WTP-Range (Maximal WTP - Minimal WTP) for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.9.: Pooled OLS Regression Models for the WTP-Range for each Experimental Round and
T1
Experimental Rounds
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Treatment Model Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
T1 Model I Constant 70.952*** 70.833*** 70.762*** 70.776*** 70.823***
(1.811) (1.812) (1.812) (1.811) (1.812)
Alone -14.952** -13.583* -12.161 -12.452 -13.373**
(7.898) (8.101) (8.104) (8.103) (8.101)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.031 0.022 0.015 0.017 0.021
F 3.41** 2.81* 2.25* 2.36* 2.72*
Breusch-Pagan χ2 3.41** 2.81* 2.25* 2.36* 2.73*
T1 Model II Constant 70.081*** 70.046*** 70.011*** 70.019*** 70.042***
(7.933) (7.936) (7.938) (7.937) (7.936)
Alone -10.871* -9.482 -8.038 -8.332 -9.267
(7.018) (7.020) (7.023) (7.022) (7.021)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.037 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.038
F 4.50*** 4.45*** 4.40*** 4.41*** 4.40***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 39.99*** 39.55*** 39.15*** 39.23*** 39.48***
T1 Model III Constant 90.910*** 90.918*** 90.925*** 90.924*** 90.919***
(9.799) (9.803) (9.806) (9.806) (9.803)
Alone -14.848** -13.468** -12.036** -12.328 -13.256**
(7.758) (7.761) (7.765) (7.764) (7.752)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.092 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
F 7.78*** 7.71*** 7.66*** 7.67*** 7.71***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 89.63*** 88.97*** 88.36*** 88.48*** 88.88***
T1 Model IV Constant 83.236** 83.242*** 83.248*** 83.247*** 83.244***
(11.481) (11.485) (11.489) (11.487) (11.484)
Alone -11.919* -10.520* -9.067 -9.364 -10.463*
(7.032) (7.035) (7.037) (7.037) (7.039)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.133 0.133 0.133 0.132 0.133
F 7.15*** 7.12*** 7.09*** 7.10*** 7.11***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 134.86*** 134.31*** 133.81*** 133.91*** 133.96***
Notes: Dependent Variable is WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.10.: Pooled OLS Regression Models for WTP-Range for each Experimental
Round and T2
Treatment Model Variable Coefficient
T2 Model V Constant 60.290*** 61.005*** 60.615*** 61.113*** 61.013***
(2.701) (2.661) (2.681) (2.660) (2.653)
Partner 10.792 0.616 7.649 -3.176 0.522
(7.874) (7.873) (7.848) (7.980) (7.916)
Attitude of individual i 11.347*** 11.196*** 11.196*** 11.281*** 11.181***
(2.001) (1.997) (1.998) (2.017) (2.005)
Attitude of individual j -1.268 -1.278 -1.197 -1.203 -1.139
(1.977) (1.981) (1.980) (1.983) (1.977)
Interactions 2.878*** 2.826*** 2.804*** 2.839*** 2.813***
(0.626) (0.625) (0.626) (0.628) (0.631)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.070 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.068
F 16.02*** 15.77*** 15.57*** 15.56*** 15.51***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 62.01*** 60.08*** 60.35*** 60.29*** 60.13***
T2 Model VI Constant 62.951*** 63.366*** 63.167*** 63.392*** 63.357***
(8.051) (8.047) (8.048) (8.045) (8.046)
Partner 7.896 -0.499 5.473 -3.791 -0.517*
(7.860) (7.823) (7.818) (7.926) (7.863)
Attitude of individual i 10.810*** 10.679*** 10.695*** 10.809*** 10.662***
(2.002) (2.001) (2.000) (2.019) (2.007)
Attitude of individual j -0.965 -0.857 -0.968 -0.937 -0.863
(1.963) (1.964) (1.967) (1.968) (1.962)
Interactions 2.190*** 2.131*** 2.143*** 2.150*** 2.133***
(0.651) (0.650) (0.649) (0.650) (0.653)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.088 0.086 0.087 0.087 0.086
F 7.36*** 7.26*** 7.30*** 7.28*** 7.26***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 85.04*** 83.99*** 84.49*** 84.22*** 83.99***
Continued on next page
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Table A.10 -- continued from previous page
Treatment Model Variable Coefficients
T2 Model VII Constant 85.269*** 85.466*** 85.409*** 85.389*** 85.515***
(9.768) (9.785) (9.775) (9.785) (9.791)
Partner 12.196 2.528 9.295 -1.113 2.172
(7.584) (7.573) (7.552) (7.671) (7.625)
Attitude of individual i 10.795*** 10.534*** 10.613*** 10.591*** 10.608***
(1.934) (1.932) (1.930) (1.948) (1.941)
Attitude of individual j -1.602 -1.486 -1.631 -1.482 -1.460
(1.899) (1.901) (1.902) (1.905) (1.900)
Interactions 2.719*** 2.630*** 2.658*** 2.654*** 2.623***
(0.607) (0.609) (0.606) (0.609) (0.612)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.152 0.149 0.151 0.149 0.149
F 10.50*** 10.30*** 10.42*** 10.30*** 10.30***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 146.46*** 143.94*** 145.37*** 143.85*** 143.91***
T2 Model VIII Constant 80.412*** 80.444*** 80.458*** 80.332*** 80.742***
(11.438) (11.454) (11.443) (11.453) (11.462)
Partner 10.074 2.028 7.795 -1.030 1.568
(7.507) (7.474) (7.466) (7.569) (7.523)
Attitude of individual i 9.993*** 9.800*** 9.843*** 9.831*** 9.837***
(1.927) (1.925) (1.923) (1.941) (1.934)
Attitude of individual j -1.350 -1.245 -1.374 -1.242 -1.223
(1.877) (1.879) (1.881) (1.883) (1.877)
Interactions 2.153*** 2.064*** 2.096*** 2.082*** 2.060***
(0.626) (0.626) (0.624) (0.626) (0.629)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.177 0.174 0.176 0.175 0.175
F 8.44*** 8.34*** 8.40*** 8.34*** 8.34***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 178.52*** 176.74*** 177.79*** 176.68*** 176.71***
Notes: Dependent Variable is WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
170
Table A.11.: Pooled OLS Regression Models for WTP-Range for each Experimental
Round and T3
Treatment Model Variable Coefficient
T3 Model IX Constant 60.890*** 61.214*** 60.879*** 61.296*** 61.183***
(2.667) (2.679) (2.667) (2.671) (2.653)
Stranger 3.405 -3.806 3.744 -6.363 -8.419
(7.861) (7.842) (7.853) (7.893) (7.947)
Attitude of individual i 11.237*** 11.220*** 11.196*** 11.350*** 10.860***
(2.004) (2.001) (1.998) (2.010) (2.019)
Attitude of individual j -1.117 -1.117 -1.197 -1.207 -1.163
(1.977) (1.978) (1.980) (1.978) (1.975)
Interactions 2.806*** 2.817*** 2.804*** 2.832*** 2.899***
(0.626) (0.625) (0.626) (0.626) (0.631)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.069
F 15.56*** 15.58*** 15.57*** 15.69*** 15.82***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 60.31*** 60.36*** 60.35*** 60.78*** 61.25***
T3 Model X Constant 62.963*** 63.807*** 62.915*** 64.005*** 64.007***
(8.088) (8.103) (8.089) (8.094) (8.068)
Stranger 3.725 -3.597 4.108 -5.573 -7.702*
(7.806) (7.791) (7.799) (7.845) (7.895)
Attitude of individual i 10.747*** 10.726*** 10.701*** 10.841*** 10.392***
(2.005) (2.002) (2.000) (2.012) (2.020)
Attitude of individual j -0.839 -0.842 -0.928 -0.922 -0.886
(1.963) (1.962) (1.966) (1.963) (1.961)
Interactions 2.114*** 2.126*** 2.112*** 2.140*** 2.205***
(0.649) (0.649) (0.650) (0.650) (0.653)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.086 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.087
F 7.28*** 7.28*** 7.29*** 7.31*** 7.35***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 84.22*** 84.20*** 84.27*** 84.50*** 84.95***
Continued on next page
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Table A.11 -- continued from previous page
Treatment Model Variable Coefficients
T3 Model XI Constant 85.112*** 86.220*** 85.015*** 86.603*** 85.915***
(9.840) (9.861) (9.775) (9.856) (9.803)
Stranger 2.112 -4.926 9.295 -7.395 -5.107
(7.583) (7.573) (7.552) (7.631) (7.598)
Attitude of individual i 10.591*** 10.637*** 10.565*** 10.792*** 10.618***
(1.934) (1.935) (1.932) (1.946) (1.940)
Attitude of individual j -1.445 -1.431 -1.502 -1.539 -1.498
(1.901) (1.899) (1.903) (1.901) (1.900)
Interactions 2.639*** 2.646*** 2.636*** 2.665*** 2.637***
(0.607) (0.606) (0.607) (0.606) (0.607)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.148 0.149 0.148 0.150 0.149
F 10.30*** 10.33*** 10.30*** 10.37*** 10.30***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 143.90*** 144.26*** 143.96*** 144.78*** 143.96***
T3 Model XII Constant 79.825*** 81.229*** 79.668*** 81.607*** 81.742***
(11.533) (11.560) (11.539) (11.556) (11.501)
Stranger 2.918 -4.042 3.628 -5.912 -8.884
(7.489) (7.482) (7.485) (7.542) (7.573)
Attitude of individual i 9.847*** 9.867*** 9.811*** 9.993*** 9.486***
(1.928) (1.928) (1.924) (1.941) (1.941)
Attitude of individual j -1.202 -1.198 -1.281 -1.286 -1.253
(1.877) (1.877) (1.880) (1.878) (1.875)
Interactions 2.065*** 2.075*** 2.061*** 2.092*** 2.170***
(0.625) (0.624) (0.625) (0.624) (0.629)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.174 0.175 0.174 0.175 0.176
F 8.35*** 8.35*** 8.35*** 8.37*** 8.41***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 176.82*** 176.97*** 176.91*** 177.30*** 178.08***
Notes: Dependent Variable is WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.12.: Pooled OLS Regression Models for WTP-Range for each Experimental
Round and T4
Treatment Model Variable Coefficient
T4 Model XIII Constant 61.039*** 61.010*** 60.971*** 61.034*** 61.021***
(2.650) (2.648) (2.653) (2.651) (2.651)
Group 3.120 8.464 3.818 -1.491 -0.137
(8.041) (7.993) (7.916) (8.028) (8.064)
Attitude of individual i 11.259*** 11.234*** 11.180*** 11.209*** 11.166***
(2.011) (1.997) (1.998) (2.010) (2.007)
Attitude of individual j -1.142 -1.339 -1.186 -1.160 -1.143
(1.977) (1.984) (1.980) (1.980) (1.984)
Interactions 2.765*** 2.691*** 2.776*** 2.638*** 2.820***
(0.640) (0.636) (0.632) (0.634) (0.640)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.068 0.070 0.069 0.068 0.068
F 15.55*** 15.82*** 15.58*** 15.52*** 15.51***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 60.28*** 61.25*** 60.36*** 60.16*** 60.13***
T4 Model XIV Constant 63.473*** 63.553*** 63.393*** 63.350*** 63.373***
(8.049) (9.776) (8.045) (8.047) (8.050)
Group 3.380 8.612 3.655 -0.832 0.320
(7.969) (7.918) (7.840) (7.954) (7.991)
Attitude of individual i 10.774*** 10.744*** 10.686*** 10.696*** 10.682***
(2.013) (1.999) (1.999) (2.010) (2.008)
Attitude of individual j -0.866 -1.066 -0.909 -0.876 -0.856
(1.962) (1.970) (1.965) (1.965) (1.969)
Interactions 2.068*** 1.995*** 2.086*** 2.139*** 2.123***
(0.664) (0.660) (0.655) (0.658) (0.664)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes No No No No No
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.087 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.086
F 7.28*** 7.37*** 7.28*** 7.26*** 7.26***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 84.17*** 85.19*** 84.21*** 84.00*** 83.99***
Continued on next page
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Table A.12 -- continued from previous page
Treatment Model Variable Coefficients
T4 Model XV Constant 85.470*** 85.452*** 85.368*** 85.422*** 85.399***
(9.785) (9.776) (9.783) (9.785) (9.785)
Group 2.942 8.619 3.814 -1.259 -0.388
(7.715) (7.671) (7.596) (7.709) (7.737)
Attitude of individual i 10.639*** 10.613*** 10.563*** 10.589*** 10.545***
(1.944) (1.931) (1.391) (1.943) (1.941)
Attitude of individual j -1.463 -1.667 -1.509 -1.477 -1.469
(1.899) (1.906) (1.901) (1.902) (1.906)
Interactions 2.598*** 2.520*** 2.605*** 2.664*** 2.654***
(0.620) (0.617) (0.613) (0.615) (0.620)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics No No No No No
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.149 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.149
F 31*** 10.39*** 10.31*** 10.30*** 10.29***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 143.97*** 143.94*** 144.48*** 143.85*** 143.83***
T4 Model XVI Constant 80.481*** 80.600*** 80.408*** 80.352*** 80.331***
(11.456) (11.444) (11.450) (11.451) (11.456)
Group 2.429 8.134 3.099 -1.125 -0.710
(7.606) (7.560) (7.486) (7.597) (7.628)
Attitude of individual i 9.868*** 9.856*** 9.804*** 9.828*** 9.779***
(1.937) (1.923) (1.924) (1.936) (1.933)
Attitude of individual j -1.224 -1.417 -1.261 -1.239 -1.239
(1.877) (1.885) (1.879) (1.880) (1.885)
Interactions 2.035*** 1.995*** 2.044*** 2.091*** 2.089***
(0.637) (0.634) (0.629) (0.632) (0.638)
Control Variables
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attitudes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.175 0.176 0.175 0.175 0.175
F 8.34*** 8.40*** 8.35*** 8.34*** 8.35***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 176.77*** 177.86*** 176.84*** 176.69*** 176.67***
Notes: Dependent Variable is WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.13.: OLS for Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for T1
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 16.563*** 17.878*** 12.498*** 13.451***
(1.436) (4.771) (4.650) (4.650)
StdvT1 -6.678*** -4.745 -6.793*** -5.138**
(2.279) (2.281) (2.377) (2.236)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.031 0.037 0.085 0.100
F 6.08 ** 1.68** 2.23** 1.87**
Breusch-Pagan χ2 4.77** 50.11*** 42.76*** 91.25***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables. OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.14.: OLS for Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for T2
Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 11.478*** 15.220*** 10.491** 13.075
(1.836) (4.895) (3.922) (5.872)
StdvT2 1.105 0.085 1.392 0.343
(2.552) (2.569) (2.604) (2.485)
Cummatti 0.411** 0.356* 0.367** 0.304
(0.188) (0.169) (0.178) (0.193)
Cummattj 0.254 0.268 0.257 0.271*
(0.208) (0.193) (0.207) (0.131)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.049 0.059 0.092 0.108
F 3.71*** 1.89** 2.15*** 1.87
Breusch-Pagan χ2 6.79*** 59.01*** 47.61*** 108.19
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables. OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.15.: OLS for Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for T3
Model IX Model X Model XI Model XII
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 11.093*** 14.318*** 8.490** 10.542
(1.477) (4.838) (5.010) (7.149)
StdvT3 2.841 2.657 3.068 3.126
(3.387) (3.471) (3.373) (3.407)
Cummatti 0.410** 0.345** 0.356** 0.286*
(0.125) (0.202) (0.174) (0.144)
Cummattj 0.246 0.247 0.258 0.255
(0.235) (0.217) (0.227) (0.201)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.055 0.065 0.098 0.116
F 4.05*** 1.99** 2.23*** 1.94**
Breusch-Pagan χ2 15.84*** 62.01*** 48.38*** 101.13***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables. OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.16.: OLS for Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for T4
Model XIII Model XIV Model XV Model XVI
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 11.931*** 15.405*** 11.103*** 13.114**
(1.859) (4.907) (3.942) (5.855)
StdvT4 -1.528* -1.941 -1.542 -1.918
(2.368) (2.434) (2.246) (2.393)
Cummatti 0.426** 0.366** 0.383** 0.316*
(0.183) (0.166) (0.174) (0.188)
Cummattj 0.282 0.284 0.290 0.291
(0.219) (0.203) (0.214) (0.198)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.050 0.062 0.093 0.111
F 3.77*** 1.94** 2.15** 1.90***
Breusch-Pagan χ2 8.44** 57.51*** 45.49*** 103.76***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables. OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.17.: OLS for Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for All Treatments
Model XVII Model XVIII Model XIX Model XX
Variable Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Constant 9.886*** 14.251** 6.792 10.028
(1.769) (5.017) (6.048) (7.672)
StdvT2 3.520 0.935 4.117 1.905
(3.381) (3.419) (3.719) (3.491)
StdvT3 4.704 2.979 5.347 3.933
(4.622) (4.554) (4.902) (4.716)
StdvT4 1.545 -0.561 1.925 0.219
(3.188) (3.274) (3.172) (3.117)
Cummatti 0.371** 0.345* 0.312* 0.273
(0.167) (0.205) (0.184) (0.207)
Cummattj 0.173 0.239 0.164 0.220
(0.266) (0.242) (0.268) (0.244)
Control Variables
Personal
characteristics No Yes No Yes
Attitudes No No Yes Yes
n 800 800 800 800
R
2
0.048 0.053 0.092 0.105
F 2.60** 1.68* 2.01** 1.77**
Breusch-Pagan χ2 19.42*** 61.51*** 57.97*** 99.96***
Notes: Dependent Variable is the Standard Deviation of WTP-Range for the chocolate bar in EUR/100 (euro cent).
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables. OLS regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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B. Knowledge, Attitudes, and
Habits
B.1. Original text of the audio tape to welcome the
participants
Welcome to the chocolate experiment at the Laboratory for Experimental Eco-
nomics.
The experiment consists of two parts:
In the ﬁrst one, you will be asked about your knowledge about chocolates and
your willingness to pay for a chocolate bar. To enable you to buy, you will receive an
initial budget of 5 EUR. In case that you buy the chocolate bar, you will receive it
at the end of the experiment together with the diﬀerence to your initial endowment.
In the next part, you will participate in a lottery where you can additionaly
increase your money earned to a maximum of 5 EUR.
After you complete these two parts, you will be asked to individually complete a
questionnaire. Please answer these questions carefully.
The rules about the procedure of the experiment will be exactly explained. Please,
always follow the instructions appearing on your computer screen.
Make all you decisions unhurriedly. Quick answers will not inﬂuence the duration
of the experiment.
Please keep quiet during the experiment otherwise the results of the experiment
may lose their scientiﬁc validity. If you have any question, please raise your hand
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and the experimentalist will help you.
Thank you in advance for your participation.
B.2. Questions Applied in the First Part of the
Experiment: Original Screens and
Corresponding Translations
B.2.1. welcome
Figure B.1.: Screen 1.
Welcome to this economic experiment at the Labor fu¨r experimentelle Wirtschafts-
forchung. With your participation, you will contribute to improving the economic
theory. The experiment is completely anonymized. Your name will only appear in
the receipt of payment.
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Please take enough time to read the instructions and to make your choices. Quick
choices do not inﬂuence the lasting of the experiment.
Please try to immerse yourself totally in the described situation and make your
choices as if they were real choices inﬂuencing your budget.
In the ﬁrst part, you will be asked about your knowledge and willingness to pay
for a chocolate bar. To buy the chocolate bar, you will receive 5 EUR. In the
expeirment, you will get the possibility to buy the chocolate bar. If you buy the
chocolate bar, you will receive it at the end of the experiment together with your
payment.
At the end of the experiment follows a short, anonymized questionnaire. Thank
you for your participation!
B.2.2. Introduction and first part of the Experiment
Figure B.2.: Screen 2.
Within this part of the experiment, you will be asked about your knowledge and
attitudes towards chocolate. Take enough time and make your choices unhurriedly.
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For each question, there are more than one answer.
To begin the experiemnt please press START.
Figure B.3.: Screen 3.
1. From the following list of names, which of them are cacao names?
• a. Trinitario
• b. Amazonas
• c. Guarana
• d. Alpujarra
• e. Maracaibo
• f. No idea
Right answers: a, b and e.
2. From the following countries, which of them are known for producing high
quality cacao?
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Figure B.4.: Screen 4.
• a. Bolivia
• b. Grenada
• c. Venezuela
• d. Ivory Coast
• e. Madagascar
• f. No idea
Right answers: c, d, and e.
3. How often do you eat chocolate?
• At least once a day (4)
• At least once a week (3)
• At least once a month (2)
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Figure B.5.: Screen 5.
• Only sometimes within the year (1)
• Never (0)
4. Do you like to eat chocolates? Choose from a scale from 0 to 7 the level of
pleasure that you exert by eating chocolate
The following set of questions were designed as yes/no questions:
5. When you decide to buy a chocolate bar, do you care about the percentage of
cacao contained in it?
6. Do you care about the fat contents of the chocolate bar?
7. Do you care about an organic cultivation of the cacao inside the chocolate bar?
8. Do you care about recommendations to choose chocolates?
9. Do you care about the package (presentation) of the chocolate bar?
10. Do you care about the provenance of the cacao contained in the chocolate
bar?
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Figure B.6.: Screen 6.
Figure B.7.: Screen 7.
187

C. Translation of Instructions for
Payments
The whole experiment consists of three parts. The mechanism described below
onlyrefers to the second part.
Your earnings in the second part of the experiment will be calculated as follows:
You will receive diﬀerent infomation in a total of ﬁve experimental rounds. In
each round, you will be asked for your maximal and minimal willingness to pay
(WTP) for the oﬀered chocolate. The minimal WTP refers to the minimal price
that you will pay for the chocolate. The maximal WTP refers to the maximal price
that you will pay for it.
Procedure:
You will get ﬁve subsequent bits of information, and after each information you
will be asked about your maximal and minimal WTP. You can, therefore, adjust
your WTP according to each additional information.
The ﬁfth and last maximal and minimal WTP will be compared with a randomly
generated market price, following the pattern described below. This mechanism will
lead you to buy the chocolate at the randomly generated market price or to get your
whole initial endowment back.
Figure 1. Marketprice > MaxWTP > minWTP . When the randomly gen-
erated market price is higher than your maximal WTP, you will buy nothing and
retain your 5 EUR.
Figure 2. MaxWTP > Marketprice > minWTP . When the randomly gener-
189
ated market price is located between your maximal and minimal WTP, you will buy
the chocolate bar with a probability of 50% at the market price and you will receive
the rest of your endowment.
Figure 3. MaxWTP > minWTP > Marketprice. When the randomly gener-
ated market price is smaller than your minimal WTP, you will buy the chocolate
bar for the market price and receive the diﬀerence to your initial endowment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Someone from the eperimen-
talist team will come to you and assist you. Thank you.
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Figure C.1.: Instructions about the payment of our participants: first part.
191
Figure C.2.: Instructions about the payment of our participants: second part.
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D. Sensory Experience
Figure D.1.: Screen 8. Instructions.
Screen 8. In the following part of the experiment, you will receive information in
ﬁve steps. The information will be automatically displayed on your computer screen
after you have ﬁnished reading these instructions and after you have answered two
questions related to it.
Please read the information carefully and follow all the instructions. You will be
endowed with ﬁve (5) EUR. With this money, you can buy a chocolate bar of 100
gr.
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After each step of information aggregation, and once you ﬁnish the described
task, you will be connected to a partner via chat. Thereafter, you have a minute to
exchange information with your partner regarding your attitude and willingness to
pay (WTP) for the whole chocolate bar of 100 gr. (This part appears only for T2,
T3, and T4).
You can choose your WTP individually between zero (0) and ﬁve (5) EUR. Please
state your WTP in cents. For example, if you want to expend 1,30 Euro, please
write 130.
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Figure D.2.: Screen 9. Instructions.
Screen 9. Once you have stated your WTP, a new screen will be displayed with
the next information. You will get a total of ﬁve informational rounds and you will
be asked ﬁve times to state your WTP.
The last maximal and minimal WTP will be compared with a randomly generated
market price.
If your maximal WTP is below the randomly generated market price, you receive
the ﬁve Euros at the end of the experiment.
If your minimal WTP is above the randomly generated market price, you will
buy the chocolate bar at the randomly generated market price. At the end of the
experiment, you receive the chocolate bar and the diﬀerence between your initial
endowment and the purchase price.
If the randomly generated market price is between your minimal and maximal
WTP, you automatically participate in a lottery with a 50% probability to buy the
chocolate bar.
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Figure D.3.: Screen 10. Control Questions.
Screen 10. Please answer the following control questions about the experimental
process:
1. How many times will you be asked for your WTP for the chocolate bar?
• only at the end of the experiment
• 1
• 8
• 5
2. What will you get at the end of the experiment?
• Only the endowment for this part of the experiment (5 Euros)
• A chocolate bar of 100 gr.
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• Either the whole endowment for this part of the experiment or you will be
commited to buy the chocolate bar.
• One will win the experimental fee and chocolate.
3. For which purpose is a chat window available?
• To reveal my identity.
• To talk about the general content of the experiment.
• To exchange personal attitudes toward the product.
• To feel more confortable.
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Figure D.4.: Screen 11. Instructions.
Screen 11. Please read the following information slowly and follow the instruc-
tions accurately. Only take the piece of chocolate, when you are asked to do so and
only do what you are asked to do in the instructions. You are in a real decision
situation, which will inﬂuence your budget.
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Figure D.5.: Screen 12. 1. Information: Seeing the Chocolate.
Screen 12. Examine the piece of chocolate for some seconds.
Concentrate your attention on the color, structur and brightness. The color of
the chocolate may vary from almost black to all possible brown shades until butter
and milky-white shades.
The chocolate should have a smooth, greasy surface. A barely shiny chocolate
surface indicates that the chocolate has gone bad. Ideally, the chocolate should
have a beamless and ﬂat surface.
A good chocolate is smooth and tenderly melting.
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Figure D.6.: Screen 13. 1. Action: Seeing the Chocolate.
Screen 13. Please take now the piece of chocolate and examine it for some
seconds.
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Figure D.7.: Screen 14. Chat Window.
Screen 14. You are now in a chat room. Please feel free to communicate with
your partner concerning your attitudes and impressions. Your partner will be ran-
dom assigned. What do you feel? Should you buy it? How much money are you
ready to spend for it? You have 60 seconds to exchange your attitudes toward the
chocolate.
Press ENTER to send your message.
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Figure D.8.: Screen 15. WTP Screen.
Screen 15.
• How much do you want to spend for a chocolate bar of 100 gr. like this oneat
the maximum?
• How much do you want to spend for a chocolate bar of 100 gr. like this one
at the minimum?
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Figure D.9.: Screen 16. 2. Information: Smelling the Chocolate.
Screen 16. By means of your nose, you can experience the multifaceted ﬂavors
of chocolate. You can inhalate these ﬂavors taking the piece of chocolate directly
under your nose.
What does the chocolate smell of? Maybe you can evaluate its ﬂavors as if it
was wine. In the bouquet of chocolate, you can ﬁnd gently rost ﬂavors, honey or
marzipan. Also you can identify caramel or vanila scents.
Chocolate with strong rost ﬂavors and pronounced vanilla scents is, certainly, not
the ﬁnest chocolate.
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Figure D.10.: Screen 17. 2. Action: Smelling the Chocolate.
Screen 17. Please take the piece of chocolate and smell it now.
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Figure D.11.: Screen 20. 2. Information: Touching the Chocolate.
Screen 20. Now you will touch the chocolate.
How can you judge the composition of the surface (from smooth to rough or
grained)?
The best way to feel the texture of chocolate is to touch it with your hands.
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Figure D.12.: Screen 23. 4. Information: Hearing the Chocolate.
Screen 23. Keep the piece of chocolate close to your ear and break it.
Pay particular attention to the noise just when it breaks. It can be very clear or
rather blunt. Chocolate of ﬁnest quality (and without ﬁlling) makes a clear noise
when it breaks. What does this one sound like? Please describe the sound as exact
as possible.
The best-known noise of chocolate is the noise of the wrapping paper. When
hearing this sound, we prick up our ears, knowing that something very good is
going to happen.
By high quality chocolate you can hear a very clear knack. The expression ‘knack’
refers to the behavior of chocolate under pression. First-class chocolate can be
recognized by straight and smooth breaking edges.
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Figure D.13.: Screen 24. 4. Action: Hearing the Chocolate.
Screen 24. Please take the chocolate now and break a piece of it oﬀ!
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Figure D.14.: Screen 27. 5. Information: Tasting the Chocolate.
Screen 27. Now we get to the most intensive sensory experience. Let a piece of
chocolate slowly melt in your mouth.
Distribute the chocolate with your tongue. This is the only way to reach all your
gustatory nerves. What do you feel?
Then exhale and smell all the ﬂavors.
Professionals in this ﬁeld are studying in the same way as wine, in which grade
the contains of sugar and acidity, are in harmony with the ﬂavors and body of the
chocolate as well as the chocolate’s aftertaste.
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Figure D.15.: Screen 28. 5. Action: Tasting the Chocolate.
Screen 28. Please take the chocolate and taste it now!
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E. Testing Risk Attitudes
Figure E.1.: Screen 31. Risk Attitudes after Holt and Laury (2002)
.
In the next part of the experiment, you will choose between the two options shown
for each lottery.
Please take enough time to make your decisions. Quick decisions have no inﬂuence
on the duration of the experiment.
Here, you have the opportunity to additionally earn up to ﬁve (5) Euros.
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Figure E.2.: screen32. Ten Paired Lotteries.
This Table shows 10 diﬀerent choice options between two diﬀerent lotteries. Thus
you should choose 10 times between Option A and Option B.
Please read the printed sheet ‘Instructions for Lotteries’ that you can ﬁnd on your
desk.
After you have made the ten choices press OK to send them. Thereafter, one
of your chosen lotteries will be randomly selected and played. This way it will be
decided, how much you will get paid for this part of the experiment.
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Figure E.3.: Screen 33. Final Payments.
• In the lottery you win: 65
• From the ﬁrst part of the experiment you receive: 500
• For your participation you will receive a total of: 565
Hereafter, you should answer a short questionnarie. After you have completed it,
you may pick up your earns from the neighboring room.
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F. Socio-Demographic
Questionnaire
ID Number: (received at the beginning of each experimental session)
Figure F.1.: Questionnaire 1.
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Gender: [Male/ female]
Do you smoke? [Yes/ No]
Figure F.2.: Questionnaire 2.
• Which chocolate brands do you know? Write down a short list of them
• In general, to make purchase decisions, do you care about advertising? [Yes /
No]
• In general, to make purchase decisions, do you care about the price of the
product? [Yes / No]
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Figure F.3.: Questionnaire 3.
In the following statements please choose the answer that better suits your be-
havior:
• Innovative products are very important for me
0 = Strongly disagree
1 = Disagree
2 = Neither agree nor disagree
3 = Agree
4 = Strongly agree
• I am a person who likes to follow up consumption trends
0 = Strongly disagree
1 = Disagree
2 = Neither agree nor disagree
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3 = Agree
4 = Strongly agree
• I am purchasing new products, just after they appeared in marketing cam-
paigns
0 = Strongly disagree
1 = Disagree
2 = Neither agree nor disagree
3 = Agree
4 = Strongly agree
Figure F.4.: Questionnaire 4.
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Thank you for participating in the experiment and for completing the question-
naire.
Figure F.5.: Questionnaire 5.
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G. Additional Tables
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Table G.1.: Descriptive Statistics for the Initial Information for the four Treatments
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
T1 0.298 0.25 0.1666 0.172 -0.198 0.662 0 0.70
T2 0.361 0.333 0.291 0.145 0.773 0.548 0 0.75
T3r 0.314 0.291 0.375 0.156 -0.323 0,260 0 0.666
T4 0.298 0.273 0.273 0.150 -0.167 0.222 0 0.636
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Table G.2.: Descriptive Statistics for Maximal WTP for T1
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 98.625 100 100 50.028 1.371 0.749 0 250
2. Round 106.175 100 100 58.570 0.936 0.940 0 250
3. Round 105.025 100 100 50.801 0.939 0.662 0 250
4. Round 111 100 100 56.202 0.530 0.628 0 250
5. Round 107 99.5 90 68.343 0.941 0.973 0 279
223
Table G.3.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Maximal WTP for T1
Round W H0
1. Round 0.956 not reject
2. Round 0.923*** reject
3. Round 0.959 not reject
4. Round 0.959 not reject
5. Round 0.914*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.4.: Descriptive Statistics for Maximal WTP for the T2
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 133.725 120 100 64.610 0.204 0.856 40 300
2. Round 134.475 125 150 62.820 0.951 0.713 10 300
3. Round 138.125 130 100 64.477 0.537 0.525 10 300
4. Round 143.875 125 100 68.608 -0.074 0.426 15 300
5. Round 145.375 117.50 100 79.521 0.019 0.611 10 350
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Table G.5.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Maximal WTP for T2
Round W H0
1. Round 0.934** reject
2. Round 0.954 not reject
3. Round 0.961 not reject
4. Round 0.959 not reject
5. Round 0.949* reject
Notes:∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.(H0: The
data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.6.: Descriptive Statistics for Maximal WTP for T3
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 132.675 120 150 78.345 3.816 1.713 0 400
2. Round 145.55 130 150 93.7 4.867 1.912 0 500
3. Round 139.275 110 100 97.183 4.862 1.938 0 500
4. Round 147.75 120 120 83.657 1.566 1.288 0 400
5. Round 136.275 105 100 87.985 3.262 1.765 0 410
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Table G.7.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Maximal WTP for T3
W H0
1. Round 0.835*** reject
2. Round 0.831*** reject
3. Round 0.818*** reject
4. Round 0.870*** reject
5. Round 0.809*** reject
Notes:∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.(H0: The
data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.8.: Descriptive Statistics for Maximal WTP for T4
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 138.90 122.5 80 73.639 0.423 0.696 11 350
2. Round 143.10 134.5 150 80.900 1.367 0.9367 0 399
3. Round 140.70 130 100 71.492 -0.183 0.546 13 300
4. Round 142.20 127.5 50 76.974 -0.755 0.3867 13 300
5. Round 132.325 100 50 83.324 -1 0.523 30 300
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Table G.9.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Maximal WTP for T4
W H0
1. Round 0.959 not reject
2. Round 0.934** reject
3. Round 0.953* reject
4. Round 0.946* reject
5. Round 0.902*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.( H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.10.: Descriptive Statistics for Minimal WTP for T1
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 42.675 40 50 38.307 1.633 1.223 0 150
2. Round 48.925 40 50 46.647 2.201 1.502 0 200
3. Round 46.425 47 50 41.561 1.138 1.203 0 150
4. Round 52.675 50 50 43.009 2.592 1.295 0 200
5. Round 49.55 50 50 44.663 2.22 1.256 0 200
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Table G.11.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Minimal WTP for T1
W H0
1. Round 0.873*** reject
2. Round 0.835*** reject
3. Round 0.855*** reject
4. Round 0.89*** reject
5. Round 0.89*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.( H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.12.: Descriptive Statistics for Minimal WTP T2
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 59.80 50 50 44.725 1.226 0.905 0 199
2. Round 58.675 50 50 41.429 1.488 0.765 0 190
3. Round 62.45 60 50 45.256 0.255 0.448 0 190
4. Round 66.05 60 60 41.698 -0.586 -0.037 0 150
5. Round 73.425 75 50 54.739 1.513 0.911 0 250
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Table G.13.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Minimal WTP for T2
W H0
1. Round 0.917*** reject
2. Round 0.923*** reject
3. Round 0.942** reject
4. Round 0.950* reject
5. Round 0.927** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.(H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.14.: Descriptive Statistics for Minimal WTP for T3
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 61.10 60 50 36.99 0.0202 0.0115 0 160
2. Round 76.70 70 100 46.662 0.942 0.772 0 200
3. Round 65.45 60 60 38.309 0.132 0.095 0 160
4. Round 76.15 74.5 60 46.369 5.047 1.540 0 250
5. Round 75.775 70 100 47.638 3.345 1.120 0 250
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Table G.15.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Minimal WTP for T3
W H0
1. Round 0.942** reject
2. Round 0.945* reject
3. Round 0.947* reject
4. Round 0.860*** reject
5. Round 0.926** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.( H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.16.: Descriptive Statistics for Minimal WTP for T4
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 62.625 52.50 50 52.099 0.564 0.901 0 200
2. Round 59.525 50 0 53.336 0.493 0.923 0 199
3. Round 62.025 57 0 51.510 0.103 0.747. 0 180
4. Round 61.175 57.50 100 51.548 0.654 0.878 0 200
5. Round 57.425 49.50 0 47.958 1.256 1.147 0 230
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Table G.17.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the Minimal WTP for T4
W H0
1. Round 0.911*** reject
2. Round 0.898*** reject
3. Round 0.911*** reject
4. Round 0.905*** reject
5. Round 0.861*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.( H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.18.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for WTP-Range for T1
W H0
1. Round 0.928** reject
2. Round 0.929*** reject
3. Round 0.942** reject
4. Round 0.971** reject
5. Round 0.940** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.( H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.19.: Descriptive Statistics for WTP-Range for T2 in the five Experimental Rounds
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 73.925 50 50 50.232 0.284 0.967 0 200
2. Round 75.80 60 40 44.374 0.006 0.755 10 199
3. Round 75.676 60 40 44.429 0.620 1.031 10 199
4. Round 77.825 55.5 40 49.758 -0.186 0.928 5 199
5. Round 71.95 50 50 52.506 -0.049 0.918 10 199
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Table G.20.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for WTP-Range for T2
W H0
1. Round 0.901*** reject
2. Round 0.921*** reject
3. Round 0.898*** reject
4. Round 0.877*** reject
5. Round 0.895*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.( H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.21.: Descriptive Statistics for WTP-Range for T3 in the five Experimental Rounds
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 71.575 50 50 65.893 7.073 2.639 0 300
2. Round 68.85 50 40 62.486 7.001 2.547 0 300
3. Round 73.825 50 20 78.965 8.189 2.731 0 400
4. Round 77.825 55.5 40 49.758 -0.186 0.928 5 199
5. Round 60.50 40 30 62.698 6.871 2.560 0 300
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Table G.22.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for WTP-Range for T3
W p-Value H0
1. Round 0.643*** reject
2. Round 0.702*** reject
3. Round 0.667*** reject
4. Round 0.733*** reject
5. Round 0.679*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.(H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
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Table G.23.: Descriptive Statistics for WTP-Range for T4 in the five Experimental Rounds
Treatment Mean Median Mode St.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness Min.Value Max.Value
1. Round 76.375 70 50 43.238 0.977 0.850 1 200
2. Round 83.575 72 100 47.244 2.392 1.267 0 240
3. Round 78.675 70 100 39.797 1.161 0.814 0 200
4. Round 81.025 70 100 44.385 0.352 0.719 0 200
5. Round 74.90 65 50 43.711 0.330 0.927 10 200
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Table G.24.: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for WTP-Range for T4
W H0
1. Round 0.943** reject
2. Round 0.909*** reject
3. Round 0.951* reject
4. Round 0.950* reject
5. Round 0.917*** reject
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.(H0:
The data set is normally distributed.)
245

Bibliography
[1] Ajzen, I. (2008). Consumer Attitudes and Behavior. Handbook of Consumer Psychol-
ogy. Psychology Press. N.Y., 525-548.
[2] Ajzen, I., and Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social
Behavior (Prentice-Hall).
[3] Allais, M. (1953). Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Cri-
tique des Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine. Econometrica 21, 503-546.
[4] Andersen, S., Harrison, G.W., Lau, M., and Rutstro¨m, E.E. (2011). Discounting
Behavior: A Reconsideration (Durham University Business School).
[5] Andersen, S., Harrison, G.W., Lau, M.I., and Rutstro¨m, E.E. (2010). Preference
Heterogeneity in Experiments: Comparing the Field and Laboratory. J. Econ. Behav.
Organ. 73, 209-224.
[6] Anderson, J.R. (1995). Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications (New York, W.H.
Freeman and Company).
[7] Anderson, L.R., and Holt, C.A. (1997). Information Cascades in the Laboratory. Am.
Econ. Rev. 87, 847-862.
[8] Anderson, L.R., and Mellor, J.M. (2008). Are Risk Preferences Stable? Comparing
an Experimental Measure with a Validated Survey-Based Measure (Department of
Economics, College of William and Mary).
247
[9] Austen-Smith, D., and Banks, J.S. (1996). Information Aggregation, Rationality, and
the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 90, 34.
[10] Baker, J., Levy, M., and Grewal, D. (1992). An Experimental Approach to Making
Retail Store Environmental Decisions. J. Retail. 68, 445-460.
[11] Ball, S., Eckel, C., and Heracleous, M. (2010). Risk Aversion and Physical Prowess:
Prediction, Choice and Bias. J. Risk Uncertain. 41, 167-193.
[12] Ball, S.A., and Zuckerman, M. (1992). Sensation Seeking and Selective Attention:
Focused and Divided Attention on a Dichotic Listening Task. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
63, 825-831.
[13] Ballinger, T.P., and Wilcox, N.T. (1997). Decisions, Error and Heterogeneity. Econ.
J. 107, 1090-1105.
[14] Bandura, A. (1972). Social Learning Theory. Morristown (New Jersey: General
Learning Press).
[15] Barsky, R.B., Juster, F.T., Kimball, M.S., and Shapiro, M.D.(1997). Preference Pa-
rameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health
and Retirement Study. Q. J. Econ. 112, 537-579.
[16] Becker, G.M., Degroot, M.H., and Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring Utility by a Single-
Response Sequential Method. Behav. Sci. 9, 226-232.
[17] Berger, C.R., and Calabrese, R.J. (1975). Some Explorations in Initial Interaction and
Beyond: Toward a Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication. Hum.
Commun. Res. 1, 99-112.
[18] Bernoulli, D. (1738). Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. Econo-
metrica 22, 23-36.
[19] Bettman, J.R. (1973). Perceived Risk and Its Components: A Model and Empirical
Test. J. Mark. Res. 10, 184-190.
248
[20] Birol, E., Karousakis, K., and Koundouri, P. (2006). Using Economic Valuation Tech-
niques to Inform Water Resources Management: A Survey and Critical Appraisal of
Available Techniques and an Application. Sci. Total Environ. 365, 105-122.
[21] Bogardus, E.S. (1926). Social Distance in the City. Proc. Publ. Am. Sociol. Soc. 20,
40-46.
[22] Bohm, P. (1984). Revealing Demand for an Actual Public Good. J. Public Econ. 24,
135-151.
[23] Bohm, P., Linde´n, J., and Sonnegard, J. (1997). Eliciting Reservation Prices: Becker-
Degroot-Marschak Mechanism vs. Markets. Econ. J. 107, 1079-1089.
[24] Bonin, H., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., and Sunde, U. (2007). Cross-Sectional
Earnings Risk and Occupational Sorting: The Role of Risk Attitudes. Labor Econ.
14, 926-937.
[25] Bossomaier, T. (2012). Introduction to the Senses: From Biology to Computer Science
(Cambridge University Press).
[26] Bower, J.A., Saadat, M.A., and Whitten, C. (2003). Effect of Liking, Information
and Consumer Characteristics on Purchase Intention and Willingness to Pay More
for a Fat Spread With a Proven Health Benefit. Food Qual. Prefer. 14, 65-74.
[27] Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets
and Other Economic Institutions. J. Econ. Lit. 36, 75-111.
[28] Braun, K.A. (1999). Postexperience Advertising Effects on Consumer Memory. J.
Consum. Res. 25, 319-334.
[29] Brehm, J.W. (1956). Postdecisions Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives. Jour-
nal of Abnormal zand Social Psychology 52, 348-89.
[30] Burnstein, E., and Vinokur, A. (1973). Testing Two Classes of Theories About Group
Induced Shifts in Individual Choice. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 9, 123-137.
249
[31] Byrnes, J.P. (1998). The Nature and Development of Decision Making: A Self-
regulation Model (L. Erlbaum Associates).
[32] Byrnes, J.P., Miller, D.C., and Schafer, W.D. (1999). Gender Differences in Risk
tTaking: A Meta-Analysis. Psychol. Bull. 125, 367-383.
[33] Camerer, C. (1989). Bubbles and Fads in Asset Prices. J. Econ. Surv. 3, 3-41.
[34] Campbell, D. T. (1963). Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Disposi-
tions. In: S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science. 6. New York, McGraw-
Hill.
[35] Cartwright, D., and Festinger, L. (1943). A Quantitative Theory of Decision. Psychol.
Rev. 50, 595-621.
[36] Clemen, R.T. (1996). Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis
(Duxbury Press).
[37] Cooper, J.B. and Pollock, D. (1959). The Identification of Prejudicial Attitudes by
the Galvanic Skin Response. Journal of Social Psychology 50, 241-5.
[38] Cox, D. F. (ed.) (1967). Risk Taking and Information Handling in Consumer Behavior
(Boston, Harvard University Press).
[39] Cruz, A., and Green, B.G. (2000). Thermal Stimulation of Taste. Nature 403, 889-
892.
[40] Cunningham, S. (1967) The Major Dimensions of Perceived Risk, in Cox, D. F.
(ed.), Risk Taking and Information Handling in Consumer Behavior, Boston, Harvard
University Press, 82-108.
[41] Dave, C., Eckel, C., Johnson, C., and Rojas, C. (2010). Eliciting Risk Preferences:
When is Simple better? J. Risk Uncertain. 41, 219-243.
250
[42] Davidson, D., and Marschak, J. (1959). Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision
Theory, in C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (eds.), Measurement: Definitions and
Theories, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, New York, U.S.A., pp. 233-269.
[43] Davis, D.D., and Holt, C.A. (1993). Experimental Economics (Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press).
[44] De Araujo, I.E. and Rolls, E.T. (2004) Representation in the Human Brain of Food
Texture and Oral Fat. J. Neurosci., 24, 3086-3093.
[45] Debreu, G. (1954). Representation of a Preference Ordering by a Numerical Function.
In Decision Processes, (New York, John Wiley), pp. 159-165.
[46] Debreu, G. (1958). Stochastic Choice and Cardinal Utility (Cowles Foundation for
Research in Economics, Yale University).
[47] Dennis, A.R. (1996). Information Exchange and Use in Group Decision Making:
You Can Lead a Group to Information, But You can’t Make it Think. Management
Information Systems MIS Quarterly 20, 433-457.
[48] Dohmen, T., and Falk, A. (2011). Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting:
Productivity, Preferences, and Gender. Am. Econ. Rev. 101, 556-590.
[49] Downey, S. (2009). HowStuffWorks. Smell and Memory.
[50] Druckman, J.N., and Lupia, A. (2000). Preference Formation. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.
3, 1-24.
[51] DuBose, C. N., Cardello, A. V., & Maller, O. (1980). Effects of Colorants and Fla-
vorants on Identification, Perceived Flavor Intensity, and Hedonic Quality of Fruit-
Flavored Beverages and Cake. Journal of Food Science, 45, 1393-1399.
[52] Duncan Herrington, J.D. (1996). Effects of Music in Service Environments: a Field
Study. J. Serv. Mark. 10, 26-41.
251
[53] Durham, W.H. (1991). Coevolution: Genes, Culture an Human Diversity (Stanford,
Stanford University Press).
[54] Eagly, A. H., and Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of Attitudes (Orlando, FL,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers).
[55] Engel, A., and Broeck, C.V. den (2001). Statistical Mechanics of Learning (Cam-
bridge University Press).
[56] Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious.
American Psychologist,49 (August), 709-724.
[57] Fahle, M., Edelman, S., Poggio, T. (1995). Fast Perceptual Learning in Hyperacuity.
Vision Res 35, 3003-3013.
[58] Fechner, G.T. (1860). Elemente der Psychophysik (Breitkopf und Ha¨rtel).
[59] Feddersen, T., and Pesendorfer, W. (1997). Voting Behavior and Information Aggre-
gation in Elections With Private Information. Econometrica 65, 1029.
[60] Feldman, M.W. and Laland, K.N. (1996). Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory. Work-
ing Paper No. 96-05-030. Santafe´ Institute, March.
[61] Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL, Row, Peter-
son).
[62] Fischhoff, B. (1991). Value Elicitation: Is there Anything in There? American Psy-
chologist, 46(8), 835-847.
[63] Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1972). Attitudes and Options. Annual Review of Psy-
chology 23, 487-544.
[64] Fishburn, P.C. (1967). Additive Utilities with Incomplete Product Set: Applications
to Priorities and Assignments. Operations Research Society of America (ORSA),
Baltimore, MD, U.S.A.
252
[65] Floyd, K. (2006). Communication Affection: Interpersonal Behavior and Social Con-
text (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
[66] Forsythe, R., and Lundholm, R. (1990). Information Aggregation in an Experimental
Market. Econometrica 50, 537-568.
[67] Franke, J. and Khlmann, T.M. (1990). Psychologie fr Wirtschaftswissenschaftler
(Landsberg/Lech, Verl. Moderne Industrie).
[68] Frings, S. (2012) Basic Mechanisms in Sensory Systems. in: Sensory perception -
Mind and Matter, Barth, F.G., Giampieri-Deutsch, P., Klein, H.-D. edts. Springer
Wien, 3-21.
[69] G’´achter, S. (2010). (Dis)advantages of Student Subjects: What is Your Research
Question? (German Council for Social and Economic Data (RatSWD)).
[70] Garc´ıa Mira, R., and Real, J.E. (2005). Environmental Perception and Cognitive
Maps. Int. J. Psychol. 40, 1-2.
[71] Gardner, R.C. (1985). Social Psychology and Second Language Learning: The Role
of Attitudes and Motivation (Edward Arnold).
[72] Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1966). Analytical Economics (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Uni-
versity Press).
[73] Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1999). The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (New
York; Cambridge, MA; London, UK, ToExcel; Harvard University Press).
[74] Gigerenzer, G., and Todd, P.M. (1999). Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press).
[75] Gigone, D. and Hastie, R. (1993). The Common Knowledge Effect: Information
Sharing and Group Judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, 959-
974.
253
[76] Goeree, J.K., Palfrey, T.R., Rogers, B.W., and McKelvey, R.D. (2007). Self-
Correcting Information Cascades. Rev. Econ. Stud. 74, 733-762.
[77] Goldstone, R. L. (1998). Perceptual Learning. Annual Review of Psychology, 49,
585-612.
[78] Greenwald, A.G., Albert, R.D., Cullen, D., Love, R., and Have, J.S.W. (1968). Cog-
nitive Learning, Cognitive Response to Persuasion, and Attitude Change. In , (Aca-
demic Press), 147-170.
[79] Grether, D.M., and Plott, C.R. (1979). Economic Theory of Choice and the Prefer-
ence Reversal Phenomenon. Am. Econ. Rev. 69, 623-638.
[80] Grohol, J. (2005). A Picture Share!. Psych Central.
http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2005/08/20/a-picture-share-4/ .
[81] Guala, F. (2005). The Methodology of Experimental Economics (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press).
[82] Guerrero, LK and Floyd, K (2006). Nonverbal Communication in Close Relationships
(Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ).
[83] Gul, F., and Pesendorfer, W. (2003). Self-control, Revealed Preference and Consump-
tion Choice (David K. Levine).
[84] Harless, D.W., and Camerer, C.F. (1994). The Predictive Utility of Generalized Ex-
pected Utility Theories. Econometrica 62, 1251-1289.
[85] Harrison, G.W. (1992). Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply. Am.
Econ. Rev. 82, 1426-1443.
[86] Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York, Wiley).
[87] Heller, M.A., Calcaterra, J.A., Burson, L.L., and Tyler, L.A. (1996). Tactual Pic-
ture Identification by Blind and Sighted People: Effects of Providing Categorical
Information 58, 310-323.
254
[88] Hellwig, M.F. (1980). On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets. J.
Econ. Theory 22, 477-498.
[89] Henrich, J., Heine, S.J., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The Weirdest People in the
World? Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 61-83; discussion 83-135.
[90] Herstein, I.N., and Milnor, J. (1953). An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility.
Econometrica 21, 291-297.
[91] Herz, R. (2008). The Scent of Desire: Discovering our Enigmatic Sense of Smell (New
York, NY, Harper Perennial).
[92] Hey, J.D., and Orme, C. (1994). Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility
Theory Using Experimental Data. Econometrica 62, 1291-1326.
[93] Hicks, J.R. (1956) A Revision of Demand Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
[94] Hilgard, E.R., and Bower, G.H. (1966). Theories of Learning. 3rd. Edition (Appleton-
Century-Crofts, New York).
[95] Hollins, M., and Risner, S.R. (2000). Evidence for the Duplex Theory of Tactile
Texture Perception. Percept. Psychophys. 62, 695-705.
[96] Hollins, M., Faldowski, R., Rao, S., & Young, F. (1993). Perceptual dimensions of
tactile surface texture: A multidimensional scaling analysis. Perception and Psy-
chophysics, 54(6), 697-705.
[97] Holt, C.A. (1986). Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom. Am. Econ.
Rev. 76, 508-515.
[98] Holt, C.A., and Laury, S.K. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. Am. Econ.
Rev. 92, 1644-1655.
[99] Horai, J., Naccari, N., and Fatoullah, E. (1974). The Effects of Expertise and Physical
Attractiveness upon Opinion Agreement and Liking. Sociometry 37, 601-6.
255
[100] Horowitz, J.K. (2006). The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanism is not Necessarily
Incentive Compatible, Even for Non-Random Goods. Econ. Lett. 93, 6-11.
[101] Houston, M.J., Childers, T.L., and Heckler, S.E. (1987). Picture-Word Consistency
and the Elaborative Processing of Advertisements. Journal of Marketing Research
24, 359-369.
[102] Houthakker, H.S. (1950). Revealed Preference and the Utility Function. Econ. New
Ser. 17, 159-174.
[103] Houthakker, H.S. (1961). The Present State of Consumption Theory. Econometrica
29, 704.
[104] Hovland, C.I., Janis I.L., and Kelley, H.H. (1953). Communication and Persuasion
(New Haven, CT, Yale University Press).
[105] Hovland, C.I., Harvey, O.J., and Sherif, M. (1957). Assimilation and Contrast Ef-
fects in Reactions Communication and Attitude Change. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology 55, 244-52.
[106] Hovland, C.I., Janis, I.L.(1959). Personality and Persuasability (New Haven, CT,
Yale University Press).
[107] Hubert, V., Beaunieux, H., Chetelat, G., Platel ,H., Landeau, B., Viader, F., Des-
granges, B., Eustache, F. (2009) Age-Related Changes in the Cerebral Substrates of
Cognitive Procedural Learning. Hum Brain Mapp 30,1374-1386.
[108] Hudspeth, A.J. (2008). Making an Effort to Listen: Mechanical Amplification in
the Ear. Neuron 59, 530-545.
[109] Hulte´n, B., Broweus, N., and Dijk, M.V. (2009). Sensory Marketing (Palgrave
Macmillan).
256
[110] Ichikawa, J. J. & Steup, M. (2012). The Analysis of Knowledge. In Zalta,
E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition). URL
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-analysis/
[111] Irwin, J.R., McClelland, G.H., McKee, M., Schulze, W.D., and Norden, N.E. (1998).
Payoff Dominance Vs. Cognitive Transparency in Decision Making. Econ. Inq. 36,
272-285.
[112] Janis, I.L. and King, B.T. (1954). The Influence of the Role-Playing on Option
Change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 49, 211-8.
[113] Janis, I.L. and Mann L. (1965) Effectiveness of Emotional Role- Playing in Modify-
ing Smoking Habits and Attitudes. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality
1, 84-90.
[114] Jaspers, J.M.F. (1978). The Nature and Measurement of Attitudes. In: H. Tajfel and
C. Fraser (Eds.), Introducing Social Psychology, 256-76. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
[115] Kahn, B.E., and Isen, A.M. (1993). The Influence of Positive Affect on Aariety
Seeking Among Safe, Enjoyable Products. J. Consum. Res. 20, 257-270.
[116] Kahneman, D., and Snell, J. (2006). Predicting a Changing Taste: Do People Know
What They Will Like? Juornal Behav. Decis. Mak. 5, 187-200.
[117] Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., and Thaler, R.H. (1990). Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. J. Polit. Econ. 98, 1325-1348.
[118] Kahneman, D., Ritov, I., and Schkade, D. (1999). Economic preferences or attitude
expressions?: An analysis of dollar responses to public issues. J. Risk Uncertain JRU
13, 203-235.
[119] Kandel, E. R., Kupferman, I., and Iverson, S. (2000) Learning and Memory. In: E.R.
Kandel, J.H. Schwartz, and T. M. Jessell (eds.) Principles of Neural Science,1227-
1246 (New York, McGraw-Hill).
257
[120] Karni, A., and Sagi, D. (1991). Where Practice Makes Perfect in Texture Discrimi-
nation: Evidence for Primary Visual Cortex Plasticity. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 88,
4966-4970.
[121] Karni, E., and Safra, Z. (1987). Preference Reversal and the Observability of Pref-
erences by Experimental Methods. Econometrica 55, 675-685.
[122] Katz, D. (1989). The World of Touch. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. (original published
in 1925).
[123] Katzner 89 Katzner, D. W. (1989). Attitudes, Rationality and Consumer Demand.
In: Kregel, J.A. (Ed.), Inflation and Income Distribution in Capitalist Crisis. Essays
in Memory of Sidney Weintraub (New York, New York University Press).
[124] Keller, L.R., Zegal, U., and Wang, T. (1993). The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mech-
anism and Utility Theories: Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Observations.
Theory Decis. 34, 83-97.
[125] Kisielius, J., and Sterhal, B. (1986). Examining the Vividness Controversy: An
Availability-Valence Interpretation. Journal of Consumer Research 12, 418-431.
[126] Kisielius, J., and Sternhal, B. (1984). Detecting and Explaining Vividness Effects
in Attitudinal Judgment. Journal of Marketing Research 21, 54-64.
[127] Klatzky, RL., Lederman, SJ., and Reed, C. (1987), There’s More to Touch That
Meets the Eye: Relative Salience of Object Dimensions for Touch With and Without
Vision. J. Exp. Psych. General 116, 356-369.
[128] Koundouri, P., Nauges, C., and Tzouvelekas, V. (2006). Technology Adoption under
Production Uncertainty: Theory and Application to Irrigation Technology. Am. J.
Agric. Econ. 88, 657-670.
[129] Kraemer, C., Noeth, M., and Weber, M. (2006). Information Aggregation with
Costly Information and Random Ordering: Experimental Evidence. J. Econ. Behav.
Organ. 59, 423-432.
258
[130] Kreps, D.M. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press).
[131] Krishna, A. (2009). Sensory Marketing: Research on the Sensuality of Products
(Psychology Press).
[132] LaBerge, D. (2002). Attentional Control: Brief and Prolonged. Psychological Re-
search 66, 220-233.
[133] Ladenburg, L., and Bye Olsen, S. (2010). Gender Anomalies in Stated Preference
Surveys: Are Biases Really Gender Dependent? Institute of Food and Resource
Economics University of Copenhagen
[134] Lamm, H., and Trommsdorff, G. (1973). Group Versus Individual Performance on
Tasks Requiring Ideational Proficiency (brainstorming): A review. Eur. J. Soc. Psy-
chol. 3, 361-388.
[135] Lange, C., Martin, F., Chabanet, C., Combris, P. and Issanchou S. (2002) Impact of
the Information Provided to Consumers on Their Willingness to Pay for Champagne:
Comparison with Hedonic Scores. Food Qual. Pref. 13,597-608.
[136] Laroche, M., Papadopoulos, N., Heslop, L., and Bergeron, J. (2003). Effects of
Subcultural Differences on Country and Product Evaluations. J. Consum. Behav. 2,
232-247.
[137] Lazo, J., McLelland, G. and Schulze, W. (1992). What is the future worth? An
Experimental Examination of Rates of Time Preference. Department of Economics,
University of Colorado, Boulder, mimeo, 22 October.
[138] Leventhal, H. (1970). Findings and Theory in the Study of Fear Communications.
In: L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology 5, 119-186.
(New York, Academic Press).
[139] Levin, I. P., & Gaeth, G. J. (1988). Framing of Attribute Information Before and
After Consuming the Product. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 374-378.
259
[140] Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B. & Phillips, L.D. (1982). Calibration of Subjective
Probabilities: The State of The Art Up to 1980. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, &
A. Tversky (Eds.). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York,
Cambridge University Press) 306-334.
[141] Likert, R. (1932). A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes. Archives of Psy-
chology 140, 44-53.
[142] Lindstrøm, M. (2005). Brand Sense: How to Build Powerful Brands Through Touch,
Taste, Smell, Sight and Sound (Kogan Page Publishers).
[143] Lohmann, S. (2011). The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91. World Polit. 47, 42-101.
[144] Loomes, G., and Sugden, R. (1995). Incorporating a Stochastic Element into Deci-
sion Theories. Eur. Econ. Rev. 39, 641-648.
[145] Luce, R. D. (1959/2005) Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. (New
York, Wiley, Reprinted by Dover Publications).
[146] Luce, R. D., and Suppes, P. (1965). Preference, utility, and subjective probability. In
R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.) Handbook of Mathematical Psychology,
Vol. III (New York, Wiley) 252-410.
[147] Maas, A. and Clark, R.D. (1984). Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen years of
Minority Influence Research. Psychological Bulletin 95, 428-450.
[148] Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., and Rustichini, A. (2006). Dynamic Variational
Preferences (Collegio Carlo Alberto).
[149] MacInnis, D. and Price, L. (1987). The Role of Imagery in Information Processing:
Review and Extensions. Journal of Consumer Research, 13(March), 473-491.
260
[150] Magnusson, M. K., Avrola, A., Hursti Koivisto U. K., Aberg, L, & Sjoden, P. O.
(2003) Choice of Organic Foods is Related to Perceived Consequences for Human
Health and to Environmentally Friendly Behavior. Appetite, 40, 109-117.
[151] Manley, G and Kppl, C. (1998). Phylogenetic Development of the Cochlea and Its
Innervation. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 8, 468-474.
[152] Manley, G and Ladher, R. (2007). Phylogeny and Evolution of Ciliated Mechano-
Receptor Cells. In: Hoy R., Sheperd G., Bausbaum A., Kaneko, A., and Westheimer
G .(eds). The Senses: a Comprehensive Reference. (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 1-34.
[153] Manley, G. (2012). Vertebrate Hearing: Origin, Evolution and Functions. In: Barth,
F., Giamperi-Deutsch, P., Klein H. (eds) Sensory Perception: Mind and Matter.
Springer Verlag. Wien. 23-40.
[154] Mari, L. (2007), Measurability, in Boumans, M. (ed.) Measurement in Economics.
London, Elsevier.
[155] Marschak, J. (1950). Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Util-
ity. Econ. J. Econ. Soc. Intern. Soc. Adv. Econ. Theory Its Relat. Stat. Math., 18
111-141.
[156] Marshall, A. (1920). Principles of Economics, 8th ed., (London, Macmillan).
[157] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., and Green, J.R. (1995). Microeconomic theory
(New York, Oxford University Press).
[158] McFadden, D. and Richter, K. (1991). Stochastic Rationality and Revealed Stochas-
tic Preference., in J. Chipman, D. McFadden, K. Richter (eds) Preferences, Uncer-
tainty, and Rationality (Westview Press), 161-186.
[159] McGuire, W.J.(1969). The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change. In: Lindzey,
G. and Aronson, E. (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. III. (Cambridge,
Mass.), 163-314
261
[160] Menges, R. (1996). Unsichere Prferenzen und der adaptive Gebrauch von Informa-
tionsstrategien: eine experimentelle Untersuchung am Beispiel ”Kaffee”(Neuried, Ars
Una).
[161] Milgram, S., Mann, L., & Harter, S. (1965). The Lost - Letter Technique:A Tool of
Social Research. Public Opinion Quarterly 29 (3), 437.
[162] Miller, G.A. (1956). The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits
on Our Capacity for Processing Information. Psychol. Rev. 63, 81-97.
[163] Milliman, R.E. (1982). Using Background Music to Affect the Behavior of Super-
market Shoppers. J. Mark. 46, 86.
[164] Mombarerts, P. (2006). Axonal Wiring in The Mouse Olfactory System. Ann Rev
Cell Biol 22, 713-737.
[165] Moray, N. (1993). Designing for attention. Atten. Sel. Aware. Control Tribute Don-
ald Broadbent, 111-134.
[166] Myers, D.G., and Lamm, H. (1976). The group polarization phenomenon. Psychol.
Bull. 83, 602-627.
[167] Nemeth, C. (1986). Differential Contributions of Minority and Majority Influence.
Psychological Review 93, 1-10.
[168] Nicholson, M. (2003). 13 Ways of Looking at Images: The Logic of Visualization in
Literature and Society (Beverly Hills, CA, Red Heifer Press).
[169] Norman, R (1976). When what is Said is Important: A Comparison of expert and
Attractive Sources. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 12, 294-300.
[170] Nunamaker, J.F., Dennis, A.R., Valacich, J.S., Vogel, D., and George, J.F. (1991).
Electronic Meeting Systems. Commun ACM 34, 40-61.
[171] O’Connor, T. (2013). Free Will. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N.
Zalta, ed.
262
[172] OECD (2008). Women and Men in OECD Countries.
[173] Osgood, C.E., Suci, G.I., and Tannenbaum, P.H. (1957). The Measurement of Mean-
ing. Urbana. IL, University of Illinois Press.
[174] Pavlos, P., Vasilios, N., Antonia, A., Dimitrios, K., Georgios, K., and Georgios, A.
(2009). Evaluation of Young Smokers and Non-Smokers with Electrogustometry and
Contact Endoscopy. BMC Ear Nose Throat Disord. 9, 9.
[175] Payne, J.W., Bettman, J.R., Coupey, E., and Johnson, E.J. (1992). A constructive
process view of decision making: Multiple strategies in judgment and choice. Acta
Psychol. (Amst.) 80, 107-141.
[176] Peck, J., and Childers, T.L. (2006). If I touch it I have to have it: Individual and
environmental influences on impulse purchasing. J. Bus. Res. 59, 765-769.
[177] Peck, J., and Wiggins, J. (2006). It Just Feels Good: Customers’ Affective Response
to Touch and Its Influence on Persuasion. J. Mark. 70, 56-69.
[178] Perlovsky, L. (2011). Language and Cognition Interaction Neural Mechanisms. Com-
put. Intell. Neurosci. 2011, 1-13.
[179] Pesendorfer, W., and Swinkels, J.M. (1997). The Loser’s Curse and Information
Aggregation in Common Value Auctions. Econometrica 65, 1247-1282.
[180] Peter, J.P. and Olson, J.C. (1993). Consumer Behavior, 3rd ed. Homewood, IL,
Irwin.
[181] Petty, R., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and Persuasion: Central and
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change (New York, Springer-Verlag).
[182] Petty, R., Cacioppo, J.T., Strathman, A.J. and Priester, J.R. (1994). To think or
not to think. Exploring two routes to persuasion. In Shavitt, S. and Brock, T. C.
(eds), Persuasion. Psychological Insights and Perspectives (Allyn & Bacon, Boston,
MA).
263
[183] Petty, R.E. and Wegener, D.T. (1998). Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persua-
sion Variables. In: Gilbert, D.T., Fiske, S.T., and Lindzey, G. (Eds.), The Handbook
of Social Psychology 4 (Mc Graw-Hill, Boston).
[184] Picard, R. W., Papert, S., Bender, W., Blumberg, B., Breazeal, C., Cavallo, D.,
Machover, T., Resnick, M., Roy, D., and Strohecker, C. (2004). Affective learning -
a manifesto. BT Technology Journal 22 (4), 253-269.
[185] Pickles, J. (2008). An introduction to the Physiology of hearing. Third Edition.
Emerald Group Publishing (Bingley, UK).
[186] Piketty, T. (1999). Attitudes toward income inequality in France: Do people really
disagree? (CEPREMAP).
[187] Plott, C.R., and Sunder, S. (1988). Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of
Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets. Econometrica 56, 1085-1118.
[188] Rabin, M., (1998). Psychology and Economics. Journal of Economic Literature
XXXVI, 11-46.
[189] Recanzone, G.H., Merzenich, M.M., Jenkins, W.M., Grajski, K.A.,and Dinse, H.R.
(1992). Topographic Reorganization of the Hand Representation in Cortical Area 3b
of Owl Monkeys Trained in a Frequency-Discrimination Task. Journal of Neurophys-
iology 67, 1031-1056.
[190] Rolls,E.T. (2005) Emotion Explained (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
[191] Ronis, D. L., Yates, J. F. and Kirscht, J. P. (1989). Attitudes, Decisions, and Habits
as Determinants of Repeated Behavior. In Pratkanis, A. R., Breckler, S. J. and
Greenwald, A. G. (eds), Attitude Structure and Function (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ).
[192] Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Gen. 104, 192-233.
264
[193] Rozin, P. (1982). ”Taste-Smell Confusions” and the Duality of the Olfactory Sense.
Percept. Psychophys. 31, 397-401.
[194] Rutstro¨m, E.E. (1998). Home-Grown Values and Incentive Compatible Auction De-
sign. Int. J. Game Theory 27, 427-441.
[195] Saaty, T.L. (1980). The Analytic Hierarchy Process: Planning, Priority Setting,
Resource Allocation (McGraw-Hill).
[196] Samuelson, P.A. (1953). Prices of Factors and Goods in General Equilibrium. Review
of Economic Studies 21,1-20. Reprinted in ed. JE Stiglitz (1966), 888-908.
[197] Samuelson, P.A. (1938). A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior. Eco-
nomica 5, 61-71.
[198] Samuelson, P.A. (1948). Economics: An Introductory Analysis (New York, McGraw-
Hill).
[199] Samuelson, P.A. (1950). The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory. Econ. New
Ser. Vol. 17, 355-385.
[200] Sarter, M., Gehring, W. J., & Kozak, R. (2006). More Attention Must be Paid: The
neurobiology of Attentional Effort. Brain Research Reviews, 51,145-160.
[201] Schiffman, H.R. (2000). Sensation and perception (New York [u.a.], Wiley).
[202] Schunk, D.H. (1991). Self-Efficacy and Academic Motivation. Educ. Psychol. 26,
207-231.
[203] Scott, Carol A., & Yalch, Richard F.(1980). Consumer Response to Initial Product
Trial: A Bayesian Analysis. Journal of Consumer Research 7, 32-41.
[204] Sen, A.K. (1982). Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Basil Blackwell).
[205] Sengupta, Jaideep and Gerald J. Gorn (2002), ’Absence Makes the Mind Grow
Sharper: The Effect of Element Omission on Subsequent Recall,’ Journal of Market-
ing Research 39 (May), 186-201.
265
[206] Shannon, C.E. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication (University of
ILLINOIS Press).
[207] Shaw, M.E., Robbin, R., and Belser, J.R. (1981). Group Dynamics: The Psychology
of Small Group Behavior (McGraw-Hill).
[208] Shipp, S. (2004). The Brain Circuitry of Attention. TRENDS Cogn. Sci. 8, 223-230.
[209] Shogren, J.F., S. Chob, S., Koo, C., List, J., Park, C., Polo, P. and Wilhelmi, R.
(2001). Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA. Resource and
Energy Economics 23, 97-109.
[210] Simon, H.A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Q. J. Econ. 69, 99.
[211] Simon, H.A. (1956). Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment. Psychol.
Rev. 63, 129-138.
[212] Simon, H.A. (1974). How Big Is a Chunk? By Combining Data from Several Ex-
periments, A Basic Human Memory Unit Can be Identified and Measured. Science
183, 482-488.
[213] Simon, H.A. (1986). Rationality in Psychology and Economics. J. Bus. 59, s209-s224.
[214] Simons D.J., Wang R.X.F., Roddenberry D.(2002). Object Recognition is Mediated
by Extraretinal Information. Perception and Psychophysics 64, 521-530.
[215] Sippel, R. (1997). An Experiment on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour.
Econ. J. 107, 1431-1444.
[216] Skinner, B. (1953). Science and Human Behavior (New York, MacMillan).
[217] Sloan, F., Culyer, A., and Newhouse, J. (2000). Not-for-Profit Ownership and Hos-
pital Behaviour. In: Handbook of Health Economics, ed. A. Culyer and J. Newhouse
(Amsterdam, Elsevier Science BV).
266
[218] Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preference. American Psychologist, 50, 364-
371.
[219] Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B. (1988) Decision Making. In Atkinson, R.,
Herrnstein, R., Lindzey, G., and Luce, R. Steven’s Handbook of Experimental Psy-
chology Vol 2. (New York, NY, John Wiley and Sons).
[220] Small, D.M., and Prescott, J. (2005). Odor/Taste Integration and the Perception of
Flavor. Exp. Brain Res. Exp. Hirnforsch. Expe´rimentation Ce´rebrale 166, 345-357.
[221] Small, D.M., Zatorre, R.J., and Jones-Gotman, M. (2001). Increased Intensity Per-
ception of Aversive Taste Following Right Anteromedial Temporal Lobe Removal in
Humans. Brain 124, 1566-1575.
[222] Smith, Robert E. and William R. Swinyard (1983). Attitude-Behavior Consistency:
The Impact of Product Trial Versus Advertising. Journal of Marketing Research, 20
(August), 257-267.
[223] Smith, V.L. (1982). Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science. Am. Econ.
Rev. 72, 923-955.
[224] Sniezek, J. A., & Buckley, T. (1995). Cueing and cognitive conflict in judge-advisor
decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62(2), 159-
174.
[225] Snyder, C.R., and Fromkin, H.L. (1980). Attitudes and Beliefs as Uniqueness At-
tributes. In Uniqueness, (Springer US), 145-162.
[226] Soars, B. (2009). Driving Sales Through Shoppers’ Sense of Sound, Sight, Smell and
Touch. Int. J. Retail Distrib. Manag. 37, 286-298.
[227] Spence, H.E., Engel, J.F., and Blackwell, R.D. (1970). Perceived Risk in Mail-Order
and Retail Store Buying. J. Mark. Res. 7, 364-369.
267
[228] Srinivasan, T.C. (1987). An Integrative Approach to Consumer Choice. Adv. Con-
sum. Res. 14, 96-100.
[229] Starmer, C., and Sugden, R. (1989). Violations of the Independence Axiom in Com-
mon Ratio Problems: An Experimental Test of Some Competing Hypotheses. Ann.
Oper. Res. 19, 79-102.
[230] Stasser G., Taylor L. A., & Hanna C. (1989). Information Sampling in Structured
Discussions of Three- and Six-Person Groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 57, 57-67.
[231] Stasser, G., Taylor, L.A., and Hanna, C. (1989). Information Sampling in Structure
and Unstructured Discussions of Three and Six persons Groups. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 57, 67-78.
[232] Stefani, G., Romano, D., Cavicchi, A. (2006). Consumer Expectations, Liking and
Willingness to Pay for Specialty Foods: Do Sensory Characteristics Tell the Whole
Story? Food Quality and Preference, 17, 53-62.
[233] Stevens, S.S., and Atkinson, R.C. (1988). Steven’s Handbook of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning and Cognition (Wiley).
[234] Stewart, N., Chater, N., Stott, H. P., Reimers, S. (2003). Prospect Relativity: How
Choice Options Influence Decision Under Risk. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 132, 23-46.
[235] Stewart, T. A. (2000). Intellectual Capital- The New wealth of Organizations (Lon-
don, Nicholas Brealey).
[236] Stewart, T.A. (1997). Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organizations (New
York, Doubleday / Currency).
[237] Swinkels, J.M., and Pesendorfer, W. (2000). Efficiency and Information Aggregation
in Auctions. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 499-525.
268
[238] Syll, L.P. (2013). Paul Samuelson and Revealed Preferences - Nothing Lost, Nothing
Gained.
[239] Tesfatsion, L., Judd, K.L., Intriligator, M.D., and Arrow, K.J. (2006). Handbook
of Computational Economics, Volume 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics, 2
(North Holland).
[240] Tolman, E.C. (1948). Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men. Psychol. Rev. 55, 189-208.
[241] Triandis, H.C. (1977). Interpersonal behavior (Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.).
[242] Triandis, H.C. (1980). Handbook of Cross-cultural Psychology: Triandis, H. C. and
Brislin, R. W., editors. Social psychology (Allyn and Bacon).
[243] Unnava, H.R., Agarwal, S., and Haugtvedt, C.P. (1996). Interactive Effects of Pre-
sentation Modality and Message-Generated Imagery on Recall of Advertising Infor-
mation. J. Consum. Res. 23, 81-88.
[244] Varian, H.R. (2006). Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (New
York, W.W. Norton & Co.).
[245] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. 2nd. edn. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).
[246] Von Winterfeldt, D., and Edwards, W. (1986). Decision Analysis and Behavioral
Research (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], New York, Cambridge University Press).
[247] Weick, K.E. (1988). Enacted Sense-Making in Crisis Situations. Journal of Manage-
ment Studies 25, 305-317.
[248] Weick, K.E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations (SAGE).
[249] Weinrich, P. (2012) Calibration. In Henk de Regt, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir
Okasha, eds., EPSA. Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam 2009, 415-425 (Dordrecht,
Springer).
269
[250] Wicklung, R.A. and Brehm, J.W. (1976). Perspective on Cognitive Dissonance
(Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum).
[251] Witt (2001). Learning to Consume, A Theory of Wants and The Growth of The
Demand. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 11, 23-36.
[252] Wong, S. (2006). The Foundations of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory:
a Study by the Method of Rational Reconstruction (London; New York, Routledge).
[253] Zajonc, R.B. (2001). Mere Exposure: A Gateway to the Subliminal. In: Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 224-228.
[254] Zampini, M., and Spence, C. (2004). The Role of Auditory Cues in Modulating the
Perceived Crispness and Staleness of Potato Chips. J. Sens. Stud. 19, 347-363.
[255] Zhao, J. and Kling, C. (2001). A New Explanation for the WTP/WTA Disparity.
Economics Letters 73, 293-300.
[256] Zhao, J. and Kling, C. (2004). Willingness to Pay, Compensating Variation, and the
Cost of Commitment. Economic Inquiry 42, 503-517.
270
